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Abstract 
This thesis aims to examine an intellectual background of formation and development of 
collective bargaining between 1860 and 1930. In the voluntary framework of collective 
bargaining trade unions were able to negotiate trade and welfare issues with their employers 
on equal terms. Its institutional formation was secured by the trade union laws of the 1870s. To 
look into reasons behind its legal composition suggests an anomalous discourse of political 
economy in the mid-Victorian period, which embodied reciprocal and self-less public virtues of 
liberalism in contrast to its individualistic and optimistic proposition of free trade developed 
after the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. The cooperation between official and popular 
economic culture ensured the rule of law in free trade economy, when the voluntary operation 
of collective bargaining was successful in identifying the public interest by seeking market 
equilibrium between the interest of producers and that of consumers. However, Britain’s 
voluntary market culture of free trade faced a severe challenge from the growth of corporate 
capitalism. Exigencies of the latter turned the free operation of collective bargaining into a 
stalemate and extracted grave concerns from liberal intellectuals, who lamented ongoing 
separation between moral and economic law in the principle of political economy. In light of the 
public interest, both New Liberal and Conservative intellectuals developed their own visions of 
collectivist society. Focusing on their usages of the liberal concept of public opinion, this thesis 
argues that political economy of historical economists, by introducing economic organisation of 
labour as the means to identify the interest of consumers with producers, suggested pluralist 
solutions to make a reconciliation with the advancement of market economy. The end of 
liberalism was heralded, when revival of the progressive movement in the 1920s was oriented 
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An incorporation not only renders them necessary, but makes the act of the majority 
binding upon the whole. In a free trade an effectual combination cannot be established 
but by the unanimous consent of every single trader, and it cannot last longer than every 
single trader continues the same mind. The majority of a corporation can enact a bye-
law with proper penalties, which will limit the competition more effectually and more 
durably than any voluntary combination whatever.  
The pretence that corporations are necessary for the better government of the trade is 
without any foundation. The real and effectual discipline which is exercised over a 
workman is not that of his corporation, but that of his customers. It is the fear of losing 
their employment which restrains his frauds and corrects his negligence. An exclusive 
corporation necessarily weakens the force of this discipline. A particular set of workmen 
must then be employed, let them behave well or ill. It is upon this account that in many 
large incorporated towns no tolerable workmen are to be found, even in some of the most 
necessary trades. If you have your work tolerably executed, it must be done in the suburbs, 
where the workmen, having no exclusive privilege, have nothing but their character to 
depend upon, and you must then smuggle it into the town as well as you can.1  
 
 
This thesis aims to rebuild the history of collective bargaining in Britain from 1860 to 
1930. From the establishment of the boards of conciliation and arbitration in the 
Birmingham hosiery industry, the scheme of collective bargaining had an enormous 
impact not only on economic life of Britons, but also on national politics. Its institutional 
arrangements, in which representatives of employers and workers sat side by side with 
each other and discussed trade issues over a round-table on a voluntary basis, did not 
appear by accident in history. There was an underlying movement of liberalism, which 
developed in a distinct form in the isle. Collecting ideas about collective bargaining 
during the period, the thesis attempts to constellate them around the interacting discourse 
of political economy. It did not receive persistent reception, but variable in periods and 
 
1 A. Smith, Wealth of Nations, London, 1999 (first pub. 1776), p.233 
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not in the least moved into the mainstream by attracting attentions of political or industrial 
elites or wider popular discourse than reformists. However, when the working-class right 
of freedom of contract was granted, freedom of collective bargaining became a symbolic 
virtue as the basis of civil society in the Victorian period. The salutary mood of co-
operation between capital and labour invoked public virtue of trust, but, as a rule, its 
raison d’etre did not last for an infinite time. Its changing economic role and political 
meanings, thereafter, provided platforms of varied liberal ideas, some of which were so 
influential as to reinvent the tradition and arrive at different understandings of utilities of 
collective bargaining. To dig out its root-cause is tantamount to recontextualization of 
liberalism, which was obscured in the process, and to reformation of Britain’s market 
culture of production and consumption. 
On the establishment of free collective bargaining the intellectual traditions have weaved 
each historiography and examined its outcome in the market economy. The rule of the 
capitalist market system has long been central to their visions and understandings, since  
the procedure of collective bargaining was considered to be a vital for its function. From 
Fabianism to and beyond Oxford School history, historians of trade unionism saw 
unbridled operation of collective bargaining as the symbol of liberal economy, by which 
individuals could maximize their interests through their exchanges of property and, in 
consequence, undersell the residuum. This thesis aims to challenge these views based on 
the market orthodoxy by scoping out a broader and heterodox spectrum of Britain’s 
contemporary intellectual outlook on market economy. The trajectory of intellectual 
discourse of political economy did not suggest the market doctrine simply as the 
economic canon to accumulate wealth of nations, but a deistic principle to see an 
individual as a moral agency in economic activities. Reid’s work on trade unionism 
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certainly injects a consideration of ‘ethical and religious’ sentiment of Victorian 
liberalism into historiography of collective bargaining.2 Nonetheless, by following the 
intellectual experience underlying the institutional growth of free collective bargaining 
this thesis reveals that separation between the economic and moral law in intellectual 
history of political economy resulted in attaching bilateral meanings to freedom of 
collective bargaining: in the age of modern corporate capitalism free collective bargaining 
connoted contradiction of freedom of individuals with the public interest.  
When the common law tradition, which had safeguarded individual liberty and local 
democracy since the Puritan revolution, embraced a juridical proposition of collective 
liberty, a paradox was posed by the progressive culture of Protestant Christianity, which 
Reid identifies as trade unionists’ motif of co-operation. Their demand for free collective 
bargaining under the liberal order of free trade was enmeshed in accumulation of the 
national interest on contrary to the communal interests. Without seeking to sanction a 
pluralist form of collective liberty, free competition in a collectivist society led to a 
decline in the mid-Victorian public virtue of trust, which had reconciled individual liberty 
with the public interest under freedom of collective bargaining. Rather than making a 
consensus with the interest of consumers, operation of collective bargaining in corporate 
economy functioned as a complementary scheme to promote material welfare of sectional 
individuals with failure to hold back expansion of market economy. Dissection of the 
discourse of political economy discloses reasons behind the institutional progress of 
collective bargaining, in which moral order was overshadowed by the growth of the 
 
2 A. Reid, ‘Old Unionism Reconsidered’, in E. Biagini & A. Reid (eds.), Currents of Radicalism, 
Popular Radicalism, Organized Labour and Party Politics in Britain, 1850-1914, Cambridge, 




economic law of national economy. By shedding a light not only on how contemporary 
intellectuals sought to react to changing economic environment, but also on Britain’s 
characteristic development of corporate culture in holding off incorporation of industrial 
relations into the political arena, this thesis argues that the voluntary culture of the 
working class was no longer raison d’etre of collective bargaining, but corporate interests 
took over it in its process. Giving legitimacy to free trade economy, the liberal context of 
political economy had acknowledged the popular economic culture. This juxtaposition 
between official and popular culture of free trade ended up in political dilemma, when 
there was an increased demand for the formation of corporate economy owing to severe 
economic competition giving rise to a political question of limited liability.     
An original and unique characteristic of collective bargaining was its voluntary system to 
meet and seek solution of industrial issues between capital and labour. This attitude to 
avoid intervention from authorities was underpinned by Britons’ high confidence in 
efficacy of the market principle, which was authorized and developed in the tradition of 
political economy. Since the publication of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations, the 
discourse of political economy had been a driving force to curtail the mercantile power 
and to establish Britain’s distinctive feature of the liberal relationship between the state 
and market, which was evinced by its advancement in the laissez-faire economy.3 The 
deistic principle inculcated market economy to set natural order emancipating men from 
obstacles to natural liberty and such experience was reviewed as ‘radical solvents of the 
 
3 On the intellectual formation of political economy, see, Istovan Hont, Jealousy of Trade, 
Cambridge, 2005. E. Rothschild, Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the 
Enlightenment, Boston, 2001. R. Teichgraeber, ‘Free Trade’ and Moral Philosophy, Rethinking 
the Sources of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations,  Durham, 1986. D. Winch, Riches and Poverty, 
an intellectual history of political economy in Britain, 1750-1834, Cambridge, 1996. 
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old consensus, more akin to conversion experience’.4 Individual morality was supposed 
to be fostered under the laissez-faire state, in which the tradition of political economy 
provided the intellectual bases of discretion about economic as much as ethical problems 
from abolition of slavery to the repeal of the Corn Laws in the early nineteenth century. 
In scrutinizing the history of collective bargaining, its voluntary institutions were strongly 
tied to contextual developments of political economy, but not applied straightforwardly 
to its deterministic assumption of impersonal market force as a guiding agency of 
collective bargaining. 
British experience of the civil war in the late seventeenth century facilitated Britain’s 
adoption of free trade. As Weber insisted, the Protestant movements called for the 
economic order based on free trade, in which the spirit of capitalism arose from 
spontaneity as long as sprung from the purely religious motives of individuals.5 Once the 
divine right of monarchy gave place to natural liberty, the regime of limited monarchy 
had acted as the fortress of ‘liberal conscience’. The state, successfully incorporating a 
part of commercial interests after 1688, could contain the revival of radical sentiments, 
when the French Revolution reignited the radical idea of popular sovereignty especially 
after Thomas Paine’s publication of The Rights of Man in 1791. Plebeian movements of 
post-Napoleonic war radicalism demanded parliamentary reform, attacking the oligarchic 
 
4 A. Howe, ‘Restoring free trade, 1776-1873’, in O’Brien & Winch (eds.), The Political 
Economy of British Historical Experience, 1688-1914, Oxford, 2002, p.194 
5 ‘The very powerful hostility of public opinion to monopolies, which is characteristic of 
England, originated historically in a combination of the political struggle for power against the 
Crown – the Long Parliament excluded monopolists from its membership – with the ethical 
motives of Puritanism; and the economic interests of the small bourgeois and moderate-scale 
capitalists against the financial magnates in the seventeenth century The Declaration of the 
Army of August 2, 1652, as well the Petition of the Levellers of January 28, 1653 demand, 
besides the abolition of excises, tariffs, and indirect taxes, and the introduction of a single tax on 
estates, above all free trade…’ (M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 
New York, 1992 (first pub.1904).p.259) 
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constitution of the legislative class as immersed in vested interests. 6  The Chartist 
movements inherited values of egalitarian republicanism and their ‘People’s Charter’ was 
centred around the equality of political rights. While reactionary measures reached a peak 
in 1819, when the notorious Six Acts were enacted and the Peterloo massacre took place, 
the laissez-faire regime was not full-fledged autocracy of old corruption by the landed-
aristocracy.7 Progressive policies like reduction of taxes on consumption, introduction of 
income tax and provision of public service including utility supply, gave impression of 
curtailing the fiscal military state and separated the interest of consumers from that of 
producers.8 This resulted in cushioning subversive enthusiasm of radicalism, when the 
working-class radicals found difficulty in gathering popular support for their traditional 
economic programme of the land reform.9  
As the discipline aiming to comprehend rational accumulation of capital, the intellectual 
discourse of political economy gave credence to progressive politics of free trade. Its 
orthodoxy endorsed two leading visions of market economy, both of which shaped free 
trade policies in the early nineteenth century. The Benthamite idea of utilitarianism 
 
6 On post-war radicalism, see, A. Burns & J. Innes (eds.), Rethinking the Age of Reform: Britain 
1780-1850, Cambridge, 2003. J. Epstein, Radical Expression: Political Language, Ritual and 
Symbol in England, 1790-1850, Oxford, 1994. C. Parolin, Radical Spaces, Venues of popular 
politics in London, 1790-c.1845, Canberra, 2010. I. Prothero, Artisans and Politics in Early 
Nineteenth-Century London. John Gast and His Times, London, 1979.  
7 M. Daunton, State and Market in Victorian Britain, Suffolk, 2008, pp.5-8 
8 On progressive politics in the early nineteenth century, see, B. Hilton, The Age of Atonement: 
The Influence of Evangelicalism on Social and Economic Thought, 1795-1865, Oxford, 1988. P. 
Mandler, Aristocratic Government in the Age of Reform: Whigs and Liberals, 1830-1852, 
Oxford, 1990.  
9 G. Stedman Jones, Languages of Class – Studies in English Working Class History 1832-1982, 
Cambridge, 1983, pp.176-8. On recent historiography regarding Chartism, see, M. Chase, 
Chartism: A New History, Manchester, 2007. C. Frank, Master and Servant Law: Chartists, 
Trade Unionists, Radical Lawyers and the Magistracy in England, 1840-1865, Farnham, 2010. 




proposed that individual morality was enhanced after maximisation of utility – the end of 
human beings was to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. On the other hand, Christian 
political economy reprobated hedonistic egoism of utilitarianism and sought to reconcile 
religion with the growth of scientific approaches. Both frames of mind, intertwined with 
one another, had upheld the market principle of laissez-faire individualism and revamped 
the mercantile or physiocratic models of economic thoughts. Their difference lay in their 
portrayals of the role of divinity in the market economy, which were founded on two 
contrasting, but influential principles of political economy – Ricardian and Malthusian 
schools of thoughts. While the former adopted technical and material-based arguments of 
economic man, employing utilitarian concepts of ‘pains of labour against the pleasures of 
profit’, the latter’s physiocratic understandings of natural order maintained concepts of 
agrarian economy such as underconsumption and a glut.10 Christian political economists, 
affected by Malthusian theories of stationary state, developed the evangelical model of 
free trade, which laid greater emphasis on providentialism. Based on a notion that a 
natural or efficient level of consumption would be restored without stimulations on 
production, evangelicals saw trade depressions and financial crisis as the ‘Providential 
check’ for injustice of capital. Hence, with the fatalistic attitude of the Christian tenet of 
Atonement, they expected the market operation to provide individuals with educational 
opportunities of spontaneous salvation.11  
Rather than Ricardian model of individualism, whose sanguine nature of utilitarianism 
 
10 On recent Malthus-Ricardo controversy, see, D. Aronoff, A Theory of Accumulation and 
Secular Stagnation: A Malthusian Approach to Understanding a Contemporary Malaise, 
Basingstoke, 2016. D. Winch, Malthus: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford, 2013. F. Maclachlan, 
‘The Ricardo-Malthus debate on underconsumption: A case study in economic conversation’, 
History of Political Economy, vol.31, 1999 
11 Hilton, op.cit., pp.25-70 
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affirmed the prospect of economic expansion, this retributive model of evangelicalism 
was influential in free trade visions of the landed and metropolitan elites, who turned to 
the ideological plank of liberal Tories in the 1820s, and in those of following Liberal 
Peelites.12  In contrast to the prospect of Christian political economists like Thomas 
Chalmers, who believed that the increased commercial activities would raise mutual 
interdependence among the people, they entered into a moral impasse, when their 
Providential order created the paradoxical social condition, in which existence of poverty 
persisted in coincidence with more avaricious attitudes of individuals.13 Accordingly, the 
binary discourse of political economy tilted towards more optimistic and growth-oriented 
mindset of utilitarianism, which relied on the state in rewarding and punishing individuals. 
Cobden’s rejection of retributive evangelicalism with the cosmopolitan language of free 
trade marked the historical watershed. The principle of free trade advocated by the Anti-
Corn Law League embraced Ricardian industrialist languages of more prosperity and 
happiness by capital accumulation and international division of labour. In the light of 
departure from the providential rule, Howe has argued that this transition of the meaning 
of free trade turned out to be ‘a symbol of new community of interest and a new 
understanding of the nation itself’.14 Instead of fatalism of evangelicals, this Christian 
doctrine was ordained to unify and moralize ‘mankind’ by commercial activities.15  
It was during the embryonic stage of Cosmopolitan vision of global civilization that the 
voluntary framework of collective bargaining came to the fore as the means to meet 
producers’ demand for equality before the law within the consumerist politics of free 
 
12 Howe, op.cit., p.198 
13 G. Searle, Morality and the Market in the Victorian Britain, Oxford, 1998, pp.8-26 
14 A. Howe, Free Trade and Liberal England 1846-1946, Oxford, 1997, p.36 
15 Hilton, op.cit., pp.246-7 
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trade. In the backdrop of this institutionalisation of economic subculture of producers, 
there was working-class acceptance of the discourse of political economy.16 While the 
Painite tradition of republican radicalism was still upheld as the democratic spectrum 
among the working classes, who fought for the natural right of labour as the fundamental 
source of property against the corrupt system of monopoly in land and capital ownership, 
impracticality of their rhetoric of land reform emasculated by progressive politics 
necessarily turned them to seek a more acceptable form of a utilitarian solution of co-
operation. In particular, Ricardian conversion from physiocratic doctrine to industrial 
capitalism gave grounds for reception of political economy at the grassroots. It offered to 
radicals who were frustrated by laissez-faire attitudes of the state different prospects of 
economic rationalisation by more practical and dissident discourse of political economy. 
They weaved its context to challenge the orthodox accounts of the market principle and 
seek social institutions to amend the situation, in which landlords and capitalist acted as 
unproductive parasites on labour. 
Declining the classical orthodoxy of political economy, in which the harmonious efficacy 
was secured by the divine rule of market economy, radicals concerned themselves in 
combining industrial disciplines with scientific enlightenment. Radical political 
economists like Thomas Hodskin, William Thompson and J.F. Bray developed more 
comprehensive understandings of political economy by taking account of politics of 
distribution of wealth beside analyses of productivity of capital, which was later shared 
by radical leaders and led to lessening of the luddite tradition of devastating machineries. 
 
16 See, M. Berg, The Machinery Question and the Making of Political Economy 1815-1848, 
Cambridge, 1980. N. Thompson, The People’s Science: The Popular Political Economy of 
Exploitation and Crisis, 1816-34, Cambridge, 1984. 
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Furthermore, the Mechanic Institutes, the working-class educational institutions, offered 
more practical and empirical approaches to political economy. Its emphasis on cultural 
and intellectual aspects promoted the idea that education of labour was beneficial for 
capital. In this way, the Institutes prepared crossroads between the popular ‘dismal’ 
principle of political economy and wide-ranging disciplines of science. Berg has argued 
that, implanted ‘respect for laws’, the working-class acceptance of political economy 
fostered the sense of civic virtues shared between industrialists and skilled labour and 
promulgated a view that transformation of industrial system through new inventions and 
discoveries was ‘conducive to harmony and stability’.17  
In particular, Robert Owen, influenced by William Goldwin’s anti-monopolist 
rationalism and Painite radicalism, proposed the social control of industries to regulate 
the providential rule of political economy. Owen did not see political constitution as the 
social evil, but repudiated the system of competition, as he saw the market principle of 
individualism as involving irrational and unnatural deficiency, and upheld the radical 
sentiment that human labour was independent source of wealth and property rather than 
property of commercial classes. To demonstrate this view, the co-operative apparatus was 
imperative for restraint in competition and overproduction. His experiment of the Grand 
National Guild of Builders attempted to achieve shorter working hours and accumulation 
of capital on a communal basis, making use of cumulative productivity raised by 
technological advancement.18 Stedman Jones has argued that Owenism expanded the 
boundary of constitutionalist rhetoric of radicalism, since by attributing cause of social 
evils to an ideological part of human beings, not to political constitution, its employment 
 
17 Berg, op.cit., pp.145-202, 272-6, 284-91 
18 T. Tholfsen, Working Class Radicalism in Mid-Victorian England, London, 1976 p.55 
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of utilitarian aphorism provided popular movement with the ‘rationalist and scientistic 
strand of enlightenment thinking’.19 Instead of boosting free trade like old radicalism, 
Owen’s scheme replaced competition with associations and the latter became 
intermediate platforms between competitive society and individuals, which set up 
foundation of subsequent working class movement of radicalism – trade unionism.20 
The growths of the popular discourse of political economy applied cultural values of 
society to its principles, in which local customs and traditions were reflected in its 
everyday practice. Its changing nature and validity of practical economic knowledge gave 
discretion to the public officials.21 Convergence between official culture of free trade and 
economic subculture of egalitarian radicalism occurred, once the liberal consensus of 
people’s budgets was associated with people’s bread questions. Peel’s total repeal of the 
Corn Laws in 1846 meant his deflection from the ethical belief in the evangelical theology 
and accepted ‘a perception of the moral and material benefits of free international 
exchange’.22 The political convention of paternalism and protectionist economy was no 
longer espoused. Russell’s administration abolished the imperial tariffs on tea, coffee, 
sugar and timber and repealed the Navigation Acts, which protected the shipping. 
Gladstone’s budget of 1853 increased direct taxation on the landed interests and reduced 
a wide range of duties over 600 commodities. In his 1860 budget, despite the public 
spending during the Crimean War, the number of tariffs was shrunk from hundreds to 
 
19 Stedman Jones, op.cit., p.127 
20 Ibid., pp.123-7 
21 F. Trentmann & M. Daunton, ‘Worlds of Political Economy: Knowledge, Practices and 
Contestation’, in Trentmann & Daunton (eds.), Worlds of Political Economy, New York, 2004, 
pp. 3, 7, 18 
22 Howe, op.cit., p.11 
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forty-eight and counterbalanced by imposition of increased direct taxation. 23  The 
advancement of freedom of exchange through a series of consumerist policies curtailed 
vestiges of the fiscal military state and entrenched the liberal consensus of people’s 
budgets, as Gladstone intended to ‘remove from the hands of the state resources …to 
fructify in the pockets of people’.24 Cobden’s peaceful and popular crusade of free trade 
forged the popular identity of free trade and became the ideological bulwark of British 
liberal democracy. In this process, the Painite tradition of republican radicalism was 
associated with the people’s ‘cheap bread’ question, as the working-class radicals 
accepted the principle of free trade as their common interests not only as producers, but 
also as consumers.25 After David Urquhart’s criticism on Whig’s interventionist and 
protectionist diplomacy, they called for fair play of the government, demanding 
accountability and electoral reform. In the paradigm of cosmopolitan model of free trade, 
radicals strived to promote the neutral state as an even-handed guarantor.26 
The Gladstonian Liberal Party became the ideological bulwark of working-class 
independence, when it stood for the cause of co-operation. Liberals like Gladstone, 
Cobden, Bright and John Mill advocated the principle of co-operation to forge the strong 
sense of social solidarity among the poor. Influenced by Owen’s experiment, their 
predilection for co-operative associations was based on their belief that mutual 
 
23 Cf. H. Matthew, ‘Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Policy of Mid-Victorian Budgets’, Historical 
Journal, vol.22, 1979 
24 Howe, op.cit., pp.39-68, 86-95, quotation from pp.67-8 
25 B. Harrison & P. Hollis, ‘Chartism, Liberalism and the life of Robert Lowery’, English 
Historical Review, Vol.82, 1967, pp.503-505, 523-30. On consumerist voice from working class 
radicals, see, M. Daunton, & M. Hilton (eds.), The Politics of Consumption: material culture 
and citizenship in Europe and America, Oxford, 2001. P. Gurney, Wanting and Having: Popular 
Politics and Liberal Consumerism in England, 1830-1870, Manchester, 2015.  
26 M. Taylor, ‘The old radicalism and the new: David Urquhart and the politics of opposition, 
1832-1867’, in Biagini & Reid (eds.), op.cit., pp.40-3 
13 
 
relationship between ‘official’ and ‘popular economic culture’ would foster ‘a general 
harmony in which the greatest good of all would be the interest and care of all’. Hence, 
Biagini has argued that liberal democracy was accredited, when the co-operative tradition 
pulled down the master-servant relationship in the industrial world.27 This party’s motto 
was exhibited in a series of trade union acts in the early 1870s, which acknowledged trade 
unions as an organisational body of labour to make a bargain with their employers on 
equal footing. The existence of Mundella’s boards of conciliation and arbitration gave 
credence to the legal recognition of trade unions in the Royal Committee of 1867. The 
Millian school of political economy countenanced the voluntary framework of collective 
bargaining as a scientifically validated measure not inimical to the market economy. The 
institutional framework of free collective bargaining was, thus, secured by legal immunity 
of trade union activities from state intervention. The state kept the neutrality in industrial 
relations by guaranteeing free trade in labour, in which each worker could exchange their 
property of labour on equal terms with capital without legal obstruction through trade 
union negotiations.   
This thesis challenges this Liberal vision of co-operation in the mid-Victorian period. 
Biagini has not examined how characteristic Britain’s co-operation between the official 
culture of free trade and popular economic culture was in the ideological sense and how 
successful it was in providing economic liberty with the working classes through the 
voluntary scheme of collective bargaining. In consideration of the neutrality of the state 
in industrial relations, the voluntary framework was the institutional formation, in which 
the government acknowledged the legal status of trade unions, but did not grant them that 
 
27 E. Biagini, Liberty, Retrenchment and Reform, Popular Liberalism in the Age of Gladstone, 
1860-1880, Cambridge, 1992, pp.141-4 
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of ‘incorporation’ – legal personality as a corporate entity. This double-edged proposition 
had a significant meaning in Britain’s economic culture of free trade and, in consequence, 
induced historians to enter into labyrinths of historiography. The orthodox understanding 
of political economy always helped to obscure this historiographical perplexity. Hilton 
has considered that in the light of free trade a crucial shift in the discourse of political 
economy was reflected in the economic question of limited liability. In contrast to 
evangelicals, who saw unlimited liability as divine retribution of commercial iniquity, 
optimistic and expansionist attitudes of free trade sanctioned formation of joint-stock 
companies based on corporate limited liability. Utilitarian political economists like 
Bentham, Cobden, Bright and Mill supported its cause, as limited liability provided 
increased and wholesale opportunities of investment to social enterprises including small 
savings of working-class co-operatives. Christian Socialists saw it as compatible with free 
trade and this enfranchisement of capital increased associational control of production, 
imposing obligations of mutual reciprocity between master and servant. Co-operative 
production was thus favourable among the Liberals for improving working-classes 
interest and engagement in management of business.28 
The growing discourse of general limited liability demised substantially the myth of 
stationary state in the Malthusian world. While the latter’s deistic programme of optimal 
choice ended up concentrating wealth on strong property holders, who had exclusive 
access to political power, expectations of the economic growth in the condition of limited 
liability replaced its theoretical fear of the principle of population with liquidity, 
distribution and employment of wealth. The fatalism to connect commercial failure to 
 
28 Hilton, op.cit., pp.256-66 
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immorality was receded, as new capitalist attitudes encouraged investment as the means 
to maximise benefit of the public, which, however, caused new concerns about 
irresponsible behaviours from overtrading and reckless speculation to fraud, collusion 
and robbery.29 Johnson has argued that in this circumstance the market principle was no 
longer premised on the zero-sum nature, but on a more practical substantial object of ‘a 
nexus of institutions and rules with specific legal definitions’. This means that the market 
institutions of free trade were determined by tensions of class and sectional interests.30 
The radical bulwark of equality before the law, thus, had to be secured by political 
institutions through activities of political parties and trade unions.   
True, the principle of co-operative production based on joint-stock limited liability 
became the agenda of the Liberal party. However, as other Western countries had already 
adopted the principle of limited liability before 1850, this did not explain Britain’s 
distinctive culture of co-operation between officials and the people.31 To clear up the 
voluntary culture in the Victorian period, it is more important to give an emphasis on its 
peculiar formation of trade union movements. As some historians have pointed out, 
Britain’s earlier acceptance of natural liberty provoked spontaneous efflorescence of trade 
unionism: in the tradition of liberalism trade unions evolved as one of voluntary 
associations.32 Compared to the Continent, where trade unions were somewhat invention 
of political parties, Britain’s situation that the labour movement could gain the legal status 
of trade unions before the extension of parliamentary franchise premised their function 
 
29 Searle, op.cit., pp.77-97, 202 
30 P. Johnson, Making the Market, Victorian Origins of Corporate Capitalism, Cambridge, 2010, 
p.115 
31 Hilton, op.cit., p.257 
32 A. Reid, United We Stand – a history of Britain’s trade unions, London, 2004, p.6 
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as autonomous countervailing force against state intervention and shaped unique attitudes 
of working classes towards statutory legislation.33 The co-operative culture reflected in 
the Trade Union Act of 1871 was so distinctive in opting for the voluntary framework as 
to contradict with co-operative production which constituted an incorporated form of 
limited liability. 
Thompson’s survey into the social and political concepts of the public and its opinion 
helps to look into this official acceptance of voluntarism. Under the consumerist politics 
of free trade, the political public was deeply immersed both in the interest of consumers 
and in the intellectual discourse of political economy in the nineteenth century. The 
rational voice of consumers acted as public opinion to embrace trade unions as the means 
to achieve the public good in discussion of industrial bargaining and wage rates. There 
was this liberal political culture of the public opinion to accept free collective bargaining 
and to legitimise its bilateral institutional proposition to secure the neutrality of the state. 
Thompson’s conceptual understanding of the public was so important for looking into 
advancement in the principle of co-operation in the liberal culture that in forwarding 
discourse of political economy, both Liberal and Conservative intellectuals later 
developed their visions by recourse to their contemporary understandings of the public 
interest, in which public opinion played a theoretical role of an economic coordinator 
complementing the indeterminate end of the market principle. In the mid-Victorian period 
this positivist conception of the public represented consumerist opinion and, in 
consideration of institutional formation of collective bargaining, its support for trade 
unions endorsed the general sentiment to bridge the gulf between non-intervening 
 
33 O. Kahn-Freund, Labour and the Law, London, 1972, pp.43-4 
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officialdom and trade unionism as a vehicle of radicalism.34  
By examining the Victorian sentiment of co-operation, which was constituted by the 
neutral state, voluntary collective bargaining and the consuming public, this thesis 
delineates economic organisation of labour, in which both consumers and producers were 
identified with each other, as a central role to safeguard the public interest. The optimistic 
and expansionist discourse of utilitarian political economy was stymied, when the Millian 
school of political economy authorized the unorthodox principle of economic liberalism 
based not on the market competition, but on a community-centred decentralised virtue 
promulgated by working-class associational efforts. 35  The humanitarian nature of 
political economy aimed to install individualism through ‘free and popular local and 
municipal institutions and industrial and philanthropic enterprises by voluntary 
associations’.36 In this principle, this thesis argues, the economic culture of free collective 
bargaining offered moral guidance and cultivated mutual reciprocity determining rights 
and duties between capital and labour, which were contrasting to the premise of the 
orthodoxy that maximisation of individual interests was directly linked to accumulation 
of the public benefit. This religion of humanity was ensured by institutional procedure of 
free collective bargaining and, at this juncture, its operation imposed the rule of law on 
market economy seeking equilibrium of moral economy by the tripartite interests – capital, 
labour and consumers.  
Such distinctive idea of the tripartite co-operation – the rule of law of free collective 
 
34 J. Thompson, British Political Culture and the Idea of ‘Public Opinion’, 1867-1914, 
Cambridge, 2013 
35 J. Lipkes, Politics, Religion and Classical Political Economy in Britain, John Stuart Mill and 
his Followers, London, 1999 
36 J. Mill, On Liberty, London, 1985 (first pub., 1859), pp.180-1 
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bargaining – was tested, when its institutional formation could no longer identify the 
interest of producers with that of consumers. Once Britain’s credence as the guardian of 
free trade was wavered by the rise of economic protectionism leading to their free import 
of subsidised and dumped products, resurgence of domestic problems like unemployment, 
sweating and an increase in casual labour, bolstered a call for more collectivist solution 
than maintaining the laissez-faire state. The double-edged proposition of the legislative 
framework of free collective bargaining was gradually reckoned to be class-biased. The 
conventional programme of trade unionism to halt overproduction and limit the number 
of apprenticeship was seen as monopolistic as hampering maximisation of efficacy of the 
market operation. This reignited the argument about the merit of incorporation conceded 
by both political economists and trade unionists and developed into their demands for 
shaking off antiquated customs of trade unions. In this circumstance, the state neutrality 
in industrial relations, which was predicated on the voluntary institutions of free 
collective bargaining reached deadlock. This thesis suggests that when the Cobdenite 
mantra of universal free trade was degenerated, the growth of the positivist conception of 
holistic and inclusive public opinion began to endorse the federative framework of 
collective bargaining, in which amalgamated bodies of both employers and trade unions 
carried out nation- or industry-wide procedure of collective bargaining. The ideas on 
public opinion could no longer legitimate the popular sentiment to fill in the gap between 
officialdom and voluntarism, but sought collectivist approach to serving the public 
interest.   
A watershed was marked, when the common law tradition approved the legal personality 
of ‘fictive’ corporation in 1889, by which legitimacy of corporate limited liability was 
entrusted to juridical discretion. Internalising the juridical dilemma between 
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individualism and collectivism, the common law tradition called into question Britain’s 
distinctive liberal culture of collective bargaining. The raison d’etre of trade unionism 
faltered, when it was clear that the bilateral propositions of voluntary institutions could 
not secure freedom of contract. In the Trade Union Act of 1871, they evaded 
responsibility of the incorporated capacity. However, as demands for co-operative 
production or corporate limited liability necessitated quasi-joint-stock entrepreneurship, 
the official culture could no longer safeguard the conventional practice of voluntarism, 
which was premised on unincorporated organisations with unlimited liability of 
individuals. The working class right of freedom of contract was subjugated to the national 
or corporate interest and trade unions could only safeguard material welfare of sectional 
interests in such collectivist framework. As a result, free trade in labour was restricted, as 
the institutional formation of voluntary collective bargaining was emasculated. In face of 
the crisis of the co-operative culture, the marginalist principle of neo classicism extended 
the utility of consumers as an economic regulator, by which the direct voice of public 
opinion could deliver its verdict in the federative framework of free collective 
bargaining. 37  In this process, the interest of consumers was still supporting that of 
producers, but the positivist concept of the public could no longer preserve the reign of 
free competition, since the existence of the neutral state, in which the institutional 
formation of voluntary collective bargaining consisted, was retrograded by the increased 
demand for the corporate governance, disposing of the rule of law in the market economy. 
Economic order of free competition ended up in making an unbridgeable gulf between 
officialdom and the residuum in the collectivist economy.   
 
37 Thompson, op.cit., pp.198-201 
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Confronting the growing importance of corporate governance, Conservative political 
economists attempted to rebuild the intellectual framework of economic organisation of 
labour by way of economic protectionism. They upheld analytical methodology of 
inductive historicism in contrast to deductive abstraction, since they believed that it was 
important to identify the role of custom of producers – a social virtue of trust – to 
galvanise collective action, by which producers developed the common interest with 
consumers. In contrast to giving utilities to the consumerist interest, their concepts of 
public opinion was, therefore, induced to seek not voluntary, but collective solution for 
harmonising the public interest in the neo-mercantilist framework, which was projected 
to reconcile officialdom with the market economy by consolidating economic 
organisation of labour as a bulwark of collective liberty in-between sovereignty and 
individuals. Historical economists like William Cunningham, Langford Price, Herbert 
Foxwell and William Ashley respectively endowed public opinion with theoretical 
reasons to determine the direction of corporate governance to identify the national interest. 
For them, to reach the common good was equivalent to a problem of religion, which 
meant that they considered that the common interest of individuals was not developed by 
their satisfaction of material interests, but by idealism of religion. Only by improvement 
in well-being of the community, individuals could maintain sound life and were inclined 
to subject themselves to selfless social duties.  
By examining the intellectual tradition of historical economists this thesis reassesses the 
decline of pluralist politics in Britain.38 The New Liberal politics of free trade adopted 
 
38  Historiography from the early 1990s suggests avoidance of the ‘class’ interest from politics. 
See, P. Joyce, Visions of the People: Industrial England and the Question of Class, 1848-1914, 
Cambridge, 1991. R. McKibbin, Ideologies of Class: Social Relations in Britain, 1880-1950, 
Oxford, 1990. D. Tanner, Political Change and the Labour Party, 1900-1918, Cambridge, 1993. 
21 
 
marginal accounts of natural liberty and remodelled a role of state intervention in the 
market economy for distributive purpose especially through imposition of taxation. 
Rather than warranting collective liberty of corporations – liberal corporatism – by 
protectionism, its adherence to free trade adopted the policy labelled as ‘collective laissez-
faire’, in which bureaucratic expertise sought to make a balance between production and 
consumption by central control.39 This meant that New Liberalism turned its corporate 
governance from the neutral to organicist approach, in which social reform ensured 
people’s welfare, calling for land reform as its ultimate end. As to industrial relations, the 
New Liberal programme endorsed the voluntary framework of collective bargaining, but 
the state played a role of an economic coordinator and defending the national interest. 
While the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 absolved trade unions from the corporate 
responsibility, in case of industrial disputes the Board of Trade mediated by organising 
institutional framework for collective bargaining and set up the legislative wage floor by 
the Trade Boards Act of 1909. Furthermore, they complemented operation of the labour 
market by compensating unemployment through social reforms like the introduction of 
labour exchanges and national insurance. In this way the New Liberal consumerist 
politics of free trade was grounded on their economic organicism to reconcile the 
consumerist interest of free trade with democratic interest of producers.    
This thesis argues that New Liberal collective politics failed to protect the pluralist and 
autonomous institution of economic organisation of labour, which resulted in 
precipitating the separation between the official and popular culture during the First 
 
J. Harris, Private Lives, Public Spirit: Britain, 1870-1914, Hammondsworth, 1993 
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World War. The New Liberal politics of free trade in labour, predicated on the voluntary 
operation of nation- or industry-wide framework of collective bargaining, marginalised 
the interest of rank-and-file producers, as it increased managerial authority in favour of 
the national interest more than exigency of the latter. Hence, the deadlock of consumerist 
politics provoked the pre-war industrial unrest, when collective bargaining by well-
organised labour ruled out the rank-and-files and the latter felt alienated. 40  British 
experience of the First World War turned its organicist governance from consumerist to 
productivist approach to the market economy.41 The Munitions of War Act restricted the 
labour market and the voluntary operation of collective bargaining was replaced by the 
state arbitration system. While the progressive movement did not give up its conventional 
practice of voluntary collective bargaining, the state took an initiative in dilution of 
unskilled labour, rational management and determination of wage rates. In this 
framework, political factors became a more important for negotiations and trade unions 
were granted administrative favour more than employers’ organisations in the war-time 
production. In consequence, the pre-war presumption of the liberal market, based on 
customary practice of collective bargaining, was overturned by substantial incorporation 
of trade unions into the national framework of economic production.  
The post-war movements to reconstruct the consumerist normalcy of free trade was led 
 
40 Reid, op.cit. On the relation between New Liberal consumerist politics and pre-war industrial 
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by the Treasury guidance to deflationary finance.42 It aimed to curtail war-time state 
intervention in industrial relations institutions. In order to complement such minimalist 
approach to the market economy, the Treasury orthodoxy of free trade availed of post-
war internationalism of equality of trade to standardize economic regulations. However, 
under the constitutional status of free collective bargaining, the progressives steeped in 
self-governing culture turned both employers’ organisations and trade unions to refusal 
of conformity to the international order. As the national interest was safeguarded by the 
organicist framework of collective bargaining, progressive movements were entangled in 
class struggle by institutional competition for political influence. The state’s withdrawal 
from the national management of production met severe reaction from miners, whose 
strike action developed into the national scale involving workers from other major 
industries. In fear of degradation of collective bargaining, it was important for 
progressives to bring about industrial reconstruction by reorganisation of industrial co-
operation. However, when producers sought to form an alliance, it was no longer co-
operation concomitant with the consumerist politics of free trade voluntarism, but with 
productivist politics enmeshed in national programmes of parliamentary parties. This 
thesis concludes that when parliamentary politics exchanged their views on progressive 
co-operation, it did not mean that the rule of collective bargaining was a safeguard of 
economic organisation of labour, in which both producers and consumers were identified 
with each other. From the Conservative project of the Mond-Tuner Talks to the Labour’s 
gradualism, the rule of collective bargaining was reckoned to be the productivist principle 
 
42 On post-war Treasury policies, see, S. Newton & D. Porter (eds.), Modernization Frustrated: 
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to expand the national wealth, since free trade was accounted merely as a technical issue 
in their economic policies.  
To follow changing ideas about collective bargaining between 1860 and 1930, this thesis 
scrutinises voices and statements of vernacular and intellectual contemporaries. From 
online newspapers to printed primary sources, they were selected and employed to fulfil 
objectives set in each chapter, but, in a broad sense, aimed at corroborating the British 
history of empiricism underlying the discourse of political economy. Before the British 
Methodenstrait, which made its divorce decisive between a deductive and inductive 
methodology, the classical discourse of political economy was the empirical science, 
which saw the complexities of human nature as an integral part of economic science. 
When the voluntary scheme of collective bargaining gained the legal recognition, its 
ideological rationale was not predicated on its orthodoxy, but countervailing principles, 
expressed not only by British positivists and Christian Socialists, but also by political 
economists adopting inductive and historicist methodology derived from Mill’s eclectic 
methodological stance. By investigating Mundella’s ideological outlook and popular co-
operative discourse shared by reformist supporters, the early part of this thesis 
demonstrates that the voluntary scheme of collective bargaining was an institutional 
framework, in which, reciprocal and associational sentiments were more discursively 
employed as its main cause than utility maximising rationality in co-operation between 
capital and labour. Furthermore, it shows that such popular ideas of moral economy were 
increasingly concerned about the growth-oriented discourse of co-operation, as the latter 




The first chapter scopes out the formation of double-edged legislative premise of the 
voluntary framework of collective bargaining to point out that its institutional formation 
was a result of dismissal of the individualist orthodoxy of political economy. Expanding 
conventional understandings of historiography, it discloses officials’ characteristic 
embrace of the working-class radical culture through the legislation of the Trade Union 
Act of 1871. It is misleading to see the legal recognition of trade unions to be either 
working-class acceptance of the middle-class virtues or their adaptation to the capitalist 
market system. In contrast to the majority report of the Royal Commission of 1867, which 
saw trade unions as in restraint of trade – obstruction to the providential rule of individuals 
to pursue their own interests, the minority report, which acknowledged trade union funds 
to make industrial action, became the basis of the Act. Positivist and Christian socialist 
intellectuals theoretically approved trade unions as the means to impart providential order 
to the working class. However, their existing studies, including Curthoys’ Government, 
Labour and the Law In Mid-Victorian Britain, place too much emphasis on the strong 
influence of official culture of ‘moralising the market’ in the making of voluntary 
collective bargaining and, as a result, are inclined to overlook the working-class embrace 
of the tradition of political economy. In this backdrop, by shedding light on the political 
impact of Mundella’s boards of conciliation and arbitration on granting legitimacy to the 
minority report, the chapter insists that Mundella’s attitude was opposite to the 
individualist orthodoxy and demonstrated Protestant culture based on mutuality and 
reciprocity in endorsement of trade unions as the means to transmit the principle of 
political economy. 
The second chapter examines the Christian culture of the rule of law in the voluntary 
scheme of collective bargaining. Main issues at stake are to reveal that its ideological 
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connotation was strictly religious and that it formed a concept of moral economy seeking 
the economic equilibrium between capital, labour and consumers for the common good. 
When Millian political economy endorsed the heterodox doctrine of religion of humanity 
advocated by William Thornton and Thomas Leslie, the popular discourse of political 
economy, deflected from the utilitarian model of Ricardian industrialism, evaluated 
associational efforts to protect religious liberty of individuals and gave higher priority to 
moral issues than to economic rationality as the means of co-operation. The democratic 
rationale of collective bargaining gathered support from Christian communities and trade 
unions were expected to become economic organisation of labour, which guaranteed the 
working classes freedom of contract by defining mutual obligation of rights and duties 
with their employers, reflecting public opinion as consumers’ voice in the communities. 
By collecting ideas and statements of contemporary liberals and intellectuals from local 
and regional press, which has been underused as a source of intellectual history, this 
chapter argues that the commitment to the rule of law of collective bargaining faltered, 
when the ideological background of morally-bound co-operation behind the voluntary 
framework of collective bargaining was gradually replaced by more growth-oriented 
concept of co-operation. What the positivist studies points to as the unstable relationship 
between the official culture and popular political economy was evinced by the latter’s 
fear against more capital-centred approach to market economy, which brought about the 
separation between the moral and economic law in the intellectual discourse. 43  The 
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voluntary convention of collective bargaining, which evaded the institutional merit of 
incorporation, was no longer efficacious in serving the communal interests.   
The latter part of the thesis discusses a contextual trajectory of the empiricist discourse 
of political economy as a counterpoise to the marginalist revolution. After Mill’s 
recantation of the wage-fund theory, the positivist social concept of public opinion filled 
in the theoretical vacuum of the orthodox market principle as an economic regulator. 
Britain’s strong liberal character of public opinion was associated with its strong 
adherence to politics of free trade. Thompson’s history of marginalism clarifies how the 
Marshallian orthodoxy evaluated the force of public opinion as the means to rein in 
economic competition.44 Marshall’s rejection of its conventional attribute of positivism 
rather endowed old marginalism with the political and historical nature and gave rise to 
his empiricist account of trade unions. On the other hand, historical economists adopting 
inductive and historicist methodology advanced their own conceptual usage of public 
opinion. Inheriting the empiricist approach of Millian political economy, their historicist 
accounts suggested community-centred propositions to amplify self-less and altruistic 
human virtues. Examining representative works of British historical school from 
Cunningham’s ultra to Foxwell’s rational empiricism, the third chapter lays out their 
general vision of collectivist society in light of the liberal concept of public opinion. Their 
antipathy to the dominion of natural liberty in neo-classicism resulted in their inductive 
and historical exploration of economic organisation of labour as a mediational role to 
safeguard economic autonomy by coordinating the balance between production and 
consumption.  
 
44 Thompson, op.cit., pp.198-201 
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The third chapter, hence, seeks to suggest that when the state began to pursue corporate 
development of national economy, the practice of voluntary collective bargaining lost its 
credence in reconciling market economy with the public good. It was Frederic Maitland, 
a historical economist more famous for legal history, who dug into England’s informal 
custom of endowing trust to voluntary associations and pointed out its peril in 
confrontation with the growth of collectivist society. Scrutinizing works of later historical 
economists like Cunningham, Price, Foxwell and Ashley, the chapter argues that their 
liberal usages of public opinion, whose function was projected to promulgate the virtue 
of trust in society, revamped economic organisation of labour into the neo-mercantilist 
economy. Since the economic principle of free trade was no longer effective in securing 
the public interest, they advocated protectionism as the means to save economic 
autonomy, by which producers and consumers could identify their interests with each 
other. From this viewpoint, historical economists did not expect trade unions to determine 
rights and duties between capital and labour in the light of the public. They considered 
that the social virtue of trust would be resuscitated, when the corporate governance was 
administered by the collective force of public opinion in contrast to its voluntarist and 
individualist concept in the neo-classical tradition. Under the rule of free competition in 
the common law tradition, corporate freedom necessarily ended up in turning its back to 
the rank-and-file members in society and led to a series of great industrial unrest before 
the First World War, to which Conservative and Liberal intellectuals took different 
approaches.45 
 
45 On intellectual approach to the pre-war industrial unrest, see, E. Green, The Crisis of 
Conservatism: The Politics, Economics and Ideologies of the British Conservative Party, 1880-
1914, London, 1995 and Ideologies of Conservatism: Conservative Political Ideas in the 
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The triumph of new liberalism in opposition to protectionism was in parallel with the 
growth of the deductive approach to market economy. In the process, the empiricist 
characteristics of public opinion was outweighed by professional and bureaucratic 
commands of statistics. In the New Liberal policy of ‘collective laissez-faire’, the 
government intervened in industrial disputes for national economy and paved the way for 
co-operation between capital and labour by tailoring the institutional framework of 
collective bargaining. The final chapter examines the process that the government’s 
organicist approach to free trade economy discounted the empiricist discourse of political 
economy. Its war-time move from consumerist to productivist policy encouraged the 
conceptual growth of industrial co-operation, which was no longer based on the 
countervailing ideological virtues as in the Mid-Victorian period, but oriented towards 
economic rationalisation in production. Trentmann has already shown the end of the 
liberal relationship between the state and market economy by entertaining the rise of new 
internationalism, which advanced the post-war international framework of coordination 
economy by protectionism and rationalisation.46 The chapter focuses on the progressive 
shift in the ideological basis of collective bargaining from viewpoints of liberal 
intellectuals, who, publishing works on industrial relations, developed their differential 
visions of the state-market relationship.  
The liberal intellectuals like William Beveridge, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Henry Clay 
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and John Hobson reacted to the dysfunction of Britain’s free trade and put forward their 
suggestions to secure fluid, equal and equilibrial market economy under the ‘collective 
laissez-faire’ system. In addressing problems of industrial relations, they upheld the 
orthodox principle of market economy, which, nonetheless, the Webbs first saw as 
hostile.47 Beveridge’s early work Unemployment: A Problem of Industry proposed to 
organise the labour market via administration of labour exchanges, which would amend 
quantitative imbalance of supply and demand for labour. The Webbs in their Industrial 
Democracy aimed to repair defects of federative or industry-wide frameworks of 
collective bargaining, since rank-and-file exigencies were inclined to be neglected. Clay 
was an orthodox economist, but reluctant to resort to deductive economic theories. His 
The Problem of Industrial Relations pointed out that the war-time production destroyed 
customary practices of producers to adjust wages to efficient rates through their voluntary 
procedure of collective bargaining. Hobson in his later work, The Conditions of Industrial 
Peace, argued that the progressive alliance could not secure natural liberty of individuals 
without the social initiative for market equilibrium. In the progressive discourse, the 
empiricist tradition attributed to the voluntary culture of public opinion was no longer 
assumed to be a regulator of market economy, but rational calculation by central authority 
in the corporate pluralist form of production.  
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Ch.1 Market and Conciliation  
 
1.1.Historiography and Collective Bargaining 
The institutional framework of standing boards of conciliation and arbitration can be seen 
as an economic subculture of free trade internationalism, following the enactment of the 
Anglo-French Commercial Treaty (the Cobden-Chavalier Treaty) in 1860. This 
commercial agreement represented Cobden’s shift in the principle of free trade from 
cosmopolitanism to internationalism, which meant that free trade partnership was 
subsequently formulated on the basis of sovereignty of nations. Cobden argued this 
regulative process would form the ‘peace bond between nations’ enabling the people of 
each nation, not their rulers, to satisfy their mutual needs.48 Anthony John Mundella, who 
visited Paris with Cobden’s delegation as a chairman of the local chamber of commerce, 
supported the treaty as he believed the treaty would increase the good will between the 
nations and peoples.49 During the downward economic spiral from 1857 the expansion of 
hose markets resulted in discord at Mundella’s stocking firm, which was known for the 
first steam-powered hosiery factory in Nottingham. A number of outworkers, like old 
framework knitters, were outpaced and replaced by the introduction of mass production, 
in which factory workers adopted new machinery. Invoking the strong Luddite tradition, 
 
48 Britain reduced duties on silks, wine and spirits and removed restrictions on the export of 
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four strikes broke out. When employers planned to carry out lockouts as counter-action, 
Mundella denounced such a course of action, as it just worsening the dreadful situation, 
and suggested, instead, a round-table conference between the employers and operatives. 
In the end, two parties of different interests in the hosiery trade reached an agreement of 
the establishment of the permanent board of arbitration, in which Mundella was elected 
as the first president of the board and declared the meaning of this establishment in his 
presidential address as follows:50  
I hope you look upon yourselves as judges of disputes, and consider that you 
are bound to form an impartial opinion on all matters that are brought before 
you. I hope you will also consider that your object will be to promote the 
prosperity of every branch of trade, and of all persons engaged in it. 
     
Mundella’s board was composed of six to seven representatives from both capital and 
labour respectively. They stood on equal footing and discussed trade issues including the 
questions of wage-rates on a regular basis. Mundella as the chairman had a casting vote, 
but there was little need to use it during his tenure.51 In addition, a small committee of 
four appointees was formed not only to make rules, but also to seek adjustment of their 
differences ahead of the opening of the formal board. In consequence, these schemes were 
successful for replacing industrial disputes with peaceful settlements for over ten years, 
as Mundella later testified ‘not one strike occurred while the Board had been in operation 
and that never before had such good feeling prevailed between employers and 
workmen’.52 Moreover, the board reached agreements in banning the notorious truck 
system in the outwork industry and in prosecution of middlemen who violated the rules 
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decided by mutual consent. 53  In this way, Nottingham hosiery trade attempted to 
overcome difficulties between capital and labour.  
This chapter examines political influence of this economic subculture of collective 
bargaining. Its contribution to the legislative recognition of trade unions in the early 1870s 
was so impactful that the report of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions issued in 1868 
acknowledged usefulness of Mundella’s boards of conciliation and arbitration. The 
commissioners learned from Mundella’s statement that there was a way to harmonize the 
interests of labour and capital.54 In the second reading of the Trade Union bill Mundella 
made a speech in legalising trade unions as follows:55  
It is purely a question of free trade in labour. A master is a corporation and 
can deal singly with his men if they go to him singly. But if they go to him as 
a Trade Union they are a body equal to himself and a bargain can be made on 
equal terms. 
 
Mundella’s bill consisted in its equality before the law placed in front of both anti-union 
employers and extreme union leaders.56 The Trade Union Act of 1871 enabled trade 
unions to enjoy the right equivalent to that of joint-stock companies: capital and labour 
could stand on equal terms in the process of collective bargaining for achieving their 
objects. This legal recognition of trade unions, nonetheless, did not signify endowment 
of the incorporated status with labour. Mckibbin has mentioned that the good-will of the 
state granted to trade unions the same privilege of upper- and middle-class institutions by 
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extending a corporate immunity – by this means a neutral state excluded politics from the 
market. 57  This liberal relationship between the state and market gave a ground for 
developing the voluntary scheme of collective bargaining. However, as mentioned below, 
in historiography, historians have shown differentiated understandings of the liberal 
background behind the establishment of collective bargaining. The chapter, shedding 
light first upon pitfalls of historiography, attempts to place the political discourse of 
collective bargaining in the context of Victorian liberalism. By dissecting Liberals’ 
perspectives in legislation of trade unions, which included Mundella’s rationale for 
adopting the voluntary boards of conciliation and arbitration, broader spectrum of liberal 
virtues was ascribed to meanings of institutionalisation of trade unions as an 
unincorporated organisation compatible with Britain’s official culture of free trade.     
A number of historical studies, particularly those about history of trade unionism have 
seen critically the development of collective bargaining, since its congruent relationship 
with the growth of capitalism. This trend was conspicuous especially after the publication 
of History of Trade Unionism in 1894 by Sidney & Beatrice Webb. The Webbs cast the 
growth of ‘new model’ unions as evidence of the spread of middle-class virtues based on 
‘free enterprise’ and ‘unlimited competition’. They considered that this new spirit paved 
the way for widening the economic gap between union and non-union workers.58 The 
mutual negotiation between employers and trade unions guaranteed ‘limited type of 
freedom’, since collective bargaining ended up in laying down regulations upon non-
union individuals, whose needs were neglected. The Webbs maintained that this 
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collective solution did not change the status quo, because ‘whenever the economic 
conditions of both parties concerned are unequal, legal freedom of contract merely 
enables the superior in strategic strength to dictate terms’. 59  Therefore, as long as 
mutually agreed solutions were sought under the voluntary system, the ideological 
hegemony of the bourgeoisie subordinated trade unions to the market principle of 
capitalism. In condition of free trade, consumers reaped direct benefits, whereas 
producers were liable to subject themselves to high pressures of market competition. Only 
those who could form unyielding combinations were able to thrive by ejecting new 
competitors from the market, manipulating rules, prices and circulation of commodities.60 
Their antagonistic tone towards the voluntary framework of collective bargaining was not 
diminished in Industrial Democracy, in which they promoted a highly bureaucratic policy 
of national minimum. Provided that there was the ascendancy of capital, the boards of 
conciliation and arbitration were not considered to be a rational measure. Despite the fact 
that they nullified their own view of interdependence between the new model unions and 
market economy, they contended that imposition of oppressive common rules as a result 
of collective bargaining upon industries concerned meant that the individual right to 
bargain with employers was substituted by regulations of trade unions. At this point, they 
assumed that there was little difference in the principle between collective bargaining and 
the boards of conciliation and arbitration:61          
...there has been, until quite recently, no clear distinction drawn between 
Collective bargaining, Conciliation and Arbitration. Much of what is called 
Arbitration or Conciliation in the earlier writings on the subjects amounts to 
nothing more than organised Collective bargaining. Thus the classic work of 
Mr. Henry Crompton describes, as ‘conciliation’ the typical cases in which 
 
59 S. & B. Webb, Industrial Democracy, pp.173-221, quotation from p.219 




representative employers and workmen meet to bargain on behalf of the trade. 
The Nottingham hosiery board, established in 1860, often described as a 
model of arbitration, was in effect, nothing more than machinery for 
Collective Bargaining, .... 
 
This pessimistic interpretation of collective bargaining by the Webbs was shared by later 
historians of different schools. For instance, the Oxford School historians like Clegg, Fox 
and Thompson upheld a similar view in their historical analysis of industrial relations. In 
their detailed study, A History of British Trade Unions Vol.1, published in 1964, the 
development of amalgamated trade societies, whose aim was to stand on an equal footing 
with their employers, was accompanied by the replacement of traditional customs – what 
they called ‘mutual insurance’ – of craft societies.62 Following the Webbs’ view, they 
argued that the search for mutual agreements with employers meant trade unions’ 
acceptance of the capitalist principle and that in proceedings of collective bargaining the 
employers necessarily took the initiative in the operation of the boards. One 
distinguishing point is that the Oxford School historians placed an emphasis upon the 
economic advantages gained by the employers in recognition of working class freedom 
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pp.152-221. A. Flanders, ‘Collective Bargaining’, in Flanders and Clegg (eds.), The System of 
Industrial Relations in Great Britain, its History, Law and Institutions, London, 1967, pp.260-
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to combine with each other. From this point of view, Mundella was seen as one of 
employers who ‘saw that the unions might prove useful partners in mitigating 
competition’.63 In contrast to the Webbs, who stressed the repressive realities of collective 
regulation, the Oxford School historians believed that consequential failure of market 
economy was possible to be modified by producers’ co-operation – the tripartite 
relationship between the employers, trade unions and the state. Therefore, instead of 
blaming the system of market economy, institutional disintegration was considered to be 
a more significant cause of economic division, which was demonstrated by antagonism 
between ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ members of trade unions.64 In this sense, the system of 
collective bargaining was initially seen to maintain desirable economic conditions, 
because its sound operation accommodated different economic interests.   
Both the Webbs and Oxford School historians saw that the making of the system of 
collective bargaining was an aspect of the growth of a capitalist economy. The third 
significant historiographical tradition of ‘labour aristocracy’, which derived from the 
Marxist principle of historical materialism, also shared this viewpoint. Like the Webbs, 
this Marxisant view saw the progress of trade unionism as the process of working class 
subordination to capitalism. Shorn of revolutionary sentiments, trade unions were 
categorised as docile and obedient organisations. 65 The label of ‘labour aristocracy’, 
which Marxist historians like Hobsbawm preferred to use, was rooted in their 
comparatively affluent and prestigious status and successful adaptation to one of the most 
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important Victorian values of ‘respectability’. 66  Whether the economic condition of 
labour aristocracy helped to develop ‘class consciousness’ within the working classes was 
an issue of controversy among them. Some denounced the ameliorative attitudes of trade 
unionism and bemoaned working class assimilation to Labourism.67 Others considered 
the collectivist policies of trade unions and friendly societies beneficial for fostering 
solidarity among workmen. The latter historians believed that the growth of capitalism 
would deprive craft workers of skills and, therefore, they would lose an advantageous 
position to form collective protection. In this reading, pre-industrial traditions and old 
skills were challenged by the development of technologies and craft workers were finally 
dissolved into the proletarian culture.68 E.P. Thompson argued that capitalism replaced 
the pre-modern moral norms of communally-bound society with the inhumane 
relationships of industrial order, based on the wage-nexus between capital and labour.69 
The formation of industrial partnership was just a temporary expedient, as it would follow 
the fate decreed by Marxist determinism. Instead of the restoration of traditional values, 
the focus of negotiation was placed on the question of wage rates and workmen came to 
understand that they were mere wage earners who only possessed their labour to sell. In 
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consequence, the further working class alienation progressed, the more the outcomes of 
collective bargaining would fail to meet rank-and-file demands.70    
With its focus on inevitable proletarianization, these analyses regarded collective 
bargaining as useful for buffering the impact of accommodating the working classes to 
the capitalist values. Ditching pre-industrial values, the institutional settlement by 
collective bargaining drew a fault line between the ‘incorporated’ competitors and ‘ruled-
out’ under-cutters. For both capital and labour, the establishment of the boards was an 
attempt to stabilize the market at the sacrifice of the excluded. However, it is worth 
questioning whether, when establishing the boards of conciliation and arbitration, 
Mundella intended to respond to the demands for the growth of market economy and, as 
these traditions of historiography suggested, to legitimate miserable outcomes of market 
economy by the adoption of the intangible economic law. What these historians called 
‘collective bargaining’ needs to be distinguished from Mundella’s scheme of conciliation 
and arbitration. Mundella rather appreciated the view of Adam Smith, who in Wealth of 
Nations, suggested that the healthy state of economic liberalism was susceptible to 
structural or institutional bias. Smith pointed out that the existing unequal conditions 
between capital and labour would deter the procedure of economic bargaining from 
reaching the price determined by free operation of the market. These inequities were 
embodied by institutional factors, which defined the legislative terms of combinations 
and economic prerogatives of capital.71 From this humane Smithian viewpoint, it is worth 
examining the context of institutional formation of collective bargaining, as the evolution 
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of institutions was highly contingent on contextual factors. While mediating, transmitting 
and implementing existing values, institutions would produce new meanings and 
definitions at the same time.72 Revisiting Mundella’s cause of the boards of conciliation 
and arbitration, which succeeded in gathering legitimacy by making use of the rhetoric of 
political economy, the historical origin of the establishment of the boards of conciliation 
and arbitration will show a different vision from these historiographical traditions.  
 
1.2. Legislative Conditions of Trade Unions  
Historically it was not at all a novel way to seek mutual agreement between capital and 
labour as solutions for industrial disputes. There were examples as early as in the age of 
medieval guilds of finding a compromise such as making and revising lists of wage rates 
through mediational methods. Over time, however, steps were taken in to limit the 
collective action of employees. The Statute of Artificers of 1563 was enacted to define 
maximum rates and to regulate the number of apprenticeship, which resulted in giving 
greater power to the Justices of the Peace and local magistrates as delegates of parliament 
and regulators of trade in districts. This act was complemented by a series of the 
Combination Acts and the common-law conspiracy theory, which aimed to restrict 
collective action of workmen. These Combination Acts and the Arbitration Acts were 
envisaged to replace strikes with compulsory arbitration. However, before the end of the 
eighteenth century, the tide of state intervention in wage settlements was gradually abated 
due to the increasing number and greater mobility of wage earners. It became difficult for 
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the central authority to bring industrial disputes under control after the growth of 
industrial economy, which led to sharper contrasts and fluctuations of wage rates between 
different regions. As a result, the Statute of Artificer and Combination Acts were 
substantially nullified and the laissez-faire attitude shown by the state encouraged 
workmen to rely on voluntary measures.73  
Although ending up as ephemeral expedients, joint industrial boards were set up in a range 
of industries from the 1830s. For instance, the printing and bookbinding industries 
introduced the practice of discussion on trade issues with representatives of workers and 
employers as early as in 1834.74 The silk trade in Hawick, Scotland, made a price list in 
joint negotiations in 1833, while the textile of Glasgow and Paisley respectively held an 
annual conference for revising prices from 1834. The carpet manufacturers of York and 
Durham organized annual meetings for fixing wage rates with delegates of workmen in 
1839. In the same year the Order of the Society of Friendly Boilermakers decided the 
arbitration procedure with their employers.75 In Nottingham, William Felkin translated 
the account of the standing arbitration system in France, the conseils des prud’hommes, 
in 1834. Felkin, who was a founder of provident societies, a merchant and lace 
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manufacturer in Nottingham, believed that it was possible to foster ‘a sense of community’ 
by mutual efforts between capital and labour. While advocating the moral outlook of 
evangelicalism and the principle of Christian political economy, he adhered to the faith 
that individuals including working men could be enlightened by their moral elevation. 
Thus, the harmonious assumptions of classic political economy were to be achieved ‘in 
moralistic and high minded form’.76 Ten years later Felkin submit a paper in regard with 
the formation of the industrial boards to the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science. It was under his influence that the Nottingham hosiery union petitioned the 
parliament for founding the courts of conciliation and arbitration in 1845.77 However, as 
Mundella insisted, there was a characteristic difference between the system of the French 
conseils des prud’hommes and his boards of conciliation and arbitration:78 
Some stupid people keep writing about the Conseils Des Prud’hommes and 
identifying them with courts of arbitration. There is no resemblance between 
the two. The former are merely third parties constituted as a court to settle 
disputes that have arisen out of past transactions. The latter consist of the 
parties themselves not merely settling past questions, but arranging the rates 
of labour and all questions arising therefrom the future.  
 
Apart from seeing the boards of conciliation and arbitration rather as a preventive measure 
than remedial one, one distinguishing aspect of Mundella’s scheme was its recognition of 
economic organizations of labour as essential to the peaceful and friendly procedure. 
Trade unions were seen as helpful for business management. However, they had long 
been regarded as illegitimate organisation as the liberal orthodoxy of individualism 
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defined them as  ‘in restraint of trade’. While friendly societies were legally admitted by 
the end of the eighteenth century, trade unions were still prosecuted under the existing 
Combination laws and common law of conspiracy. In the 1820s, allied with middle class 
radicals such as Joseph Hume and J.R. McCulloch, Francis Place, a journeyman tailor 
and a leading member of London Corresponding Society, attempted to repeal the 
Combination Acts. He insisted on freedom of contract through the abolition of inequity 
of the law.79 In consequence, the repeal of the Combination Act in 1824 enabled workmen 
to combine with each other and bargain with their employers in collective forms. Still, 
they had to face hardships as a result of legal inequalities. The Amendment Act of 1825, 
passed by Peel, was designed to penalize trade unions’ ‘molestation and obstruction’ as 
criminal conspiracies against non-union members. Moreover, under the Master and 
Servant Act of 1823 employers were able to prosecute employees who breached contract. 
Thereafter, its coverage was expanded into a wider range of industries and involved 
coalmining, building, printing, transport, engineering, tool and cutlery making, glass and 
pottery manufacture, coach building, the iron industry, boiler-making and common 
labouring.80  The 1843 Worsted Embezzlement Act applied criminality of breach of 
contract further to domestic out-workers.    
The Master and Servant Acts came to be seen as feudal laws, by which the property 
owning class could secure an advantage in industrial relations.81 Under the acts workers 
breaking the contract were punished as criminals with imprisonment and hard labour, 
whereas employers were only liable to the civil law sanction of paying compensation. In 
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addition, the issue more relevant to working class combinations was the criminal law of 
conspiracy, which impeded them from acting collectively by imposing charges of 
‘intimidation’.82 According to George Howell, a shoemaker and later the first secretary 
of the Trades Union Congress, apart from persons at the meeting with the employers, ‘all 
other combinations and agreements to the prejudice of the third persons are still 
conspiracy’.83 Before the reform act of 1867, trade unionists, rather than seeking legal 
recognition, needed to secure freedom from legal threats to their common interests, 
because it was obvious that whether workers’ combinations were sued or not was 
predicated upon the employers’ discretion. Looking back at the situation, Howell, in his 
book Labour legislation, labour movements, and labour leaders, published in 1902, 
argued that ‘‘‘the Law of England, as respects combinations’’ has[d] not given the 
protection which was needed’.84 
Despite their extra-legal status, trade unions grew in strength after the repeal of the 
Combination Acts. The primary purpose of workmen’s associations was to protect 
independence of labour as producers by providing the mutual assurance of ‘self-help’.85 
Some London artisanal societies formed clandestine groups and fulfilled the trade union 
functions under the cloak of the friendly societies. 86  After the two major political 
uprisings of the 1840s – the Chartist movement and the free traders’ demand for the repeal 
of the Corn Laws – what the Webbs called the ‘new-model’ unions started to appear in 
craft trades – engineering, printing, bookbinding and building – as well as in seniority 
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trades based on piecework – coal-mining and iron and steel. Local bodies were gradually 
merged into the amalgamated unions. Taking advantage of these more coordinated bodies, 
they adopted systematic ways to manage personal records of subscriptions and benefits 
and consolidated local funds for more efficient accumulation and payment of mutual 
insurance such as sick pay and superannuation, both of which were important for 
attracting and sustaining the members of unions. In some cases full-time officials were 
appointed as administrators. Outsiders were impressed by their large size of strike funds, 
which eluded government’s supervision.87 One of the most outstanding examples was the 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE) established in 1851 in the north-west. The 
ASE did not change significantly the basic functions of local unions: they continued to 
restrict the number of apprenticeship; provide insurance-based relief for members 
suffering from unemployment, sickness and accidents; and negotiate with employers in 
terms of conditions of work. These institutional shifts were considered to be important to 
increase the bargaining strength of trade unions. 
Unions’ commitment to politics was increased by sharing their concerns at interactive 
forums. Pioneered by the London Committee of Trade Delegates (LCTD), regional or 
national coordination of trade unions of different industries began to be appreciated. 
Although its influence was confined to trade unions in London, when the National 
Association of United Trades for the Protection of Labour was established after the LCTD 
in 1845, its participants shared the view that in order to vindicate the rights of labour it 
was important to strive for equality before the law. Under the president of Thomas 
Duncombe, an aristocrat-cum-chartist, they discussed issues relating to how to protect 
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interests and promote the well-being of associated trade unions through mediation, 
arbitration and legal proceedings.88 Moreover, in the late 1850s federative bodies of trade 
unions – trade councils – were established in the major cities such as London, Sheffield, 
Edinburgh, Dublin and Birmingham. These councils influenced trade union policies and 
activities. Adopting economically rational measures, they tended to see strikes as the last 
thing to which trade unions should resort. In particular, the London Trade Council 
engaged directly in national politics and targeted removal of the legal obstacles, under 
which trade unions laboured. The leading figures were contemptuously called by the 
Webbs a ‘Junta’, representatives from craft societies – Robert Applegarth of the 
carpenters and joiners, William Allan of the engineers, George Odger of the shoe-makers, 
and Edwin Coulson of the bricklayers. After the failure of the London building dispute in 
1859, in which the Joint Committee of Carpenters, Masons, and Bricklayers attempted to 
shorten hours of work and defend the right of labour to combine, the Junta began to seek 
franchise extension as a prerequisite for changing the existing labour laws, which 
thwarted workers from standing on equal terms with their employers. 
Mundella insisted on the importance of combinations of labour. He believed that since 
combinations among employers were tacitly acknowledged as commonplace, it was 
difficult for workmen to talk on equal terms without allowing their combinations. 
Denying the criticism that giving the right to combine would give labour an advantage 
over capital, Mundella cited some phrases of the father of political economy, Adam Smith, 
and argued that repudiation of combinations of labour meant the deprivation of 
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workmen’s liberty:89  
I sincerely believe this, and maintain that any restriction or infringement of 
this right would be in contravention of the liberties of the subject, and 
dangerous to the best interests of society. But there are limits beyond which 
liberty becomes license; and these limits are well defined by the author I have 
referred to. “But when,” he says, “workmen have power to refuse to employ 
themselves on terms of which they disapprove, they have got all in this respect 
to which they are entitled. None of them have any right to dictate to their 
fellows; or to say that because they object to certain stipulations in the terms 
offered by such and such employers no one else shall be allowed to accept 
them. A pretension of this sort strikes at the very foundations of society.” 
 
Trade unions were the ‘inevitable outgrowth of this freedom’. Behind Mundella’s 
affirmative attitude to workmen’s combination, there were two firm convictions. First, he 
believed that workmen’s labour was sacred and inviolable property, which no one could 
abuse without violating the law of property. As a co-entrepreneur of a hosiery firm, 
Mundella upheld the view that it was workers who were crucial to the prosperity of the 
industry and were enthusiastic about adopting the way to improve their standard of living 
and productivity.90 Second, Mundella regarded strikes as a ‘sad necessity’ of industrial 
disputes, which ended up in national calamity. Having experienced, in his younger days, 
fearful privations caused by large contributions to union funds during strikes, he believed 
that strikes and lock-outs led to demoralising state of both capital and labour. From this 
point of view, it was important to set up a system useful for reconciliation of the 
relationship between capital and labour, in which they could meet together for the 
common ground, ‘with the honest desire to arrive at the truth, and to do justice to each 
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other’ for then ‘a good understanding is almost sure to follow’.91     
In general, trade unions were thought to be purely economic organizations of labour, 
whose morale was neither affected by politics nor religion. Their retreat from Chartist 
insurrectionism after the Plug Plot riots turned them into ‘essentially non-political and 
non-sectarian’ units, whose raison d’etre was to protect their wages and workplace 
conditions.92 The traditional motto of trade unions, ‘a fair day’s wage for a fair day’s 
work’, was based upon what they believed the moral right of labour. After the repeal of 
the Corn Laws their demands, merged increasingly with the ‘bread and cheese questions’, 
were overlapped with the currents of radicalism.93 As the Nonconformist tradition of 
equality before the law was recalled in the anti-Corn Law movement, the Nonconformist 
churches, which were concerned with the miserable result of the 1851 religious census, 
made a direct commitment to the establishment of organizations of labour, since they 
considered that the preservation of working class independence by activities of voluntary 
associations was a key of civilization. They considered that moral values like self-
dependence and self-respect were to be fostered by associative efforts of individuals. 
Therefore, except those seeing trade unionism as protectionism contrary to individual 
freedom, Nonconformists largely supported trade unions in their campaign for 
amendments to the labour laws, as they believed that labour should be allowed to combine 
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freely and act collectively to struggle for fair wage rates and better conditions, insofar as 
they would not obstruct other individuals. For them, the prohibition of freedom of 
association by laws simply meant the failure of liberal institutions. In prompting Liberal 
politicians to promote the cause of trade unionism, they championed the principle of 
conciliation and arbitration, since it was seen as a favourable way to evade illiberal 
conditions, in which individual rights were violated. They argued that independence of 
individuals could further be strengthened through collective self-help.94  
 
1.3. British Positivism and Trade Unions 
Mark Curthoys’ Governments, Labour and the Law in Mid-Victorian Britain, published 
in 2004, examined in detail the formation of the ‘official mind’ in the process of 
legislative recognition of trade unions. What became an ideological instrument to break 
down the theoretical stronghold of the individualist doctrine of political economy was the 
‘inductivist and historicist’ critique espoused by ‘friends of labour’ such as J.M. Ludlow, 
Thomas Hughes, Frederic Harrison and Henry Crompton –  the intellectuals of Broad 
churchmanship labelled as Christian Socialists and Positivists. Their approaches to trade 
unionism were developed in reaction to the ascendancy of the Evangelical principles. 
Denouncing the ‘civilisation’ based upon the Enlightenment, as the disciples of August 
Comte, they believed that the true progress would be achieved by the development of the 
‘true religion’, namely, Christianity.95 Therefore, on the basis of their rationale of the 
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religion of humanity aiming at reconciling scientific developments with religious 
conscience, there was a cardinal rule of morality by order, whose emphasis upon 
intellectualism had a strong correspondence with the ongoing established intellectual 
traditions of Coleridgan elitism and Carlylian industrialism. Regarding the French 
Revolution as the consequence of social exclusion, these schools of thought adopted 
ideological frameworks of harmonic and unifying orientation, in which the creation of an 
‘organic community’ or ‘national unity’  was anticipated through the endowment of 
providential institutions. From this point of view, the economic organization of labour 
was regarded as playing an important role in educating workmen to develop collective 
identity as a part of the nation. It was meaningful to juxtapose the conscience of non-
conformists with that of the establishment, on the grounds that Comte saw that the 
uncultivated virtues of the working classes, which were frugal, disinclined to earthly 
power and not debased by habits of capitalist society, were highly valuable in his positive 
stage of history – the last of his hypothetical three steps of human intellectual progress 
after the theological and metaphysical stages. Thus, in contemplation of the non-
revolutionary propensity of trade unionism, Comtist intellectuals were keen on giving an 
unrelenting support to its cause as acceptable instruments to preserve the institutions of 
providential order.96   
Both Christian Socialists and Positivists were gradually entangled with the trade union 
movement notably after the London engineering disputes in 1851. They felt particular 
sympathy with the amalgamated trade societies because of their conservative 
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characteristics. Ludlow was impressed by their ‘really brotherly spirit’ and regarded the 
1825 repeal act as a ‘solemn duelling code’ which was considered to be a chief cause of 
unstable states of industrial relations.97 Such sentiments were endorsed and recreated in 
the discourse of the National Association for Promotion of Social Science (SSA), 
established by the Henry Brougham in 1857. The SSA was a forum for various social 
issues attracting figures who later became liberal reformists, including advanced 
employers like Mundella and Thomas Brassey, trade unionists like Applegarth and T.J. 
Dunning, advocators of the co-operative movement, G.J. Holyoke and Lloyd Jones and 
Comtist intellectuals, Ludlow and Harrison. They forged a consensus that trade union 
activities, though ‘in restraint of trade’, were necessary for the harmonious relationship 
between capital and labour. Its report, Trades’ Societies and Strikes, issued after an 
investigation of trade societies in 1860, formed a basis of the empirical approach by 
attesting that in reality combinations of labour were an economically rational strategy 
which was useful for educating workmen and that strikes were justifiable means, which 
the theory of supply and demand should take into account.98 These accounts later had a 
significant influence upon Henry Thring’s official endorsement of legalizing 
combinations of labour, in which the Home Office Counsel was convinced by F.D. 
Longe’s renouncement of the wage fund theory two years before J. S. Mill’s recantation 
was made widely known.99 This implied that the orthodox rule of political economy was 
no longer considered to be plausible to determine trade union policies. It was obvious that 
the judgment of the Hornby v. Close case, which placed trade unions outside the 
 
97 Curthoys, op.cit., pp.55-7 
98 L. Goldman, Science, Reform and Politics in Victorian Britain, The Social Science 
Association 1857-1886, Cambridge, 2002, pp.201-213. Curthoys, op.cit., pp.52-3 
99 Ibid., pp.74-80 
52 
 
application of the Friendly Societies Act, was seen by Hughes and Harrison as repugnant 
to the direction of the SSA’s report. These pro-union intellectuals saw the growth of trade 
unionism as a natural reaction by labour to the unrelenting progress of individualism, 
which had been depriving the latter of economic safeguards.100 In the Erle’s commission 
they helped Applegarth to fend off the cross-examinations of an anti-union M.P., J.A. 
Roebuck and to give empirical evidence of ‘respectable’ unions.101   
While the majority report of the Royal Commission on trade unions originated from the 
utilitarian premise of individualism and, hence, proposed to impose restrictions upon 
unions by distinguishing their benefit functions from trade funds as a condition of 
registration, the minority report drafted by Hughes, Harrison and Mundella, aimed to give 
legal status to all trade societies and extend the coverage of the Friendly Societies Act. 
The latter became a rallying point of radicals and they organized a lobby, which was 
strong enough to convince H.A. Bruce, the Home Secretary, to re-introduce a bill outlined 
by a Positivist Home Officer, Godfrey Lushington who adopted substantially the line of 
the minority report.102 The Positivist intellectuals believed that once trade unions were 
recognized ‘by the law and the public opinion, their laudable characteristics – public 
spiritedness, mutuality, and ‘‘heroic struggles for the good of their order’’ – would be 
acknowledged...’. However, to achieve this aim, they understood that the Trade Union 
Act of 1871 had to secure the immunity of trade unions from prosecution as a corporate 
body, since the full incorporation was considered to be an inadequate measure for 
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associations, which were not formed as commercial purposes and unable to bear financial 
burdens. Crompton, a Positivist barrister, and Harrison argued that the policy of 
incorporation was undesirable for voluntary solutions as it would strip a right to pursue 
their private interests by imposing public regulations.103   
The 1871 act was a triumph of the voluntary principle of trade unionism, by which 
spontaneous actions of its members were to be safeguarded. However, when historians 
examine an impact of Positivism on this process of validation of British voluntarism, it is 
not satisfactory to take into consideration solely the solemn account of the execution of 
moral order by authority, which assumed that orderly society would appear after the 
pervasion of morality through the institutional nexus. The British context of Positivist 
traditions had a broader sense than the conventional Positivist studies have suggested. 
One outstanding argument was presented by Jocelyn Betts, whose historical surveys 
pointed out the failure of ‘official’ economic culture to embrace the reality of civil society. 
Betts has argued that the credibility of Mill’s co-operative economy was undermined by 
the decline of democratic values of co-operation, which was supplanted by economic 
interests in private firms in the 1890s. Its failure to take account of the importance of 
entrepreneurship was fatal to his theory. By contrast, those, deep admirers of Comte and 
Carlyle –  Harrison and Edward Beesly – were not hesitant, when declaring their support 
to the cause of trade unionism, to envisage the uninterrupted progress, not of ‘working 
class independence’, but of its ‘purely economic arrangements of practical 
convenience’.104  It was clear that their ultimate end was to entrench ‘correct moral 
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leadership in industry’.105 The flowering of entrepreneurship disclosed Mill’s theoretical 
fallacy of co-operative values as annexation of working class radicalism to the orthodoxy 
of political economy.  
For Betts, Mill’s theoretical premise of economic co-operation was not based on practical 
needs for moral leadership but on ideological utopia. Mill shared the Saint-Simonian 
thought which was a premise of both Comte and Carlyle to avert social exclusion leading 
to revolutionary militarism, but rejected their ideal of an orderly society founded upon 
hierarchical apparatus. Their difference in visions was obvious in their attitudes towards 
political economy. For those who oriented towards industrialism – the unification of 
economic organisations under the jurisdiction of the government – political economy was 
a discursive field leading to atomism. On the other hand, Mill’s ultimate goal of co-
operative society was not severed from the traditional principle of political economy. 
Inheriting the basics of the discipline from his father, James, and Ricardo, John Stuart 
Mill maintained that ‘the spirit of equality and love of individual independence’ was to 
be fostered not by moral leadership but by competition. Mill’s theoretical arguments were 
formulated by the laws of the market, whose Ricardian rhetoric of industrial capitalism 
implied that moral degeneration accompanied by the Malthusian pitfall of stationary state 
was to be overcome by the growing power of masses increased after the competition. 
From this point of view, securing independence of members, economic organizations of 
labour were not deemed to be the means to achieve the convergent state of the nation, but 
rather to disseminate ‘decentred public virtue’. For Mill, an ultimate aim of co-operation 
was to seek democratisation in business ownership and the workplace, in which labour 
 




could learn ways to gain independence, self-control and ownership and finally become 
trustworthy enough to participate in management of joint enterprises. Among the Millian 
circle including Fawcett and William Thornton, trade unions, fostering the contractual 
relationship between capital and labour, were considered to be an educative milestones to 
the co-operative economy.106   
Suggesting a broader set of ideas about British positivism, the rest of this chapter aims to 
show an alternative interpretation underlying the enactment of the Trade Union Act of 
1871. Although not suggesting reasons of the ideological collapse of Mill’s ideal of co-
operative economy, a close examination of the contextual development of the Positivist 
tradition in Britain will reveal a historical trajectory, in which this broader re-
interpretation ensures that the official economic culture incorporating Millian political 
economy had been successful in accommodating demands of working class radicals. 
What is necessary to verify this argument is a shift in the historical focus from the 
discussion of rationality at metaphysical levels to that of embodiment of ideas in 
institutions. By looking into the economic subculture of industrial relations a reason 
behind the legal recognition to trade unions will not be solely understood by the practical 
motive of self-interests, as some Positivists who were followers of Comte and Carlyle 
proclaimed. Alternatively, Mundella’s democratic prospective of industrial boards of 
conciliation and arbitration was formed by more arational values based on his broader 
accounts of altruistic and selfless propositions, which became another rallying point of 
the minority report.     
Research in social science has suggested that disparities of power were not to be fixed, 
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but amended by the economic bargaining or by the party politics in democratic 
constitutions. 107  Its validity was revealed once historians of industrial relations like 
Alastair Reid and Jonathan Zeitlin examined the working class politics of the division of 
labour. They stressed the popularity of liberal values within many working-class 
communities.108 These values were said to have been embodied by the process of reaching 
consensual contracts through collective bargaining, in which working classes struggled 
for the demarcations and conditions of work. However, as mentioned above, in the early 
nineteenth century the inequity of laws still restrained them from standing on the same 
ground with their employers. The Gladstonian Liberals accepted the principles of co-
operative societies and trade unions as their twin tactical pillars of promoting working 
class independence in the 1860s. With the watchwords ‘self-defensive Individualism, 
made attractive by amity, strengthened interest, and rendered effective by association’, 
they advocated ardently the sense of social solidarity in order to influence behavioural 
patterns of people in the lower ranks. 109  At that time the increasing demand for 
enfranchisement supplied an opportunity to cement the political alliance between the 
Liberal reformers and trade unionists. For trade unionists the extension of 
enfranchisement was imperative for securing equality with employers before the law. 
Applegarth believed that the campaign for manhood suffrage was equivalent to the 
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struggle for citizenship. Alongside the established argument of ‘no taxation without 
representation’, he expounded the idea that three policies – political power, educational 
opportunity and expansion of co-operation – were imperative to liberate the working 
classes.110 He set up the Manhood Suffrage and Vote by Ballot Association in 1862, 
which was later merged into the Reform League. Largely working class in membership, 
the League demanded for universal male suffrage – ‘every resident and registered adult 
male person’. The League worked closely with the National Reform Union, which was 
composed mainly of members of the Liberal party and demanded the reform confined to 
ratepayers including ‘respectable’ working men. George Howell, the secretary of the 
League, supported pro-union Liberals such as Hughes, Mill, and Joseph Cowen during 
the 1865 election. After the rejection of the reform bill introduced by Russell and 
Gladstone in 1866, the League launched demonstrations and public meetings on a large 
scale in major cities. It was at this critical moment that the legal status of trade unions 
came into the limelight because of two controversial incidents: the Sheffield outrages of 
1866 and the Hornby v. Close case of 1867.   
Both cases posed a question for the cause of trade unionism. The Sheffield outrages 
aroused public suspicion on the cause of trade unionism after an explosion of a house of 
a workman, who seceded from the local Saw Grinders’ union during a strike. On the other 
hand, the judgment of the Hornby v. Close case excluded trade union funds from the 
coverage of the Friendly Societies Act of 1859, which meant that trade unions were no 
longer qualified to charge against unlawful embezzlement. In face of these adversities, 
the reformist alliance needed to prove that trade unions were not inherently coercive 
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bodies, operating ‘in restraint of trade’. The crux of this problem lay in the extent to which 
combinations of workmen restricted the freedom of individuals. There was a strong view 
that prohibition of picketing was indispensable for keeping the market immune from 
obstacles limiting ceaseless flows of individual labour.111 The orthodoxy of political 
economy still regarded collective action of workers as incompatible with its doctrine of 
the providential law: the common interests of the public would be threatened, when the 
right of individuals to pursue their own interests was disrupted by, in this case, trade 
unions. On the other hand, the reformist alliance agreed that working class organizations 
like trade unions would promote the common interests, because, in Applegarth’s words, 
they would transmit ‘man’s duty to man’ and help to engender the spirits of self-reliance, 
mutual aid and solidarity.112 Especially, it was the long-lasting zeal of trade unionists to 
have the direct interests in industrial issues and to deepen mutual understanding between 
capital and labour. At this point, the dynamism of civilisation was going to puncture the 
myth of political orthodoxy – the economic rule of market individualism, whose political 
economy was corroborated by the existing legislative framework of class-biased laws 
founded upon the feudal values of masters and servants. Its theorem became contradictory, 
when labour began to seek the equality before the law, since it was clear that the end 
result of political economy, the harmony of different interests, lost its validity as long as 
it did not take account of collective bodies of labour.  
True, Curthoys has examined in detail the process, in which the restrictive measures of 
the majority of the committee – compulsory registration with the separation of welfare 
and trade funds for registration and conformity of union rules to statute – was emasculated. 
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Failure of the Russell Gurney’s Act, which provided trade unions with protection of their 
funds, caused grave concern of the committee that for unions there were small benefits of 
registration to gain. The positivism of the minority report challenged the majority’s 
utilitarian proposition. It freed ‘the voluntary, collective forces in society from restriction’, 
which later developed into a concept of ‘collective laissez-faire’. 113  However, this 
removal of the restrictiveness of the majority report did not mean that reconciliation 
between capital and labour was achieved by granting the status of providential institutions 
to trade unions, which were deemed to be beneficial for ‘moralizing’ the market. 
Legitimacy of the minority report was gained, when the perspective of political economy 
and its concept of the market were known to be embodied by Mundella’s voluntary boards 
of conciliation and arbitration and it formed a rallying point of reformist supporters.   
At this point, the question is how far the legislation of the 1870s was informed by ideas 
of state neutrality. The perspective of giving the status of providential institutions echoes 
Mckibbin’s argument about the effective ‘incorporation’ of labour. What enabled trade 
unions to enjoy the unfettered operation of collective bargaining was the successful 
transmission of the ruling class moral values of fairness and evenness to the working 
classes through the ‘given’ institutional privileges under the neutral government.114 In the 
1860s the incorporation of the working classes was actually a far-reaching topic discussed 
especially in association with the enfranchisement issue. There were two international 
catalysts for this concern for the nationalization of the constitution – Italian unification 
and the American Civil War. As Harvie has argued for academic liberalism, the British 
liberal tradition more broadly began to tilt into affirming the incorporation of the working 
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classes. It was Mazzini’s concept of ‘moral’ nationality, which led to a revamp of 
utilitarian individualism. It developed the concept of ideal citizenship, which would 
inculcate the merit of co-operation rather than class struggle. In consequence, the 
orthodoxy of utilitarianism needed to adopt the reform programme of liberalism seeking 
the civil and legal equality in the 1860s. Moreover, the working class support for the 
North during the American Civil War provided them with the upper-class confidence in 
their fidelity to the moral reform of popular government. 115  Thus, the notion that 
alienation from the government would threaten the advancement of society was 
acknowledged and the working class incorporation into the existing institutions was 
placed on the political agenda.     
It is important to point out that liberal reformists were inclined to become radical as the 
tide of democracy advanced the cause of liberalism. True, that the Positivists shared with 
them the view that the working classes had a crucial part to play in ensuring active 
government. However, while the Positivists aimed to educate the working classes through 
institutional apparatus, the morale of liberal reformists, of whom John Bright took the 
initiative, was polemically susceptible to a small group of the Liberal Party, the 
Adullamite. Its leader Robert Lowe, a ‘Foxite Whig’, was a staunch believer of the 
individualist doctrine. Yet, his view was somewhat harsh, as he did not take into account 
the moral regeneration of utilitarianism.116 He espoused economic liberty, but believed in 
a role for the government in free-enterprise economy.117 Henceforth, he fiercely opposed 
the extension of franchise, as fearing intrusion of ‘class-biased’ opinions into politics and 
 
115 Harvie, op.cit., pp.97-115 
116 B. Hilton, ‘Utilitarian or Neo-Foxite Whig? Robert Lowe as Chancellor of the Exchequer’, in 
Green & Tanner (eds.), op.cit., p.46 
117 Harvie, op.cit., p.152 
61 
 
its consequence of shattered society due to the working class ignorance of political 
economy.118 Lowe’s abhorrence of democracy stimulated the demand for electoral reform. 
For the reformist liberals the extension of enfranchisement was imperative for more open 
society. The focal point became the question of legal recognition of trade unions. 
Providing them with the status of the national institutions was considered to be a vital 
issue for good governance. The reformists believed that combinations of labour would 
promulgate moral values, which were expected to become the bases of political education 
and collective self-help. On the other hand, Lowe detested trade unions ‘founded on the 
right of the majority to coerce the minority’ and saw its legal recognition as a portent of 
monopolization of labour, which he believed, ‘far more oppressive and indefensible’ than 
notorious specimens of the Corn Laws.119 All societies in restraint of trade should be 
illegal. Therefore, in the Royal Commission, he demanded the separation of welfare from 
trade functions of unions and their rules abided by strict conformity to the law.   
As Curthoys has argued, the contribution of the Positivist lawyers was so significant as 
to defy the proposal of the majority and, instead, promote the view of unions as worth 
having the advantages of the Friendly Societies without shouldering corporate 
responsibility. They tried to endorse the view that there was no need for alterations to 
union rules, nor of interference in management, because the importance of the legal 
recognition was to transmit the idea of self-reform as a moral duty, rather than imposing 
legal penalties. In Curthoys’ work this view was central to the frame of mind of the 
minority report, which, he sees, represented reformists’ rationale of the incorporation of 
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trade societies.120 Nevertheless, it is possible to suggest a different and more ‘radical’ 
point of consensus on the sanction of unions’ incorporation. The other Adullamite, Lord 
Elcho, thought that the Master and Servant Acts were oppressive, and in co-operation 
with Alexander MacDonald, the president of the National Miners’ Association, 
introduced the amendment bill, which became the Master and Servant Act of 1867. Yet, 
Elcho’s intention was still based on anti-democratic reasonings. He feared the 
development of trade unionism and though criminality was removed in the case of breach 
of contract, a penalty of imprisonment was still imposed on labour inflicting damage to 
personal property. He severely opposed the legal recognition of trade unions and 
demanded their limit to friendly society functions. The reason of Elcho’s support for 
labour was twofold. First, he wanted to ‘show up’ the reformist liberals a way to deal with 
labour. Second, he felt sympathy towards the wretched, which was reflected in his 
paternalism. For him, it was repugnant to seek legislative solutions, but it was admissible 
to secure industrial peace through the voluntary framework of boards of conciliation and 
arbitration.121              
Mundella’s boards of conciliation and arbitration came into the limelight after the 
commission. His electoral triumph in Sheffield popularised the scheme, as embodying 
‘the good and the interest of all classes’.122 Mundella believed that his boards would 
eliminate ‘all danger from trade unions, and had substituted quiet and peace – a perfect 
Agapemone’ between capital and labour.123 It was evident that Mundella upheld the 
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orthodox view of Positivism that antidotes to pauperism and crime were to encourage 
education, co-operation and formation of associations and saw his boards as a means to 
transmit the moral values of humanity and progress.124 However, Curthoys seems to 
undervalue a distinctive and essential aspect of Mundella’s scheme of collective 
bargaining by laying an overshadowing emphasis upon its role of moralizing of the 
market.125 In fact, this neglects the importance of Mundella’s boards. What underpinned 
Mundella’s rationale of advocation of his boards of conciliation and arbitration was his 
firm belief in the principles of Protestantism, which were grounded upon ‘freedom to all 
and patronage to none’. He believed that it was the duty of every Englishman to ‘wish 
them all God speed’ and declared clearly that the boards of arbitration and conciliation 
were invented by Christ, who taught him, in the cause of justice and reason, that ‘Let both 
parties act on the principle of ‘‘Do unto others as you would that others should do unto 
you’’’.126 The main priority of the establishment of the boards was, therefore, to preserve 
the right and liberty of individuals to ‘purchase his own loaf to sustain his own place of 
worship’.127 Through the procedure of collective bargaining, the working classes were 
expected to learn the operation of economic laws – political economy.128 Gladstone also 
addressed this justification of collective bargaining. He told Mundella that ‘they 
[arbitration and co-operation] are the only systems which do not interfere with the true 
principles of political economy’.129  
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Mill’s recantation of the wage fund theory should not be seen as the state’s renouncement 
of political economy on trade union policies. Rather, as Biagini has argued, it provided 
the cause of trade unionism with the scientific basis of political economy, which assumed 
that ‘the market price of labour became an undetermined entity which was to be defined 
by workers and employers in their bargainings’. Given such legitimacy of political 
economy, trade unions were able not only to ‘gain real increases in wages’, but also to 
‘prevent employers from imposing a wage level much lower than the one which have left 
a fair margin of profit to them’.130 At this moment, political economy was inclined not to 
ascribe outcomes of the market mechanism to the deistic will of optimal choice. Such 
metaphysical understanding was gradually replaced by more practical and substantial 
application of the concept of market to ‘a nexus of institutions and rules with specific 
legal definitions’.131 This means that conjectural accounts of market institutions became 
exposed to the public and while an influence of trade unions on bargaining procedure was 
increased, its ultimate judgment was allocated to ‘the invocation of public opinion’.132 
Disconnecting state intervention from trade union activities, Mill’s theoretical credibility 
assured the entrenchment of state neutrality and succeeded in garnering the support of the 
Gladstonian Liberals such as W.E. Forster, G.J. Goschen and J.D. Coleridge. All of them 
popularised the notion that trade unions were no longer the threat to free trade or to the 
state finance. Mill himself declared his support to the minority report in the Bee Hive.133 
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In this way, the acknowledgement of free collective bargaining became the rallying point 
in support of the minority report.  
Pledging support for the minority report, George Potter, a member of the Progressive 
Society of Carpenters and Joiners, also consented to Mundella’s scheme of conciliation 
and arbitration for the reason that it would halt ‘the tyranny of capital’.134 There was a 
strong antagonism between Potter and Applegarth’s Conference of Amalgamated Trade 
(CAT) particularly after the Hornby v. Close case. When the CAT, which Mundella saw 
as the assembly of ‘model’ trade unions, introduced the Associations of Workmen bill 
aiming to secure protection of union funds by deposit of their rules, Potter concerned legal 
segregation of small and local unions, which Applegarth detested as ‘strike societies’, and 
launched a separate conference at St Martin’s Hall. However, in terms of the Trade Union 
Bill, Potter formed a united front with the CAT, which later became a base of the 
establishment of the Trades Union Congress (TUC). Potter explained the reason behind 
his backing of the bill as follows:135  
If boards of arbitration of a character to be effective for the prevention of 
strikes and lock-outs should ere long be established, the men would hail them 
as a great boon. But who can close his eyes to the fact that the working-men 
of this country are more dependent upon the capital of others…? And this 
state of things will inevitably continue until they insisted upon the enactment 
of such laws as, in the language of the late Mr. Cobden, will enable them to 
turn over the furrows of their own freeholds, from which they have long been 
practically excluded.    
 
Upholding the traditional trade union motto of ‘a fair day’s wage for a fair day’s work’, 
Potter believed that to seek mutual agreement between capital and labour was the best 
 
134 G. Potter, ‘The Trade Societies of England’, Contemporary Review, xiv, 1870, p.427 
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way to preserve the best value of human beings – ‘independence’.136 Combinations of 
labour were ‘unassailable in respect of principle’, as it enabled to give ‘a full justification 
of the workman’s claim to make his own bargain’. In this sense trade unions would enable 
‘the weaker and less capable members of the different trades and occupations’ to ‘have 
the greatest interest’.137 It was misleading to portray collective bargaining as imparting 
privileges or requiring legal incorporation. On the contrary, Potter regarded it as 
beneficial for adjusting the rate of wages to the ‘varying state of all the circumstances 
affecting trade, whether from the capital or from the labour side of the question’.138 A 
buttress of this perspective was his firm belief in economic liberty embedded in the boards 
of conciliation and arbitration:139     
There must be in conciliation or in arbitration the utmost liberty for the play 
of all those influences which determine the character of a trade dispute, bring 
out facts in exact form and in full light, and overpower the prejudice and the 
passion which may have been introduced into the question, by the 
dispassionate expression and suasive application of that special knowledge 
which both sides are ready to endorse when free from those agitations of the 
spirits which interfere with a judgement according to knowledge. 
 
Biagini has defined as ‘liberal corporatism’ this view of industrial society, in which 
observance of a democratic framework of collective bargaining would maximize the 
interests of both capital and labour. A salient point was participants’ spontaneous and 
mutual obligation to the ‘trade’ rather than ‘class’ interests. 140  It was important to 
preserve their ‘natural order’ of interests. This nonpartisan principle was to be secured by 
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Mundella’s strong insistent on voluntarism, which placed no faith in the state for 
settlements of industrial conflict. Mundella believed that only men who had both special 
knowledge of their trade and showed a special interest in peaceful settlement could carry 
out ‘open and friendly bargaining’, which enabled the employer and employed to discuss 
their common affairs openly and freely.141 Promulgating the public image of ‘law-abiding, 
peaceful and conciliatory’ trade unions, he strongly commended the voluntary framework 
of collective bargaining as an ideal for the amicable settlement of industrial disputes. On 
the 1867 conciliation act, framed by Lord St. Leonards, he did not admit any concessions 
to the use of the enforcement of the law and argued that ‘nothing contained in the Act 
should authorise any council to establish the rate of wages or the price of workmanship 
which the workman should in future in paid’.142 His experience told him that compulsive 
measure had never been necessary:143 
It cannot fix a rate of wages, or control the varying circumstances which 
enhanced or reduced wages; and the right place to adjust all such questions as 
the law cannot and ought not to define such as changes in machinery, working 
hours, rates of wages, apprenticeships, and the relative shares of the master 
and workman in the profits of apprenticeship, is the Board of Arbitration. 
 
Mundella was opposed to the arbitration system which was delegated to persons 
uninformed or uninterested in the particular trade.144 He did not see legislative solutions 
as a remedy, because it did not reflect each party’s friendly spirit. The primary aim of the 
Mundella’s scheme was to substitute the good will for hostile feeling of both classes.145 
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From this point of view, the Trade Union Bill was a question of justice – ‘this bill was 
the same for the master; for trades’ unionists; for the non-unionists; they should all be 
placed upon an equal footing; let there be no special legislation for trades’ unions’. Citing 
the statement of the colliers of South Yorkshire, Mundella referred to what he wanted 
through the Bill: ‘this is right, or it is wrong, but it is never the wrong time to sit down 
and try to be friendly and adjust your differences’.146 Giving labour the right to combine 
enabled both capital and labour to consider what they should do and what they should not 
do.147  It was Mundella’s vision of democratic exchange as an antidote to miserable 
conditions of industrial relations, which gained ‘the emphatic endorsement’ of the Royal 
Commission. 148  It is now clear that Mundella’s voluntary measure of boards of 
conciliation and arbitration was not formulated primarily for gaining the institutional 
privilege as the incorporated institution. It is also illusory to see that it prompted the 
working classes to accept the system of market capitalism, which resulted in widening 
the economic gap between the union and non-union workers. Instead of the law of supply 
and demand, it rather embraced Mill’s view of the market, as shown in the next chapter, 
which put strong faith in the civic virtues to foster individual independence. Thus, while 
the legal incorporation of the working classes was assured by giving the sanction for 
combinations of labour, the mainstay of the Trade Union Act of 1871 was its official 
acceptance of free collective bargaining between capital and labour, as a way to preserve 
working class independence. It was on this Mundella’s altruistic and selfless cause, rather 
than self-centred reason of Positivism, which George Potter and Lord Elcho came to 
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agreement and expressed a support for the minority report. 
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Ch.2. The Rule of Law and Collective Bargaining 1870-1890 
                                                            
2.1. Co-operative Ideology and Collective Bargaining in the Mid-Nineteenth 
Century 
As my first chapter has shown, the pro-union intellectuals of Broad churchmanship, such 
as Christian Socialists and Positivists, aiming at communal unity grounded upon the 
vertical relations of moral authority, saw the economic organization of labour as the 
means to transmit their moral order to the working class people. Taking the collectivist 
approach to the market principle, their frame of mind was summed up as ‘moralizing of 
the market’ – reconciliation of moral order with unbridled economic activities. When 
enacting series of the trade union laws in the 1870s, the advanced liberals, concerned 
about the individualistic creed of utilitarianism growing under the free trade economy, 
strived to establish the economic safeguard of labour by giving the legal status to trade 
unions and securing the free operation of collective bargaining. However, in respect of 
allowing the organized labour to seek voluntary solution, the institutional framework of 
collective bargaining was not to be entirely ordained by the guidance of the providential 
order in the act of incorporation of labour. The room for demonstrating a radical sentiment 
of economic liberty emerged and the tradition of political economy formed another 
political platform of the minority report in the 1871 Trade Union Act, granting its 
scientific acknowledgement to the cause of trade unionism. As a result, the conventional 
positivist view of orderly society was made a contrast with the market principle of 
competition, which had been the theoretical format of the economic orthodoxy to achieve 
individual independence. It was this ideological juxtaposition of the positivist social 
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philosophy and the tradition of political economy, which formed the solid intellectual 
stronghold in securing the voluntary framework of collective bargaining and fostered 
economic subculture of free trade in labour in the early 1870s.   
This chapter examines the rise and fall of the ideological context behind the legal 
institution of collective bargaining. The voluntary framework of collective bargaining 
was a landing point of the binary assumption of the 1871 Trade Union Act, at which the 
official economic policy of free trade could accept the working class radicalism. This co-
operative doctrine of liberalism imposed the rule of law upon liberal society. When the 
intellectual discourse of political economy sanctioned trade unionism as a bulwark of 
religious liberty of individuals, its acceptance of pluralism necessarily implied its 
deviation from the orthodox principle of market economy. This chapter, by collecting 
popular and vernacular voices about collective bargaining, first attempts to scrutinize how 
this rule of law in collective bargaining was recognised in practice. Under equality before 
the law, the voluntary framework of collective bargaining enabled both capital and labour 
to determine their rights and duties. Such producers’ customary exercise did not drive its 
function to maximize the interest of individuals and damage labour organisations as some 
historiography tended to appeal. Inquiries into contemporary ideas would suggest, rather, 
how much public consciousness was shared under the rule of law in the co-operative 
doctrine of the mid-Victorian liberal economy, as far as it undergirded religious liberty 
of individuals in a pluralist form. And how what some historians considers to be the 
traditional programme of trade unions – putting brakes on overproduction and limiting 
the number of apprenticeship – was anticipated in the procedure of collective bargaining 
in the aim of accommodating to the communal interests. The rule of law behind 
institutions of collective bargaining was, nonetheless, gradually deteriorated, once there 
72 
 
was a growing demand for official embrace of industrial relations. In the intellectual 
discourse, the liberal ideology of co-operation began to demand capital- or growth-
oriented approach to market economy. Tracing voices of contemporary intellectuals, this 
chapter, second, examines their fear against separation between the moral and economic 
principle. The expansive and growth-oriented language of co-operative production, 
replacing the ideological bastion accommodating the market principle to the common 
good, curtailed the religious concord of liberal co-operation – the voluntary practice of 
collective bargaining in a pluralist form. This shift in the sense of co-operation, in 
consequence, turned Liberal intellectuals to develop their contexts of political economy 
based upon modern idealist principles in response to fractured industrial society.      
It has been argued that the intellectual discourse, which evoked the discursive congruity 
between co-operative production and political economy, lost its validity before the 1890s. 
Its conflicting relationship was pointed out by Betts, when he revealed theoretical fragility 
of Mill’s questionable convergence of the theory of co-operative production with the 
tradition of political economy. Mill’s ideal of co-operative production could not put the 
seal upon economic concerns due to the persistence of the concept of wage labour and 
the growing pressure to increase economic efficiency, which helped to turn later 
intellectuals to appraise the economic thoughts giving endorsement to rare competency 
of entrepreneurship. In theory, Mill’s civic independence was reckoned to be achieved by 
self-governance of workers throwing off shackles of wage labour and by free competition, 
whose effects were maximized by spontaneous motives for economic activity. Its basis 
lost ideological persuasiveness in terms of its inherent ambiguity. Mill’s adherence to the 
authority of political economy appeared contradictory, because his insistence on 
collective ownership for the public good fended off what he upheld – ‘the competitive 
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workings of the market’ as a safeguard of civic independence. Hence, Betts has argued 
that the unity between ‘official’ and ‘popular’ economic culture was so weak, as long as 
Mill’s moral ideal of co-operative production was successful in hindering the growth of 
capacity on the part of the concept of ‘capital’, on the importance of which the positivists 
continued to insist. Mill’s civic virtue of independence was no longer possible to achieve 
through the unity of industrial relations, because his ideal of working class ownership was 
the upshot of a ‘mid-Victorian ambiguity surrounding the theorization of business 
leadership’. Therefore, the marriage between classical liberalism and co-operativism, 
promoted by the Millian circle, was so unstable that the divorce came through, when the 
requirements of efficiency called for by the market resulted in unveiling the naivety of 
the Millian principle of co-operative production.149 
Indeed, Mill adopted the market principle as the source of active, but also civic-minded 
character of individuals. Nonetheless, by this means he seemed not to mean to place 
individuals under the pressure from the market economy as giving a momentum to 
economic competition in private realms. To foster educated and self-improving character 
of the working class, Mill explicitly gave his theoretical support to trade unions, which 
were a stepping-stone towards his ideal of co-operation. In the process, he did not discard 
the concept of competition as beneficial for workers and also maintained the importance 
of support of capital, both of which were deemed to act as a counterpoise to the state 
authority. When the presence of Mundella’s boards of conciliation and arbitration lent 
credence to the minority report of the Royal Commission, the co-operative ideology 
manifested in the legal framework of the 1871 Trade Union Act did not favour the way 
 
149 Betts, The business enterprise in mid-Victorian social thought and‘John Stuart Mill, 
Victorian Liberalism and the Failure of Co-operative Production’, quotation is from p.3 
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of orderly institutionalisation of the organized labour, on which the conventional 
positivist vision was premised. It did help to underpin the institutional arrangement of 
voluntary collective bargaining, in which the principle of political economy was justified. 
At this point, the issue at stake was not whether the co-operative ideology was hostile to 
the tradition of political economy, but, given that there was a strong affinity between the 
Victorian liberalism and the prevalent interpretations of Mill’s principle of co-operation, 
it was, rather, important to emphasize that the intellectual context of political economy 
did not give a priority to economic concerns, but to moral issues. In the case of Millian 
political economy, as Lipkes has argued, Mill’s extra-economic considerations were 
aimed to offer the ground of religious diversity to the religion of the dissenters. Therefore, 
by giving acknowledgement of political economy Mill, as a ‘supporter of religion’, 
endorsed trade union activities as a bulwark of religious beliefs of individuals against 
discretionary omnipotence of human beings in disguise of ‘expert opinion’.150  
After the decline of Chartism, trade unionism, alongside the co-operative movements, 
became a main vehicle of working class radicalism. For the latter, Mill’s political 
economy was the liberal safeguard, which contended the importance of competition in 
place of moral leadership, as the means to achieve individual independence. He 
considered trade unions to be the means to help disseminate civic virtues and, in contrast 
to his father James, it was important for him to achieve fair economic distribution prior 
to the equality of the political rights. In order to combat political corruption owing to 
demoralising force of aristocracy, the recognition of working class associations were 
considered to be necessary in terms of moral progress. He thought that the principle of 
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co-operation based on voluntary associations were effective in case of industrial working 
classes, as long as the sense of ‘public spirit, generous sentiments… and equality’ was 
not to be raised under the circumstance of ‘isolation of interests’. The associational efforts 
were vital in terms of enabling labour to have a bargain with their employers on equal 
terms and to protect the relative autonomy of working classes. In the process, Mill revised 
his early understanding of Ricardian postulates. Springing from his strong belief in 
altruism, his endorsement of the ‘heterodox’ intellectuals, such as William Thornton and 
Thomas Leslie, resulted in demythifying the theoretical concept of Benthamite 
utilitarianism. The principle of political economy redefined the legitimacy of economic 
liberalism, whose premise was deflected from the atomistic doctrine of utility maximizing 
desire of individuals and accepted the more community-centred or associational vision 
based upon altruistic and selfless propositions. In this popular version of political 
economy, the economic rationality was sought by their moral reasons obliging mutual 
reciprocity, aiming to benefit broader communities. 
In defending the rationale of trade unionism, the anti-utilitarian attitudes were expressed 
in the religious and economic sentiments of radicalism. Their intellectual discourse was 
led principally by Mill, when endorsing the arguments of Thornton and Leslie. Since the 
religious beliefs of individuals should not be denied by the experts, the rule of majority, 
which would be sanctioned by the presumption of utilitarianism, was mistrusted. 
Thornton argued that in order to protect the natural rights from legitimized obligation, 
which was to be determined by ‘scientific laws’ of human behaviours, it was important 
to distinguish religious morality from the coercive function of utility – there were, he 
continued, ‘private rights independent of utility which no public needs can cancel’. The 
human faculty such as freedom, fallibility and altruism, all of them bestowed by God, 
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was more complex than being presupposed and was developed spontaneously not in the 
least by proliferation of privileges as a consequence of rational calculation.151 Hence, the 
juncture of the ideological divorce between the positivist social philosophy and the 
tradition of political economy could happen, when the growth of the market principle 
accompanied by an intellectual shift in the discourse of political economy justified an 
increase in economic efficiency and detached itself from the humanitarian nature of 
Millian political economy. In this transition to a more pragmatic version of science, a 
historical explanation of the market principle is needed to focus on the utility of the co-
operative ideology. It was this reciprocal, religious and economic sentiment, which in the 
middle of the nineteenth century was induced to limit the operation of unbridle economic 
activities under free trade.   
In fact, when it became obvious that the Churches had failed to respond to the needs of 
the working classes in the middle of the century, a sense of sin spread out among the 
denominations of Christianity and turned out to be their redemptive action in opposition 
to individual outlooks given by the tripartite force of evangelicals, dissenters and 
Benthamites, which were seen to carry out most of reforms by the mid-nineteenth century. 
Thornton injecting ‘an object of worship’ into Mill’s religion of humanity, the frame of 
mind of Millian political economy was more or less shared by a wide range of the 
religious press from that of the Roman Catholic to the Nonconformist. They accepted 
trade unions as part of the unity of industrial societies and some took close and friendly 
attitudes, about which Mayor called ‘a golden age in relations of religion and the unions’ 
lasting until the 1880s. Such revived Christian sentiments were inclined to advocate the 
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co-operative ideology between capital and labour, informing that the present condition of 
society was not determined by external laws.152 The Dundee Courier & Argus mentioned 
that to the ‘common sense and the Christianity’ of the country, ‘a war between capital 
and labour will be the obstruction’. What was needed to restore the harmony was mutual 
conciliation based upon ‘the sense of mutual regard and love which forms the very 
foundation of Christianity’.153    
Such Christian support for the co-operative movement was first demonstrated in the mid-
nineteenth century. The Christian Socialists, such as F.D. Maurice, J.M. Ludlow and 
Thomas Hughes, after the decline of Chartism attempted to turn the working class 
attention from political action to the reformist measure of reducing the harm of unlimited 
competition through the moral guidance of mutual obligation between capital and 
labour. 154  Inheriting not only the Owenite model of communal regulation of 
overproduction, but also Louis Blanc’s revolutionary framework of the Ateliers 
Nationaux, they believed that associational efforts of producers would minimize the 
oppression of competition. The ‘enfranchisement of capital’ was their mainstay. 
Encouraging the working-class co-operatives, in which workers as shareholders had their 
direct interests in business, they demanded the right of limited liability of small investors 
in order to facilitate expansion of working class investment and increase in opportunities 
to lead them to the ‘mutual sharing of profit and incur the losses and debts of other 
partners’ in working class co-operatives’.155 Despite the legal securities they preserved 
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for producers’ co-operation such as the Joint Stock Companies Winding Up Acts of the 
late 1840s and the Industrial and Providential Societies Act of 1852, such producers’ co-
operatives did not flourish. Beatrice Webb criticized co-operative production for not 
guaranteeing the full control of labour and pointed out, as one of reasons of its failure, the 
rise of the consumers’ movement.156 In fact, thereafter, the more non-conformist version 
of consumers’ co-operation took its place. The Rochdale society was a famous model of 
the combination of consumers. Taking the form of co-operative property management, 
the distributive co-operation aimed at the mutual improvement of moral discretion of 
members through the market activities. Biagini has argued that the Gladstonian Liberals 
embraced the co-operative principle of the consumers’ movement and they believed that 
by its expansion the strong sense of social solidarity would be fostered among the poor.157 
Taking account of experiments carried out by co-operators in the light of producers and 
consumers, the principle of co-operation, which aimed to put a harness upon the 
atomizing operation of the market economy, became the central ideological premise of 
labour policies in the Gladstonian Liberal party. 
When the optimistic and cosmopolitan model of free trade economy obtained the 
economic legitimacy after Cobden’s rejection of the retributive model of evangelicalism 
and Peel’s repeal of the Corn Laws, Ricardian political economy of the industrialist, 
competitive and growth-oriented discourse came to the fore. With its utilitarian sentiment 
of happiness and prosperity, the sanguine language of free trade was used as a crusade 
against the ancient regime, overturning the economic paradigm of paternalist and 
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protectionist policies of mercantilism.158 The widespread popular support was gained by 
making an appeal to the ‘people’s bread’. When propitiation of the interests of consuming 
people was successful in fostering unity and morality of consumers, the more secular 
version of free trade was recognized as the safeguards of the national community and 
believed to serve the common interest of both manufacturers and working classes. Thus, 
politics of free trade economy encouraged the establishment of consumers’ identity in 
British political culture. In this sense, the working class demands for a fair return from 
their labour as a prerequisite for their moral duty were manifested in the light of their 
independence not only as their interests of producers, but also of consumers. However, 
when trade unionists upheld the traditional trade union motto of a ‘fair day’s wage for a 
fair day’s work’ as the moral right of labour and strived to legitimate the economic 
organization of labour to increase their bargaining power, such trade union programme 
was overlapped with a current of radicalism.159 The growing sentiment of industrial 
democracy was tied with a more egalitarian vision of the republican tradition.160 Free 
trade in labour – producers’ right to exchange their ‘labour’ as sacred and inviolable 
property in a free and fair market – was to be secured, only when the democratic 
assumption of co-operation was shared by capital and labour in the procedure of the 
voluntary collective bargaining. While it permitted the relative autonomy of the working 
classes, the libertarian rights of producers were restricted to the extent that the 
‘democratic spirit’ was successful in retarding the desire of utility maximizing individuals 
for the sake of defending their natural liberty, on which the moral system of Millian 
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political economy was based. Different from marginalist theorists, who later elaborated 
the theory of consumer surplus, Mill, therefore, stressed that the consumption of 
‘unproductive labour’ did not benefit the working classes in general.161  
In this sense, developed as the economic subculture of free trade economy, the co-
operative ideology of the mid-nineteenth century required the commitment to the rule of 
law in terms of the condition that operation of the voluntary framework of collective 
bargaining aimed at securing a strict equilibrium between production and consumption. 
The esprit de corps of this sense of moral economy was expressed by George Potter, a 
staunch contemporary proponent of the lawfulness of local trade unions. As the crux of 
collective bargaining, he expounded the importance of seeking identical interests of the 
tripartite agents of economy – capital, labour and consumers. Potter argued that in order 
to achieve their equilibrium it was necessary to instil among them the morale ‘ruled, and 
safely guided by the spirit of moderation and mutual forbearance in their relation one 
towards the other’. On the basis of this discussion, there was a firm belief that it was 
important to take account of the interests of consumers as an impersonal mediator 
between ‘the claims of labour’ and ‘frank and general concession on the part of capital’, 
because the consumers ‘should take and express their views as a class of what may appear 
to them a war between the two sections of producers, and a war, too, which they may 
conceive, and even sometimes really feel, to be prejudicial to their interests of 
convenience’. For Potter, ‘a fair, reasonable and intelligent’ discretion of the consumers 
was the third economic force, which would constrain avarice of producers and was 
expected to be a guiding hand of trade unions to achieve their universal recognition, 
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helping to discard their violent images.162  
Furthermore, John H. Rutherford’s comment in the Leicester town meeting for peaceful 
relations between capital and labour expressed comprehensively this co-operative 
ideology between capital, labour and consumers as the Christian spirit of justice of 
favouring mutual conciliation for a system of guaranteeing peaceful solution. Rutherford 
was an evangelical preacher and showed a grave concern about the dominant spirit of 
trade – utilitarianism, which was labelled as the ‘doctrine of devils’. With a firm belief 
that only by the Millian principle of co-operation, could industrial prosperity be ensured, 
he insisted that in uniting capital and labour there was ‘application of the great principle 
of brotherhood to labour’. Co-operation meant having confidence each other, organizing 
together and becoming their own masters by fulfilling their duties: ‘He did not care 
whether a man was a peer or parson, a rich man or pauper…it was not to himself and 
family he owed it, but to his country and the world, of which he was a member, that he 
did not neglect his daily task…’. The term, ‘duty’, was possible to be paraphrased into 
the term ‘labour’, as he also contended that ‘labour was not an indignity, nor was it a 
curse, but that it was a blessing and an honour’. From this point of view, trade unions 
played an important role to reach the sommum bonum of co-operation, as they had merits 
of uniting them removing injustice and social misery and increasing moral influence in 
place of industrial warfare. The organized labour was a means to ease the accomplishment 
of independence and emancipate labour by securing a ‘fair day’s wage for a fair day’s 
work’, which was achievable only by reckoning the consumers’ interests. The latter 
needed to be allocated a ‘fair share of the profits over and above what was paid for capital 
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and labour’. The scheme of conciliation and arbitration was indispensable for avoiding 
industrial disputes. In the world of commerce, where ‘capital could not do without labour, 
and labour could not do without capital’, it was ‘one of the most Christian acts’ to show 
the spirit of co-operation.163 
The religious discipline of the rule of law was, thus, entangled deeply with the Victorian 
value of the co-operative ideology. Mundella himself believed that his ‘reasonable, 
humane and Christian system’ was to promote mutual respect between capital and 
labour.164 Samuel Morley, a Nonconformist employer, argued that a successful settlement 
of industrial dispute was obtained, when both capital and labour shared the high moral 
grounds:165  
The highest position that employers could wish for their man was that they 
should recognise their duty to God as well as to man; for this involved their 
duties to themselves, to their families, and to society. 
 
Its characteristic of tripartite liaison between capital, labour and consumers also became 
the basis of the foundational idea of the voluntary framework of collective bargaining. 
Thompson’s research of the intellectual discourse and scholarly usage of the public 
opinion has shown that the interests of consumers were well reflected in the concept of 
the public opinion as an imponderable economic force. Thompson has maintained that 
the public opinion was virtually steeped in the interests of consuming people. After the 
repeal of the Corn Laws, in regard with economic and political performance, the public 
opinion fulfilled an important role not only in regulating industrial disputes and 
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preserving industrial peace, but also in underpinning the premise of political economy of 
free trade. From this point of view, the voluntary procedure of collective bargaining 
opened the room for the prospects of consumers to materialize their interests in industrial 
warfare, when the latter taking a form of and being represented by the public opinion.166 
In fact, The Morning Post reckoned this intangible existence of the public as one of 
economic factions, whose interests were highly susceptible to disruption of industrial 
relations:167   
There is, however, a third party, who always suffers from these contests, and 
that is the consumer – that curious indescribable entity called the public. 
Capital cannot lie idle, labour cannot be suspended in any trade, or in any 
branch of trade, without the public suffering from the suspension of activity 
in production, and the consequent increase of prices. In the long run it may 
be safely asserted that the consumer suffers as much or more from strikes than 
either the capitalist or the workman. The loss in their case is spread over so 
large a surface that it is impossible to ascertain its amount per individual, but 
it is none the less real for that; and this is a solid and substantial reason why 
the public should discourage strikes, and should support any movement which, 
by establishing sound relations between capital and labour, shall render them 
unnecessary and impossible. 
 
Therefore, instead of resorting to strikes and lock-outs, it was considered to be beneficial 
for the public to seek the voluntary solutions to stabilise industrial relations. These claims 
on the significance of consumerist culture were also consistent with the foundational 
disposition of the voluntary boards of conciliation and arbitration, as, Lujo Brentano, a 
contemporary historical economist, stated concisely that the sanction eluding separation 
of strike and benefit funds resulted ‘in the interest of the public as well as in that of the 
trade union’.168 From this viewpoint, the legal recognition of trade unions was thought to 
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be beneficial for the public. On the contrary, collective bargaining was also seen as a 
means ‘to gain their point with the public’.169 When reviewing history of the combination 
acts, The Sheffield & Rotherham Independent mentioned that at present ‘both parties are 
careful to consider how the issue will be regarded by the public’ and that ‘each side is 
anxious to have a good case, conscious that it is of the first importance to secure the 
pressure of public opinion for their own side’.170 In short, the operation of free collective 
bargaining was consequently constrained by the moral force of the public determining 
‘the fair value of labour’ through open discussions. Morley, an industrialist M.P., insisted 
that harmonious distribution of wealth could not be achieved if legislatively imperative, 
but once ‘creating a public opinion amongst the workmen, as also amongst the 
employers’.171 
Before giving a narrow focus upon the scheme of collective bargaining as the 
battleground of producers’ interests between capital and labour, which is inclined to reach 
a conclusion that emphasized its procedure as the cause of economic inequality, it is 
important to take into account the disposition of collective bargaining, which was affected 
by the indeterministic character of the public. In the context of economic liberalism, this 
discursive shift of political economy turned out to be the less deterministic economic 
doctrine, and contributed to wide-ranging interests of communities. Therefore, it is vital 
to grasp the function of collective bargaining as the machinery adjusting the interests of 
both producers and consumers, since historiography based on the previous and 
deterministic assumption of the market principle as an impersonal force tended to 
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overlook the economic culture of free trade – the economic values of consuming people. 
However, as Thompson has examined linguistically, it is likely misleading to make a 
clear-cut distinction of the interests between producers and consumers. The concept of 
the public as the secular economic force always had complex connotations. Its 
composition was varied, as, in practice, it was overlapping, interrelated with and as 
important as that of classes on a constant basis. For instance, it may be beneficial for the 
consumers, if they could buy products as cheap as possible, but less, if this leads to 
extraordinarily lower wages of labour, as many of them in most cases constitute the 
working classes as well, and the similar effect can be seen in the case if profiteering by 
the producers extorts exorbitant payment from the consumers. Therefore, the extent to 
which the moral force of the public made a pressure to take a balance of the economic 
forces through the procedure of collective bargaining remained enigmatic. 
Although Betts attributes the degradation of the democratic values to Mill’s theoretical 
deficiency in evaluating the potential of entrepreneurship, whose original concepts were 
rooted in the tradition of Comtian intellectualism and Carlylian industrialism, the 
ideological breakdown of equality between capital and labour was not rooted in the 
theoretical illegitimacy of Mill’s co-operative production. Its main vehicle was, rather, 
the growth of the market principle, which was accompanied by the greater division of 
labour, as Adam Smith mentioned that the division of labour was to be limited by a scale 
of the market. What did lubricate the discourse of the market principle, which promoted 
the division of labour greater to the extent that almost nullified the co-operative ideology 
of the mid-nineteenth century and replaced the values of industrial democracy with the 
ideological supremacy of economic efficiency? The progenitor of Mill’s decentred public 
virtue, Alexis Tocqueville, arguing the growth of liberty and equality in the U.S., foresaw 
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the industrial relations fallen back to the despotic one, when the greater equality between 
capital and labour ended up in confronting a ‘degrading utilitarian reality’ under the 
growth of national economy, as its increasing needs to serve the national economy 
accelerated the greater division of labour.172 The rule of law in collective bargaining 
would be collapsed, when the co-operative ideology of the mid-nineteenth century 
experienced separation of producers – capital and labour – from consumers. The 
voluntary framework of collective bargaining guaranteed the institutional privilege of 
trade unions to seek the natural order of interests. However, their necessity to reconcile 
the market may have induced its principle to lean to more productionist policies.  
The tradition of political economy, which had strived to seek economic liberty of 
individuals, revealed the truth that the metaphysical principle of the market no longer 
guaranteed economic liberty of labour, particularly when it was argued that such theories 
of the market helped to preserve the unequal and exclusive conditions of labour. Under 
the optimistic and growth-oriented model of free trade, a series of legislation was passed, 
which formed the legal ground of entrepreneurship: the repeal of the Bubble Act in 1820, 
the Joint Stock Companies Acts of 1844 and 1856, the Limited Liability Act of 1855 and 
the Companies Act of 1862. The Evangelicals showed a deep concern about reckless 
speculation after the general limited liability as an omen of the end of their providential 
framework.173 The Christian Socialists, on the other hand, considered that the right of 
limited liability enabled individuals to flow, distribute and employ the source of wealth.174 
However, despite the efforts of the latter, the limited liability joint-stock company was 
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not deemed to become a popular form of economic activity before the 1890s.175 Mill’s 
principle of co-operation was an institutional programme to protect liberty and equality 
of individuals from the collective force of the majority. By the ‘recognition of certain 
immunities’ individual independence and diversity of opinions were to be ensured. In the 
light of free trade, individual liberty was taken into account, when issues on trade were 
left to the people rather than by incorporation into the whole system, because the 
combinations of joint stock companies and limited liability were inclined to increase the 
merit of incorporation as much as that of economies of scale.176 The collapse of industrial 
co-operation could be seen, when their democratic solution could no longer gain a 
consensus of the public, and rekindled the discussion about alternative methodology of 
incorporation of the economic organization of labour.  
 
2.2. Voluntary Framework of Collective Bargaining 
The co-operative ideology between capital and labour was safeguarded by the voluntary 
framework of collective bargaining, which was projected to preclude interference of 
external force in the natural order of industrial society. This sentiment of people’s 
commitment to the rule of law was entrenched by the neutral concepts of laws. The trade 
union laws of the 1870s guaranteed spontaneous reaction by capital and labour to 
industrial issues. Introducing the Trade Union Bill, H.A. Bruce, the home secretary, 
believed that neutrality of the law was ‘the principle of putting employers and workmen 
on a footing of perfect equality’ and would ‘promote a good understanding and voluntary 
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manners between the parties without having recourse to legal proceedings’.177 The legal 
edifice of the 1871 act classified the legal status of trade unions into the scope of the 
Friendly Societies Acts. By this means, trade union funds were immunized from 
prosecution for corporate responsibility, as they were not considered to be corporate 
bodies liable for financial burdens. The other civilizing codes enacted in 1875 – the 
Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act and the Employers and Workmen Act – 
removed substantially the class-biased regulations, the former sanctioning trade unions’ 
capacity of ‘peaceful picketing’ by giving clarification of definitions to formerly 
misleading legislatory terms like ‘coercion’ and ‘molestation’ and the latter substituting 
liabilities of fine for imprisonment in the case of breach of contract. As to the reduction 
of legal inequity, George Howell, the secretary of the Trades Union Congress, argued that 
‘the newer phase of civil actions for damage is one to be met, grappled with, and dealt 
with in the spirit of broad justice as between man and man’. 178  These changes in 
jurisprudence became a legal bulwark of the voluntarist framework of collective 
bargaining.  
The legislative reforms of the 1870s were promoted mainly by the political alliance of the 
advanced Liberals and the Trades Union Congress. After the Trades Union Act of 1871, 
the latter organized their protest against the Criminal Law Amendment Act (CLAA), 
which was its pernicious offshoot and was stained with legal inequity in terms of leaving 
arbitrary discretion to magistrates. Hence, the penal sanctions against London gas stokers 
in 1872 and Chipping Norton Labourers in 1873 evoked the strong radical demand for 
equality before the law, when these cases overshadowed the acknowledged advantages 
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of trade unions in the 1871 act. The TUC aimed at the repeal of the CLAA and the 
amendment of the Master and Servant Act by launching a large scale demonstrations and 
lobbying activities. The friends of labour, such as W.V. Harcourt, Henry James and 
Robert Lowe who this time targeted the legal consistency of free trade economy showed 
unwavering support for a general reform of the law of conspiracy even after the Liberal 
party went out of power in 1874.179 Based on the principle of legal justice, the labour law 
reforms in the 1870s had crucial meaning for ‘the personal freedom of the working classes’ 
no less than for the right of trade unions to strike.180   
The rights of labour to bargain on equal terms with the employers was secured by the 
government’s withdrawal from interference in industrial disputes. This neutral state was 
constructed by the bulwark of the legal structure, defying the conventional idea that 
combinations of labour were in restraint of trade and removing the taint of serfdom by 
charging breach of contract with civil liability. It guaranteed the equal treatment between 
capital and labour before the law by endowing the economic organization of labour with 
the legitimacy to take collective action for securing their natural interests. Trade unions 
representing the interests of labour were regarded as counterpoise to the pressure from a 
clique of employers. Behind this premise there was the reason that labour was likely to 
be in isolated and weak position compared to capital which was combined and strong. 
Potter argued that there was no means to cope with the ascendancy of capital apart from 
forming combinations of labour. Iniquitous laws were, therefore, needed to be amended, 
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because ‘the law should be made for the weak against the strong, the poor against the rich, 
and not for those who could almost suppress every institution in the country’.181 Only by 
combinations of labour independent producers would be able to engage in work with ‘a 
full justification of the workman’s claim to make his own bargain’.182 Introducing the 
Arbitration Bill in 1874, Mundella argued that trade unions were imperative for fair and 
effectual decision making of collective bargaining, because the ‘natural and legitimate 
means of equalising the advantages which capital possesses over labour’ and that ‘they 
give power to the working man to enable him to deal on terms of greater equality with 
employer’.183 Under the neutral labour laws, trade unions were expected to fulfil the 
mediating role of economic agents, as Henry Crompton, a Positivist Liberal barrister, 
expounded its definition as follows: they were able to regulate ‘the relations between 
workmen and masters, or between workmen and workmen, or between masters and 
masters’ by ‘imposing restrictive conditions in the conduct of any trade and business’.184   
The neutral legal framework secured the free operation of collective bargaining between 
employers and representatives of trade unions, which was tantamount to their direct 
higgling of the market price of the value of labour. Its implementation warranted a more 
open and detailed procedure and enabled trade unionists to make fairer regulations and 
adjustments of industrial issues. 185  By this means, trade unionists improved 
communication with employers and made an approach to what Applegarth desired – 
‘reliable and valuable data’ for ‘the amicable adjustment of wages or other matters to 
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dispute’.186 James Peattie, a Scottish moulder, gave a further account that the members of 
trade unions could now grasp the ‘rise and fall of the markets, the state of trade and every 
other thing in connection with capital and labour’.187 A fair equilibrium of the labour 
market was, thus, to be achieved no longer by the metaphysical doctrine of supply and 
demand, but by the institutional procedure, in which trade unions could speak publicly 
and gain publicity for their activities. 188  In this voluntary framework of collective 
bargaining the issue at stake between capital and labour was what Crompton strived to 
ensure – ‘freedom of contract and equity of service as between capital and labour’.189 
Seeking the fair contractual relationship between capital and labour became a prevalent 
form of industrial relations under the neutral governance. 
It is worth asking whether the development of the contractual relationship was a harbinger 
of the individualist society, in which self-determining individuals aimed to maximize 
their private properties.190 Many historians have seen this newly established practice of 
industrial relations as the process for accommodation of labour to the law and order of 
the middle-class society, whose strong tenor of individualism would finally atomize wage 
earners and raised their money-mongering attitudes. The contractual obligations 
reinforced the domination of capital in terms of separation from the archaic measures of 
traditional or paternalist control of industrial societies.191 Case studies on the boards of 
conciliation and arbitration in coal mining industries resulted in strengthening this view 
of the growth of the capitalist order, when they arrived at conclusions that their adoption 
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of the voluntary system ended up in collapse of trade unionism or its resurgence with 
militant function.192 On the basis of these arguments there were primary focuses upon 
class divisions in the market economy, in which the conventional network of society was 
substituted by the cash-basis contracts between capital and labour. However, in 
interrogating utility of collective bargaining, it is a theoretical pitfall to specify a wide 
chasm opened between classes as the progress of atomization of individuals – the growth 
of labour alienation in a Marxist sense – or the development of contractual relationship 
as the breakpoint of moral economy. The point at issue is how the voluntary framework 
of collective bargaining was understood by contemporaries: whether the new framework 
of industrial societies was seen as the means to take advantage of selfless labour. If so, 
whether the development of contractual relationship obliterated trade customs and led to 
the conditions of class struggle.        
Rather than rejoicing at making a step towards a robust competition for the maximum 
benefits, industrialist Liberals considered that the voluntary framework was a suitable 
condition for nurturing moral obligation between capital and labour. Thomas Brassey, 
who was also a well-known political economist at that time, argued that it was not the 
role of the state to elevate the moral condition of the people, but was ‘the self-help and 
self-sacrifice of the whole nations’. The moral values of individuals were considered to 
be fostered by individual institutions, which were set out by the ‘wisdom of the past age’. 
From this point of view, the voluntary scheme of collective bargaining was useful as long 
as it ‘naturally facilitate[s] peaceful negotiation where a desire for peace exists on both 
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sides’.193 In consequence, ‘many prejudices may be removed, and much personal regard 
may be stimulated by an honest interchange of ideas, face to face, in a spirit of conciliation, 
and with a mutual and sincere desire to reach the truth, and to maintain justice’.194 
Mundella also believed that what was beyond the sphere of legislation was the 
development their mutual understandings. Only by the voluntary procedure people’s 
‘moral force’ was exerted, their ‘best spirits’ provoked and ‘best influences’ pervaded.195 
While the costly and desperate measures like strikes and lock-outs were avoided, the 
outcomes of collective bargaining depended upon ‘the good judgment of both parties, and 
upon the kindly feeling and desire of both parties to do right’.196 To seek the peaceful 
settlements through free collective bargaining indicated an ideological meaning to locate 
representatives of capital and labour on the side of reason, which was believed to ensure 
progress and humanity of civil society. 
Furthermore, there was strong consensus amongst the Liberals that such mutual 
enhancement of morality would serve the public interests. Thomas Hughes appraised an 
effect of collective bargaining as follows: ‘If this arbitration system were extended 
throughout the country, the good it would do would be incalculable’, as ‘it would end all 
the fighting and struggling which periodically take place in all the large centres of 
industry, and would, in the end, promote the best interests of all classes’.197 Similar 
prospects were expressed by industrial M.P.s such as Charles Seely and Samuel Morley. 
The former argued that the experience of collective bargaining resulted in increasing his 
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respect for labour, when he felt the ‘plain common sense’ displayed by trade union 
representatives, and that the ‘association of the interests between capital and labour’, 
therefore, enabled them to work together for the ‘general good’.198 The latter gave his 
consent that the ‘higher nature of the man’ would deepen their mutual understanding and 
help to bring national prosperity.199 The conciliatory spirit of employers, with educative 
intention of moral enhancement, was to be dedicated not only to creation of a general 
feeling of mutual confidence between capital and labour, but to an increase in the sense 
of common good.       
On the other hand, current studies of trade unionism have suggested that, encouraging the 
advancement of social responsibility, mutuality and equality, the procedure of collective 
bargaining was not to foster the monopolistic characteristic of trade unionists, who were 
lampooned as labour aristocracy, but the fellowship between capital and labour. It was 
trade unions’ programme to protect traditional values and practices by halting the 
progress of overproduction, which was feared to bring about the volatile conditions of 
economy. They limited the number of apprenticeship and urged employers to correspond 
to demands of consumers.200 Daniel Guile, a shoemaker, confirmed this view. He argued 
that trade unions disregarded the rule of supply and demand, when they accumulated 
funds in a booming period and bought up the surplus labour during depression. It yielded 
a better result of equilibrium of the labour market than allowing an increase in the rate of 
unemployment and poverty.201 Therefore, as George Odger, a shoemaker, argued, the 
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boards of conciliation and arbitration were ‘a place where men thought, discussed, and 
reasoned out question’.202 From this viewpoint, trade unions were not only to play a role 
of ‘the saviours of the wages of the working class’, but also to achieve the ‘prosperity of 
society’, as successful in securing ‘a fair right to claim all just and honourable 
considerations’ of capital and labour.203      
George Howell, the secretary of the Parliamentary Committee of the TUC, insisted that 
there were the ‘rights and duties’ existing between capital and labour. In Conflicts of 
Capital and Labour, he argued that the growth of the contractual relationship did not 
mean that labour became subordinate to capital. It was not a contract of exchanging 
commodities, but of ‘partnership or joint activity, it is an association involving every side 
of life’. Labour was ‘the creator of commodities’ and ‘with the wants of citizen and a 
family at home’ they needed to make a bargain with their buyers, who could provide them 
with the ‘means of subsistence during their manufacture, and also the market wherein 
they may be bought, sold or exchanged’. It was obvious that ‘nothing is more fallacious 
than to call labour questions simply a matter of wages and money’. Rather, the contracts, 
made between capital and labour, were a sign of a partnership ‘involving a real equality 
of duties and powers’.204 Building a safeguard of individual workers, trade unions had the 
public duty of fulfilling obligations to their members as well as to their communities. 
Howell believed that the condition of the people could be improved by attaining their 
independence – ‘self-reliance and self-help’ – which was developed by associational 
effort for the common good.205 To achieve this aim, the unity between capital and labour 
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was important, because the ‘dignity of their work and lives rests in their knowing and 
performing their mutual duties and their common tasks’.206  
In contrast with the hypotheses that negotiation of the terms of contract through free 
collective bargaining between capital and labour was the cause of individualist society, 
as it gave birth to what Fox considered, ‘wary, mutually suspicious, arms-length, zero-
sum relationship’, the principle of collective bargaining was seen by both industrialists 
and trade unionists to be the rational means to inject religious, or humanitarian, 
programme into the contractual relationship. When both large employers and 
representatives of trade unions praised the boards of conciliation and arbitration in the 
admission that ‘each side has its rights, and that each side has its duties towards the other’, 
they ‘at least share the congratulatory mood’.207 Odger believed that the boards would 
develop the ‘virtues of character’ and would ‘do more to educate the people than any 
other means’.208 Many contemporaries saw the scheme of conciliation and arbitration as 
a milestone to co-operative economy, as Mundella admitted that trade unions were the 
‘natural and legitimate’ means to contribute to the ‘promotion of co-operation and 
industrial partnerships and the success of boards of arbitration’.209 In the Trades Union 
Congress in 1875 presenters like G. Tomlinson, T. Halliday and J. Samuelson strongly 
advocated the boards of conciliation and arbitration as a chief measure to ‘seek or accept’ 
co-operation between capital and labour. 210  Alexander MacDonald of the Glasgow 
Trades Council regarded co-operation between capital and labour as the ‘summum bonum 
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to be gained from Unionism’.211  
However, the intense manifestation of the co-operative ideologies did not necessarily 
mean that the practical experiments of producers’ and consumers’ co-operation were their 
ideal mode of production. Howell saw them as helpful for developing experiential 
knowledge of trading and manufacturing among the working classes, but denounced as 
they did not show much progress in respect of ‘labour’ problems. 212  The rights of 
voluntary collective bargaining were rather exerted for preserving the autonomous 
disposition of labour, as Reid has argued that traditionally the working classes had 
contrived to establish their own communities through struggles for boundaries and 
conditions of work and their preference of the ‘liberal and self-regulating society’ was 
embedded in the consensual contracts. 213  Thomas Burt, the secretary of the 
Northumberland Miners’ Association, believed that labour was the ‘chief essential in the 
production of wealth’ and its ‘full emancipation’ was possible by co-operation between 
capital and labour – ‘working together for a great and a common object’. He advocated 
the ‘friendly, amicable, and harmonious relations’ between employer and employed, 
because it was only by an appeal to reason and common sense that the latter could have 
a ‘fair share in the wealth he did so much to produce’, which he called ‘simple equity’.214 
Rupert Kettle, a judge of the Wolverhampton County Court, upheld the view that the 
principle of co-operation was achieved only by trade unions and that two parties with 
their respective claims would reach the decision of what was ‘just and equitable at the 
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time’, by which labour would ‘get the best price for his work’. 215  The voluntary 
framework of collective bargaining was, therefore, the co-operative scheme between 
capital and labour, which was established not for the pursuit of sectional or self-interests, 
but for imbuing the sense of altruism and reciprocity between capital and labour. Far from 
applauding the deterministic economic law, its operation was based upon their ‘rights and 
duty’. In implementing the boards of conciliation and arbitration, trade unions were seen 
as a practical means to secure the benefit of a wide range of labour.216 With strong 
encouragement of non-unionists to join unions Potter argued that the combinations of 
labour was helpful for securing a ‘fair share of their profits,’ which had an equivalent 
meaning to the ‘welfare of all classes of the community’.217 It was considered to be 
achieved by the mutual improvement between capital and labour. Quoting Mundella’s 
statement, Potter showed a strong sympathy with his view of the interactive influence of 
the boards of conciliation and arbitration:218     
‘‘In fact’’, says Mr. Mundella, ‘‘the less the workmen is kept in the dark, the 
better it is both for himself and his master. On the other hand, the insight 
which the master obtains into the circumstances and views of the workmen, 
tends greatly to develop his sympathies and to improve the workmen’s 
condition’’ 
 
2.3. Public Opinion and Growth of Collective Bargaining 
The institutionalisation of the voluntary collective bargaining was the liberal programme 
aiming to build up trust in British society by improving mutual understandings between 
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capital and labour. Establishing the contractual relationship both parties were to grant 
their common assent to reciprocal ‘rights and duties’. This voluntary means to settle 
industrial disputes was invoked by strong manifestation of the co-operative ideology as a 
moral force inculcating the sense of the reciprocal and humane system of collective 
bargaining, rather than encouraging incorporation of trade unions into the modern market 
economy, whose unbridled operation was seen to end up in making the wider economic 
gap between the trade unionists and non-union individuals. The visions suggested by both 
the industrialists and trade unionists emphasized its outcomes as beneficial for broader 
interests of communities. The former believed that it can be achieved by exerting their 
moral force, whereas the latter by increasing their autonomy by halting the process to 
overproduction. True, they shared the concept of co-operation. It was not so close to 
Mill’s ideal of co-operation, in which shackles of ‘wage labour’ were to be overthrown, 
as to the more religious sense of co-operation, which was founded upon the mutual 
obligations assigned to the demarcation between capital and labour. However, this 
entrenched institutional safeguard of free labour was always exposed to the propositional 
concern expressed in the TUC – whether ‘it is futile to expect that co-operation will every 
permanently supersede competition as a fundamental element in the machinery of 
society’.219 As Mill considered, were trade unionists successful in managing economic 
competition for achieving active character of individuals, or his ideological concept of 
industrial democracy was invalidated by the pressing reality of trade and industry?        
In the discourse of political economy competition in the market economy was curbed by 
the economic legitimacy of public opinion. Thompson has argued that the deistic rule of 
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supply and demand was hijacked by the inductive and historicist approach promoted by 
the historical economists and positivists, who granted trade unions the scientific basis. As 
the dissolution of the wage fund theory was an instance of this downfall of economic 
absolutism, their denial of self-interest and the tenet of perfect competition was successful 
in replacing theoretical accounts of conventional political economy with more ‘non-
technical’ analyses of economy. This meant that the interregnum of the orthodoxy of the 
economic thought was filled by the deity of the positivist social philosophy: the positive 
conceptions of the public. The public opinion was considered to be secularised 
providence and to guarantee ‘the social justice of a reformed market.’220 Despite the later 
progress of the theory of marginalism and professional authority attached to it, its 
speculative propositions of incomplete competition and the custom of ‘bilateral monopoly’ 
eventually underwrote the unshakable centrality of the ultimate indeterminacy of the 
market. From this point of view, the invocation of public opinion as the economic 
momentum to regulate competition was, as Thompson’s examination of Alfred Marshall 
indicates, necessarily premised on the operation of trade unions rather than on the 
authority of statutory legislation. Marshall argued that, if there were associational efforts 
of both capital and labour, ‘the solution of the problem of wages becomes indeterminate’, 
but decided only by ‘higgling and bargaining’.221 
In the moral economy of free trade the public opinion was considered by political 
economists to uphold the ‘interests of consumers’. It played a role of displaying 
influential and worthwhile ideas of moral efficacy and became a linkage between 
economy and social forces. Considerable faith in the public opinion by Liberals resulted 
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not only in advocating the voluntary framework of collective bargaining, but in 
encouraging the separation of economics from politics. As a regulator of industrial 
disputes, it exercised influence upon the process of collective bargaining. 222  The 
theoretical premise of the voluntary collective bargaining – equilibrium of tripartite force 
of capital, labour and consumers – was complemented by the public opinion. This 
imponderable economic force made it possible to expand the function of collective 
bargaining into federative action. When the National Federation of Associated Employers 
(NFAE) was established in 1873 as counteraction by employers against an increasing 
influence of trade unions, many predicted the appearance of antagonistic relationship 
between capital and labour. George Potter immediately showed a concern about its 
conservative element, because he believed that the employers’ combination was aimed to 
protect their privileges by crippling local unions both of artisans and of agricultural 
labourers.223 The Lloyd’s Weekly reported that the federation was a ‘tyranny of the most 
dangerous kind’, breaking the balance and deepening the chasm between capital and 
labour. When the coverage of industrial conflicts extended from those of a single trade to 
a national level, the only remedy seen as feasible was ‘a national strike, as a reply to a 
national lock-out’. It concluded with W.H.S. Aubrey’s comment that ‘the working man 
hope no longer for conciliation. He must be up and doing; since the representatives of the 
National Wage Fund can bring all their forces to bear at any moment upon the smallest 
trade in the country’.224 Joseph Chamberlain, upholding a belief that free labour meant 
‘the most absolute freedom of combination’ – ‘the most absolute right of working men to 
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unite to secure the best remuneration for their labour’, argued that the NFAE was ‘a 
disastrous failure’ to suppress their united action. This would cause the division of the 
nation after the condition of ‘internecine-war’ between capital and labour. He looked for 
a settlement to ‘an extension of the principle of arbitration’, which enabled combinations 
of labour to ‘have a share in determining what remuneration shall be paid to them for their 
labour’.225         
For the purpose of achieving this development of the voluntary framework of collective 
bargaining, the strong reliance upon the concept of the public opinion was expressed by 
both Liberal and labour leaders. Mundella did not see the establishment of the NFAE as 
a foreboding issue and, rather, expected that it would be an opportunity to expose reasons 
of employers to ‘an intelligent public’ and encourage the latter to support the reform of 
iniquitous labour laws. He believed that it was opposed to their interests to make worsen 
industrial relations by rejecting the principle of collective bargaining and that the legal 
reforms would lead not only to ‘the higher physical and intellectual development of 
children of this country’, but also to ‘a kindly feeling between all classes of the 
community’.226 The working classes were at present morally progressed to accept the 
principle and would not show the ‘slightest tinge of hostility towards capital’.227 He was 
also sanguine about arranging a ‘system of arbitration for the whole kingdom’, because 
‘it is only through the action of such federations that a really national code of arbitration 
can receive the necessary sanction’. Either capital or labour, ‘the parties who had rejected 
it as a peacemaker had been losers’ and in the procedure it would be crucial to solicit 
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‘obedience from the losing side’. 228  Henry Slatter, a member of the Provincial 
Typographical Society, also thought that there was little doubt that the employers’ 
federation would produce evil results, as, making use of it, trade unionists were possible 
to meet ‘one or two of the best and wisest of the employers’ to carry out trade negotiations. 
The sound performance of collective bargaining between federal organizations of capital 
and labour was to be secured by the reforms of labour laws.229 Joseph Arch mentioned 
that the NFAE’s exposition to the public would result in increasing their accountability. 
Frederic Harrison agreed with his point that federalization would stabilise industrial 
relations in terms of enabling a regular arbitration and alteration of the laws, as it would 
behove employers to become moderate. William Morris, the chair of the Halifax Chamber 
of Commerce, admitted that the NFAE’s purpose was ‘defence and not aggression’ in 
favour of representing ‘one interest in a great court of conciliation and arbitration’.230 It 
was obvious that there was a growing expectation to rationalize the principle of collective 
bargaining with the endorsement of federative bodies of capital and labour, which were 
supposed to make its procedure more open, stable and credible by laying it before the 
eyes of the public. 
It appeared that Mundella’s original model of community-based framework of boards of 
conciliation and arbitration was no longer deemed to be viable. In the early 1870s the so-
called ‘arbitration craze’ occurred among industries with trade unions. It has been argued 
that almost all unions experienced settlement of industrial disputes by the mutual 
solutions.231 Even the Agricultural Labourers’ Union agreed with the County Chamber of 
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Agriculture of Warwick to set up the conciliation board in 1872 with Joseph Arch’s 
remark that ‘when landlord and farmers and labourers ….can sit down together, and rise 
up together in a spirit of good fellowship, then the millennium will be at hand…’.232 
However, this growing tide of industrial democracy was receded after the economic 
downturn of the late 1870s. The amalgamated unions of craft workers in engineering and 
building industries recovered their influence by forming federations to coordinate 
interests with adjacent societies. On the other hand, the locally based industries such as 
coal-mining attempted to hold out by inventing the new measure of joint control like the 
sliding scales.233 Thomas Burt thought that the arbitration system was not perfect, because 
in most cases arbitrators were sympathetic to the side of the capital. In fact, confronting 
strikes and lockouts of the coalmining industry in 1876, Mr. Laird from the Newcastle 
Trades Council, speaking of arbitration in the annual meeting of the TUC, expressed 
discontent that the character of award was defined by ‘the extent to which the coalowners 
humbug the arbitrators and umpires’. 234  The same issue about the rejection of the 
reciprocal means by the employers was also added to the agenda of the next year’s 
meeting.235 Mr. Gibson, the chairman of the Edinburgh Trades Council lamented that 
‘they (employers) had forgotten their old love for arbitration’.236 In responding to these 
situations, Burt considered that the sliding scale was useful for getting rid of the difficulty: 
‘it would be as true mathematics could make it; there would be no human passions, for 
there would be no umpire’. With its high accuracy, the sliding scale would become the 
‘barometer’ which would tell the ‘pressure of the atmosphere’. The salient point did not 
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change. It was important for labour to stand firmly ‘man to man’ and that ‘there had not 
been a single secession from the ranks of the association’.237 By an appeal to ‘reason and 
argument’, the rates of prices and wages were to be determined by regular meetings 
between capital and labour. Burt argued that the sliding scale revalidated the power and 
value of trade unions in propping up ‘conciliation and good feeling between the men and 
their employers’. 238  At the bottom of this frame of mind, there was Burt’s strong 
disposition to the co-operative ideology. In his autobiography, he declared that it was 
minors’ spirit of co-operation which enabled them to follow the rule of collective 
bargaining during the economic depression in the late 1870s:239          
Our arbitrations, and for the most part our sliding scales too were fated to be 
in operation during and extremely critical period of trade depression, and 
however partial their success they carried us over the crisis with less friction 
and with smaller reductions of wage than took place in almost any other 
mining district. To the credit of our men I am glad to say that in all our history 
and throughout our whole negotiations, whether the medium was an 
Arbitration Court, a Wages Committee, or a Conciliation Board, the miners 
invariably accepted and carried out their agreement. In all our general wage 
reductions, by the methods named, never was a single pit stopped a day or an 
hour in resisting the award, however, distasteful or however hateful the result 
might be.  
 
Nonetheless, it is worth interrogating what sort of changes these developments of the 
voluntary principle of collective bargaining brought about in the moral presumption of 
co-operation. The politics of free trade in labour adopted the voluntary principle for the 
existence of trade unions as the means of labour’s associational efforts to achieve their 
civic independence. This vision was still manifested in the TUC in 1878, when G.F. Jones, 
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the president, declared that the voluntary principle formed the ‘basis of their political 
liberties, guaranteed to them (unions) by the Constitution’. It had an equivalent meaning 
to the ‘sacredness of personal freedom’, which should be ‘upheld and defended at all 
hazards; for the violation of that principle would jeopardise the very existence of their 
unions’.240 The public opinion as an economic regulator was in theory a last piece to 
complement the tripartite equilibrium of the interests between capital, labour and 
consumers, which embodied the summum bonum of moral economy boosted by the 
Christian rationale in the mid-nineteenth century. The co-operative ideology was, thus, 
demonstrated by the strong confidence in the public opinion by the liberals, who saw it 
as a role of building a bridge of trust between politics and society. This sense of classical 
liberalism, coloured with the Christian ethos, would see a danger of dismissal, if its 
characteristic of the tripartite equilibrium lost its moral consensus, confronting the growth 
of the market economy. J. R. Hicks, a well-known economist, suggested that in the early 
twentieth century the autonomy of moral economy was threatened by the centralized 
bodies, which drew authority away from the local unions. Since the local boards of 
conciliation was established in the progress of the liberal movement, there was an 
educational effect on both parties through working together on the boards and dealing 
with industrial issues for the purpose of maintaining their ‘trade customs’. However, such 
sentiment did almost disappear in the 1930s:241 
In an industry which is the home and centre of industrial progress, the 
maintenance of customs and traditions is not an easy matter. It is easy to see 
that conciliation would have been little use here, for even a radical employer 
would hardly have looked favourably on the unions’ rearguard action against 
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economic progress, and an outside chairman would probably have been of the 
same opinion.   
 
Concerns about the growth of the voluntary principle of collective bargaining were 
expressed by liberal intellectuals and Christian preachers in the late nineteenth century. 
Their remarks addressed the intrusion of material interests into the bulwark of religious 
liberty of individuals by diminishing the cause of conciliation movement between capital 
and labour. When Henry Crompton, a positivist barrister, published Industrial 
Conciliation in 1876, he examined how to secure independence of labour by legal reforms. 
It was important to nurture their economic independence through the boards of 
conciliation and arbitration. However, the boards were not a panacea. The moral 
education was necessary, because the institutions themselves did not teach them how to 
achieve their ends.242 In particular, in the case of the arbitration court, it would not 
become a first priority to reconcile capital with labour. As long as a series of judgments 
by arbitrators ended up in imposing the ‘absolute rules’, they were in no sense ‘deductive 
applications of the truths of political economy’. They were just temporary outcomes 
deduced from accumulations of former awards. For Crompton, who laid emphasis on the 
importance of moral institutions in local markets, it was important to reach an agreement 
after ‘full consideration of all the moral and social circumstances of the case’. From this 
point of view, the growth of the voluntary principle of collective bargaining necessarily 
entailed the separation ‘between moral and economic laws’, in which ‘the former must 
be disregarded in coming to practical decision on these matters’.243  Rupert Kettle’s 
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arbitration court was denounced as just offering temporary expedients and hardly 
preventing strikes and lock-outs. The organizations of capital and labour should resort to 
the boards of conciliation and arbitration ‘as the instrument for establishing peace and 
good will, liberty and justice:’244 
A board of conciliation can achieve that at which arbitration should aim, that 
is, a moral and religious settlement, necessarily based on a due regard to all 
economical conditions and facts. Mr. Kettle has done good service by 
insisting on the business character of boards of arbitration. Business does not 
exclude, but should be based on and subordinate to, justice and morality.  
 
On the other hand, Rupert Kettle, who became the president of the Working Men’s Club 
and assisted in setting up the arbitration courts, argued that it was a role of clergymen to 
focus upon the moral effects of trade unions in the case that public opinion condemned 
the latter. It could often be seen that the rules of political economy were contrary to the 
‘doctrines of Christian Charity’. Since the long-established master and servant 
relationship was now replaced by the relationship of ordinary buyers and sellers of labour, 
there was the ‘proness to unholy avarice which comes of such traffic’. The ‘sin of 
covetousness’ appeared, when individuals by the ‘accumulated zeal’ sacrificed what ‘he 
feels his private’ to what ‘for the time he believes to be his corporate duty’ for the benefit 
of the association. Confronting such situations of individuals being enforced ‘personal 
wrong’ for ‘corporate good’, what clergymen could do was by exerting the influence of 
their ministerial office to ‘admonish those under his pastoral charge to a more strict regard 
of personal duty’. Each worker had an obligation to serve his family and capitalist to 
provide the former with the ‘means of subsistence in return for their labour’. Clergymen’s 
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assiduous check on whether individuals could undertake the performance of their primary 
duties, rather than secondary and corporate ones, would support them to carry out ‘what 
is positively and primarily right’:   
An exigency has arisen in modern society for those who have undertaken, 
under the most solemn of human obligations, the duty of spiritual pastor, to 
reconcile those institutions which have grown out of a great social necessity 
with immutable justice between man and man.        
 
Therefore, Kettle stressed the advantages of the arbitration court, not only as a peaceful 
alternative to strikes and lock-outs, but also as the ‘expedient of obtaining an impartial 
judgment’, to which clergymen, as ‘teachers of the doctrine of peace’, should resort for 
the sake of their ‘sacred influence’.245 This did not mean that Kettle lacked confidence in 
trade unions. Far from it, he believed that they could play an important role not only in 
promoting free thought and free action among working classes, but also in evoking their 
respect for the law and moral means to achieve ‘what they believed to be right’.246     
What Crompton and Kettle’s apprehensions shared in common was the undeniable fact 
of the growth of political economy, which became less congruent with the moral 
presumption of collective bargaining. The principle of political economy began to deviate 
from its consolidated bastion of the religious concord. Once, the boards of conciliation 
and arbitration were the place where capital and labour discussed their reciprocal ‘rights 
and duties’ on equal terms. Some industrialists believed that by this means it was possible 
to exert their moral influence upon working classes, whereas trade unionists to carry out 
unions’ programme to halt overproduction. The co-operative ideology underpinned their 
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frames of mind. However, its moral consensus underlined by the humanitarian discourse 
of Millian political economy was in peril. Trade unions were considered to be powerful 
instruments for the teaching of political economy. The Examiner still upheld this view 
and it argued that the knowledge of political economy stood ‘most in need’ for both 
organized capital and labour to complete the arbitration or conciliation system and to 
reach common consent in a harmonious manner. 247  Indicating weakness and 
inconclusiveness of the arbitration system, Robert Moffat, a Scottish Congregationalist 
missionary, argued that its partiality was caused by a ‘strong bias’ on the side of 
employers – so many decisions were founded on the principle that ‘the employers best 
understand the facts and necessities of their position’. By this unequal treatment under 
arbitration, labour had to either accept the superior understandings of their employers or 
decline to submit to arbitration and provoke strikes to counteract their intentional 
unfairness. This class biased attitude was forged by the ‘solemn lessons of political 
economy’. However, he denied as ‘an utterly false and groundless assumption’ the fact 
that political economy was more on the side of the employers than on the side of labour 
– ‘Political economists are on the side of the employers; but political economy is not’.         
Moffat considered that it was not only the interest of employers against labour, which 
spurred the division of the class interests. Rather, the principal impetus for employers to 
extend production was the ‘competition’ with other employers – ‘that is his individual 
interest’. It resulted in opposing to the restriction of their production, by which the 
demand ‘must always be forced, by lowering cost and reducing wages, to come up to the 
supply’. In this condition of unlimited competition there was no demand for labour 
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holding out against reduction of remuneration until the exhaustion of other labouring 
capacity. Nonetheless, Moffat insisted that because of this ‘weakness, due to the isolation 
caused by competition’ it was possible for labour to make a plea of the ‘strongest 
justification of the independent action’. If employers pursued the policy of 
overproduction, labour became companions of their economic ruin; ‘Why, then, should 
not the latter look after their own interests?’ There seemed to be no longer ideological 
means to fill the gap of the interests between capital and labour:248 
It is to the perpetuation of this excess of power to which we owe so much 
mercantile disaster, and so much mercantile dishonesty, that the incessant 
advice of the Press in labour disputes is directed. This must be so as long as 
the Press trusting to the partial reasoning of a false science, urges general 
arguments against one side in such disputes, while all the arguments derivable 
from true science are equally applicable to the excesses of either. 
 
Moffat’s view insinuated dissolution of the moral basis of co-operation – the strict 
equilibrium of the tripartite interests between capital, labour and consumers. However, 
there was still strong confidence in the public opinion to decide the fair rates of wages. R. 
S. Wright, a liberal barrister, proposed in the TUC to establish the supreme board of 
appeal or arbitration in London, where he believed to be the centre of public opinion. 
Impartial judgments would be secured, he argued, by Mundella, Brassey, Lord Derby, 
Kettle, Crompton, Harrison, and David Dale, who were able to ‘command public opinion’ 
through the central board system.249 Arnold Toynbee argued that the rates of wages were 
not determined by competition in the market, but by the board of arbitration in which not 
only the public opinion of the newspapers, but also that of the workmen and the employers 
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were expressed. Unless competition was modified, ‘the condition of the workman in 
England was not likely to improve at any very great pace’.250 
Thompson has argued that after the dismissal of the wages fund doctrine, there was no 
coherent economic theory to determine wage rates until the 1920s. Meanwhile, the public 
opinion as an intangible economic force was regarded by economists as the ‘referee of 
last resort’. The theoretical indeterminacy of wage rates was rendered by the historicist 
and inductive disciples into economic accounts of remuneration linking higher wages 
with increased productivity, which was presented, in particular, by Brassey. The 
individualist approach taken by Marginalists could not throw off their legacy and it was 
well reflected in Marshall’s proclaimant of his approval of old unionism. However, the 
positivist principle of the public opinion characterized by ‘acute self-consciousness and 
interventionism’ was more applicable to modern economics than less self-conscious 
disposition of historicist studies and easier to register qualification of the ‘increasing 
individualism’ in its holistic school of thought. 251  Therefore, Marshall’s theoretical 
handling of public opinion to explain remuneration was inclined to assume as an 
economic force ‘the desire of men for approval of their own conscience and for the esteem 
of others’.252 Still, trade unions were considered to be central to the influence of public 
opinion and by the means of the federalization of organizations of capital and labour, 
local interests were constellated in front of the public at the national level. The increased 
power of public opinion was synonymous with the consumerist public ‘against the selfish 
interests of sectional producers’.253  Under this circumstance, outcomes of collective 
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bargaining were basically dependent on ‘comparative bargaining strength’ of the 
respective sides. Besides Marginalism, the positivist social philosophy of public opinion 
was widely shared in the academic discourse of economics and given the impetus as the 
moral force in the course of economic competition. In the ‘living wage’ question from 
the 1890s, it was still considered to serve the adjudicatory function.254 This section saw 
apprehensive views of contemporary intellectuals, who feared the separation of the 
economic discipline of political economy from moral economy. The ideological 
watershed between traditional and modern conception of the market principle seemed to 
be marked, when the intellectual discourse of public opinion was merged with the more 
organic and holistic visions of integrated society than its humane role to guide the 
autonomy of economy. Especially, when the public defence of the minimum wages 
sought its economic legitimacy by drawing upon the high wage theory.   
 
2.4. The Growth of Co-operation and Industrial Peace 
The voluntary framework of collective bargaining was successful embodiment of the co-
operative ideology in the series of the trade union acts. However, in the state of ‘collective 
laissez-faire’ there was a persistent tendency to see trade unions as a threat of collective 
tyranny trampling over non-union individuals. This frame of mind shared its theoretical 
basis with anti-democratic and –class war sentiment expressed by the Adullamite Liberals 
such as Robert Lowe, who formerly believed that trade union activities were ‘in restraint 
of trade’ and deleterious to the harmonious operation of the individualist market doctrine. 
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For such exponents of the deistic principle of political economy, giving the legal status 
to trade unions and rights of free collective bargaining had almost the same sense as to 
‘leap in the dark’, as far as it limited individuals to pursue their own interests. Curthoys, 
focusing on the Home Office officials, has argued that the Trade Union Act of 1871 was 
a political expediency to prevent the intrusion of ‘class’ warfare into the parliament.255 
The associational privilege was given to trade unions, by which they were immunized 
from legal prosecution as the corporate body. In this perspective, trade unions were 
disparaged as mere fighting organizations of the working class, whose main concern were 
their material interests. The repeal of the CLAA was, therefore, a herald of the ‘class feud’ 
in terms of enabling trade unions to exert their freedom to strike’, because there was no 
legal capability to halt the collective pressure, which individuals would encounter.256  
This deductivist vision of the market principle gradually gained momentum in proportion 
to the decline of the co-operative ideology shared between capital and labour. When the 
voluntary framework of collective bargaining was established, their moral efforts to reach 
reconciliation were reckoned to achieve equilibrium between the interests of producers 
and consumers. This ideological mainstay wavered, when the course of collective 
bargaining was affected by the growth of the deductive approach to the market. It is likely 
to describe this restoration of deductivism as the breakpoint of ideological conflicts 
between individualism and collectivism, but possible to be outlined as an economic shift 
from moral economy to modern mode of production, which occurred in the battleground 
of voluntary institutions of collective bargaining. In the process of this transition there 
were two focal points to be noted: the growing antagonism towards conventional trade 
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union practices and the ideological progress of productivist co-operation. Both of these 
views were discursively intertwined in terms of giving authority to the deistic market 
principle, which was believed to result in the prosperity of the national economy. 
Confronting this economic reality, the traditional trade union programme of halting 
overproduction by holding back abundant labour and securing reserve price for their daily 
labour was no longer reasonable.   
Leone Levi, a jurist and economist, developed this view by insisting on collective tyranny 
of trade unions against the economic orthodoxy of supply and demand. He conceded the 
combination of labour as the means of labour to hold on for the operation of the market 
and useful for adjusting the wage rates more responsive to its operation. However, it 
would often ‘produce a state of irritation and discontent which often interferes with the 
progress of production’, because the restriction of supply of labour by trade unions and 
its artificial prevention of a fall of wages were deeds of monopoly, when economically 
wrong, interfering with freedom of labour and the general economy of production. Since 
‘both employer and employed alike depend upon production as the only source for profits 
and wages’, ‘the certain consequence of the withdrawal of labour being to discourage 
production, to enhance cost and to increase the difficulty of foreign competition – 
injurious alike to the producer and to the whole community’. To remove such hindrance 
to successful production, what became the best safeguards were ‘a proper sense of the 
necessity and utility of continuous labour, an earnest desire for the achievement of 
excellence in workmanship in every branch of industry and a keen and lively interest on 
the part of one and all to promote national prosperity’.257  
 
257 The Morning Post, Sep. 2, 1875 
116 
 
The productivist strand of the market principle favoured the improvement of the condition 
of labour through the material growth. For this purpose, it was seen as valuable to adopt 
the co-operative production, in which the working classes could learn know-how to 
become capitalists. In the social science congress of 1877 John Watts, a former Owenite 
reformer and co-operator, denounced the policy of trade unions as protectionism and its 
tendency to ‘destroy capital’. It was beneficial for the interests of workers to increase 
available capital, but the policy of the unionists was in opposition to this axiom and tended 
to ‘lessen production, reduce capital, and prevent the best men from raising themselves’. 
Industrial strife by means of strikes and lock-outs would cause wholesale demoralisation 
and the only remedy was ‘compulsory arbitration’. He believed that the accumulation of 
capital was to be done more advantageously by the hands of the employers than of 
workmen, so the joint-Stock Companies were the ideal way of co-operation, whose shares 
were possessed by the latter, but belonging to the associations of the former.258 Thomas 
Brassey also showed his approval of co-operative production and mentioned that the 
‘utility of the trades unions need not be confined to the single question of wages’. It would 
be beneficial for the welfare of the people in terms of providing ‘rational amusements and 
technical education’.259 It was the best means of ‘ascertaining the fairness or the reverse 
of the employers’ demands’. In the short run, the arbitration board was certainly useful to 
settle industrial disputes, but in the long run, co-operative production would be the 
essential feature of the social state.260  
The historical current of co-operative production, which was rooted in Owenite 
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experiment and developed by the Christian Socialists in the early nineteenth century, at 
this point, began to overlap with the ideological context of the voluntary collective 
bargaining. In fact, from the beginning, the moral consensus on the voluntary framework 
of collective bargaining had faced the severe criticisms from co-operators inside and 
outside trade unions. Archibald Briggs of the firm of Henry Briggs, Son, and Co., Limited, 
pointed out its vulnerability as early as in 1870. He argued that Mundella’s system could 
not become a panacea as long as it was possible for the workers to elude demands of 
public opinion by leaving their districts, to which the employers needed to pay careful 
attention and in most cases agreed to be bound. This led the latter not to accepting the 
awards of arbitrators. Instead, co-operative production grounded upon the joint-stock 
company was proposed as a solution to this labour question. Improvement in the financial 
position of collieries was inevitable to ‘the social and moral condition’ of the colliery 
communities in Normanton. For Briggs, since labour did not have the executive ability, 
or practical knowledge of management, they could not escape from the ‘thraldom of 
capital’ and participate in productive concerns. While ‘associations of workingmen’ were 
not proposed to grant to labour ‘any share of profits’, industrial partnership would enable 
the true union of two classes to seek the common good in the heartiest manner.261  
When the Trade Union Act of 1871 gave trade unions the legal status, they were bound 
by the terms of the Friendly Societies Act, by which their funds were exempted from legal 
charges imposed upon corporate bodies. Contrary to this premise, there was strong 
complaint among members in regard with unions’ incapacity to invest their funds for the 
purpose of incrementing their share. Trade union leaders seemed not to be unaware of 
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advantages of co-operative production, but basically against investment of their funds, as 
needed for immediate use in the cases of industrial disputes and welfare expense. 262 
Andrew Boa from Glasgow insisted that just upholding the motto of ‘each for all and all 
for each’ did not secure the ‘sacred gains of labour’. To achieve an equitable distribution 
of wealth ‘productive co-operation’ was imperative. While restraining the imperious law 
of supply and demand, it enabled labour not only to employ the capital at their disposal, 
but also to have an ‘inviolable right to participate equitably in the distribution of the 
profits’.263 James Peattie, from Dundee, considered that if an immense amount of savings 
of trade unions could be invested into joint-stock companies, industrial partnerships or 
co-operative associations, it would return more percentage and root out causes of strikes 
and lock-outs. On behalf of the advancement of labouring class, they ‘ought to make their 
social and moral position go hand in hand with their pecuniary advancement’.264 Henry 
Slatter was also a co-operator. After discussing the plausibility of incorporating trade 
unions under the Limited Liability Act, he argued that trade unionists could not object to 
the formation of societies for their own self supply ‘guided by themselves’. In this sense, 
the rules of co-operative societies were not inconsistent with the objects of trade unionists 
aiming to ‘promote the practice of justice, truthfulness, and economy in production and 
exchange’ with subscription to their funds.265 Rather than insisting on the ‘rights and 
duties’ of industrial relations, these statements emphasized the remunerative advantages 
gained by speculation of union funds for a step to co-operative production. J.D. Prior of 
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carpenters’ union declared its common benefit in the TUC as follows:266 
Trade unions taught workmen how to dispose of their labour on the best 
possible terms, after which co-operation took up the question and showed the 
best mode to dispose of the profits trades unions enabled them to make. The 
sooner trade unions and co-operation worked in common with each other the 
better would it be for the working classes. 
 
The ideological dilemma between the frugal co-operation of moral economy and the 
expansive co-operative production could be seen in the Co-operative Congress in 1877. 
The fault line of the discourse was drawn between the frame of mind of co-operation 
between capital and labour for the interests of the great masses of the people and that of 
co-operation founded upon increased profits. Canon Vaughan, a vicar of church, argued 
that co-operation was to replace the hostility between ‘two sets of forces’ – capital and 
labour – and that co-operation ceased to be co-operation, when the co-operators forgot 
their priority of reconciling these two forces as all their aims and efforts and carried out 
their business as ordinary employers did – e.g. paying the market rate of wages and 
discharging labour. Whether the movement was successful or not was seen to depend 
heavily upon their moral strengths – ‘the patience, self-sacrifice, thrift, toil, and 
providence’. In conclusion, Vaughan warned co-operators never to ‘allow the moral and 
social influences and advantages of the system to be lost sight of in, or even 
overshadowed by its pecuniary and commercial advantages’. The Hon, Auberon Herbert 
made a distinction from joint-stock companies in respect of protection of manual 
producers as the end of co-operative production and emphasized the importance of 
competition in the market to elevate characters of self-help, self-reliance and nobler 
 




On the other hand, discussing the relationship between capital and labour in the expansive 
co-operative production, Frederick Smith argued that a distinct position of labour from 
shareholder or capitalist would cause trouble in the periods of either economic expansion 
or stagnation. The activities of trade unions were incompatible with the principle of co-
operative production for the reason that it was imperative to reconcile the ‘iron rule of the 
profit-maker with the tendency of the trade unionists to increase both the quantity and the 
cost of the manual labour required for the production of a given article’. Considering the 
difficulty in making a just division of profits in a definite way, he believed that it was 
wiser to make a workman participate as a shareholder. By this means adequate rewards 
would be received by the ‘stead, thrifty workman, without wasting our energy and our 
money upon the idle, the drunken, or the improvident’. This could be done by ‘giving 
increased facilities to the workman for becoming a proprietor’. E.V. Neale pointed out 
that the means of trade unions to improve the position of workers were inefficient insofar 
as they ended up in evoking ‘tyrannical oppression towards the very class for whose 
benefit they are formed’, limiting their own freedom by injuring the general public in 
strikes and lockouts. If the organized labour facilitated co-operative production, the ‘law 
of love’ would pervade society and the ‘burden of each will become light because all will 
learn how to bear the common burden in common’. This could be achieved by the 
employment of union funds for loans to members to increase their shares as well as that 
of societies through a return on investment. Slatter still maintained that the general 
depression made it desirable to promote co-operative investments which were ‘more 
profitable’, as huge savings of union funds would help the growth of capital as long as 
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they were in the hands of bankers.267 Later, he mentioned that ‘the spirit of friendliness’ 
was exhibited in the congress and it was successful to convey ‘to the trade unions its 
conviction that their aims are identical with ours: we both desire to raise the workers of 
the country by the great principle of association; and we earnestly hope the leaders of the 
trade unions will be prepared to join with us in considering how we can practically unite 
their organized labour in our organised consumption to bring about successfully co-
operative production, using profitably the capital of both’.268     
These criticisms made by co-operators on the economic policies of trade unions obtained 
the economic legitimacy, when due to the growth of deductivist vision of the market 
principle they were merged with the class-based approaches to the voluntary procedure 
of collective bargaining. Its productivist inclination was inevitably directed to criticisms 
of economically irrational practices of trade unions. An orthodox economist, W.E. Jevons, 
considering the good laissez-faire relationship between the state and market economy, 
argued that the higher the esprit de corps of trade unions was lifted, the more beneficial 
to the public they would be. However, it was not improbable that they would experience 
‘degeneration of associations’, by which he meant monopolistic attitudes of trade unions. 
After the full legal rights were given to the latter, it was possible for them to achieve an 
increase in earnings through discretional use of their moral right to strike. Trade unions’ 
exclusive privileges of limiting the number of labour and keeping their market price above 
the natural rates of wages were deleterious to the public interest. In order to prevent trade 
unions from falling into anomaly, the ‘public and the Legislature’ needed to keep ‘vigilant 
eye on all such bodies’ and reform as soon as possible, once they ‘fall away from their 
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original good purpose’.269  Considering a difficulty to move the legal sanctions into 
effective operation, the enactment of the trade union laws in the 1870s was inevitable for 
the state. Nonetheless, Jevons pointed out that in the case of industrial emergency, which 
would cause serious damage to the national economy, the Conspiracy and Protection of 
Property Act of 1875 opened up a possibility to exert ‘some legal authority capable in the 
last resort of obliging citizens to perform certain essential duties’ – any breaches of 
contract between capital and labour could be punishable for the violation of social 
orders.270  
As a critique of collective tyranny by trade unions, Jevons could not help encouraging co-
operative production. One of main causes of industrial disputes was the ‘anti-capitalist 
feelings of the workman’, who believed that ‘he is by the nature of things cut off from the 
possession of capital, and even looks upon it as contrary to the esprit de coups of his order 
to own capital’. There were no other ways to break down this ‘most mistaken and 
lamentable feeling’ than the ‘insidious way in which capital accumulates in a well-
managed co-operative society’:271 
The balance not only grows, but it growth excites the more interest because 
the owner, as a customer, a member, or even a committee man, assists in its 
growth, and may take part in the management of the affair. …savings 
deposited in almost any form of co-operative company tend to excite the 
instincts of the capitalist, and to acquaint the owner with a new view of the 
labour question.  
 
What he implied by using the phrase, ‘a new view of the labour question’, became clear 
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when the effective industrial partnership was successfully established. Whereby the 
interests of workman were necessarily ‘bound up with those of his employer’ and, 
therefore, ‘should be pitted in fair competition against those of other workmen and 
employers’. Jevons pointed out that there were no longer legal obstacles at present to 
dampen the ‘zeal to produce the best and the cheapest and most abundant goods’:272   
The old mistaken law of unlimited liability is sufficiently set aside by the 
Companies Acts of 1862 and 1867, and also by the Partnership Law 
Amendment Act of 1865, which allows any trader to give an employee a share 
of profits without thereby rendering him liable as a partner, or giving him 
right to demand an account.   
 
The existence of trade unions altered the nature of higgling and caused a dead-lock in the 
process of collective bargaining. Since wages and prices were determined by the law of 
supply and demand, it was desirable that individual workman was able to make a bargain 
with his employer.273 Jevons agreed that the voluntary solution was the ideal way to settle 
industrial disputes, but what was the ‘great evil’ at this moment was the ‘entire disunion 
of the labourer and the capitalist’.274 The interference of trade societies should not be 
allowed, if it would be directed to sectional welfare against the rest of the community. In 
order to rectify such adverse situation, it was preferable to arrive at conclusion of 
industrial issues by a ‘careful estimation of the total utilitarian results’.275  
In the age of the growth of capital the principle of co-operative production, based upon 
the deductive approach to the market, was considered to be an alternative measure to 
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avoid the class struggle between capital and labour among trade unionists. The 
conventional trade union strategy to halt overproduction was under the threat of this 
materialistic frame of mind. In 1880 J.D. Prior, the chairman of the Parliamentary 
Committee of the TUC, believed that it was possible by adopting co-operative production 
to raise the ‘whole mass of the community’ to a ‘higher position of comfort, intelligence, 
and respectability than they had yet attained’.276 In the T.U.C. William Swallow, a co-
operator, read the paper about co-operative unions, in which he argued that the principle 
of co-operative production would enable the scheme of self-employment. Workmen 
could secure the profits by themselves, to which their employers hitherto had exclusive 
access. By this means, workmen were no longer the ‘hired servants of capital’, because 
there was no reason why ‘if working men can make business prosper for the advantage 
of the capitalist, they should not make it prosper for the advantage of the worker’.277 Four 
years later, John Burnett declared in the congress that the ‘heart of the trades-unions of 
the country beat in complete unison with the hearts of the co-operations of the country’, 
as long as co-operative production was ‘the ultimate goal of many of their (trade 
unionists) desires’. Robert Knight seconded this view and pointed out a practical 
difficulty which hampered trade unions to go hand in hand with co-operation and to 
advance their interests: 
Unless the Congress altered their rules they could not take any of their funds 
to establish co-operative production. What they ought to do, and what every 
other society in the same position as they were ought to do, was to establish 
a co-operative society on the principle of limited liability. 
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John Borrowman admitted that it was a good thing for the interests of labour to make 
capital more available for them. He believed that a ‘higher and truer solution’ was in ‘self-
employed labour’, since ‘until the working men created for themselves capital to employ 
their own labour their true status could never be recognised’.278  
It is misleading if this materialist vision to promote the expansive principle of co-
operative production was considered to be the polar opposite of the individualist or anti-
socialist economic ideas in respect of restraining evils of competition. Their accounts of 
a rise in remuneration linked with higher productivity undermined assumptions of 
primacy of capital and uniformity of wage rates and associated the question of distribution 
of wealth with moral or utilitarian judgments. However, when the ideology of co-
operation was used as the means to fend off class struggle by inculcating the capitalist’s 
spirit to labour, the economic discourse of co-operation began to merge with the 
ideological ideal of individualism. It was demonstrated especially by economists in the 
Economic Association and the Liberty and Property Defence League, who were aimed at 
erecting a ‘pure science of economics’ in order to bring back authority of the absolutist 
market principle. John Mason, placing utilitarian economists such as Jevons contrary 
position to individualist economists, clearly pointed out that the voluntary co-operation 
was used for the defence of individualist economic principle and that in the early 1890s, 
articles of individualist economics such as Thomas Mackey and Henry Wolff ‘stood 
cheek-by-jowl’ with those of the Christian Socialists in the pages of the Christian 
Socialist journal and the Economic Review.279 Despite the fact that the mainstream liberal 
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economists sought to temper the unrestrained operation of the market without infringing 
private property and free enterprise, this situation was not surprising, when the economic 
perspectives of both schools were anomalous in the light of the productivist and growth-
oriented principle of co-operation, which, however, ended up in emasculating the 
traditional and countervailing programme of trade unions – maintenance of autonomy of 
labour by constraining overproduction and limiting the number of apprenticeship. The 
individualist attempts to re-erect ‘scientific’ economic theory were, nonetheless, based 
upon a more inflexible belief that the market activities should not be intruded by the moral 
and political considerations. 
This individualist economic thought remained peripheral, but denoted crucial difference 
from the intellectual discourse of classical political economy, which was founded upon 
Adam Smith’s theorem that exchangeable value of commodities was balanced by the 
quantity of labour necessary for their production. In this perspective, the macro-economic 
usage of the wage funds theory was even not sufficient to explain the value of capital, 
because wages were determined by the quantity of labour. Therefore, the proponents of 
individualism in the late nineteenth century scoffed at the socialist idea that the labour 
had the right to the whole produce of industry. They suggested instead as alternative 
metaphysical factors of the true sources of wealth more rare and mental aspects of human-
beings, which were often represented in economics by the ‘‘right’ to property and the 
‘mind’ and ‘ability’ of the entrepreneur and landowner in the creation of wealth’.280 In 
principle, the driver of market economy was not motivated by the self-less virtues such 
as the reciprocal rights and duties between capital and labour, but was more oriented to 
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maximising his self-interest and thrift in his market activity. However, it is important to 
keep in mind that when reformation of the economic discourse took place after the 
discovery of poverty in the 1880s, the socio-political concept of public opinion played a 
central role to reconcile a loss of confidence in the self-regulating function of the market 
and was widely upheld among the mainstream liberal economists including Marshall, 
Foxwell, Price and Pigou. The salient point was how such economic discourse of public 
opinion managed to hold off political embrace of industrial relations between capital and 
labour – avoid engaging in one class against another by adjusting the interests between 
producers and consumers. In Britain the modern market principle with the concept of 
national economy advanced together with the ideological pervasion of the productivist 
version of co-operation, which had unravelled the mid-nineteenth century Christian 
consensus to achieve the free and fair equilibrium between tripartite economic forces of 
capital, labour and consumers through the voluntary and local framework of collective 
bargaining. Needless to say, the epicentre of the series of ideological upheavals was the 
intellectual discourse of trade unions and their aftermaths were concentrated on political 
discussions about the utility of collective bargaining. 
One numerical survey suggests that there was a gradual advance in the real wages 
accompanied by cheaper food and raw materials in proportion to industrial productivity 
between 1873 and 1895. Wilkinson and Tarling have attributed these trends to political 
influence of collective bargaining with its process of wage and price determination. They 
argued that its economic effects reached stalemate, when it faced the heightened 
resistance from the employers’ organizations due to the increased pressure from 
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international trade in the 1890s.281 Henceforth, the voluntary framework of collective 
bargaining was placed under the vigilance of politicians and bureaucrats, who held it as 
the official policy to promote peaceful solution and intervene with industrial disputes. 
Did this mean that the scheme of collective bargaining was advocated for accommodating 
trade unions to the deterministic principle of the market, which historians of industrial 
relations saw as trade unions’ acceptance of rules of market economy to stabilize national 
economy and exclude under cutters? Before moving to national political debates about 
the voluntary collective bargaining, it is worth mentioning how the liberal intellectuals 
saw the current economic problem of industrial relations to avoid generating a class-based 
frame of mind between organizations of capital and labour. As mentioned above, the 
factual tendency to separate between the moral and economic law was a persistent 
concern from the beginning of the legal establishment of the voluntary collective 
bargaining and continued to beset liberal economists and clergymen. How did they 
attempt to address this undesirable situation of conflictual relationship of industrial 
relations? 
In the Church Congress at Leicester, W.E. Fox considered that the cause of industrial 
disputes between combinations of capital and labour was mainly as to the ‘division of 
profits’ accruing from ‘industrial partnership’. He pointed out that the present 
antagonistic disposition shown repeatedly by trade unions was likely to produce evils to 
society. It not only became a restriction of production and discouragement of superior 
workers, but ironically resulted in driving away the ‘kind’ and ‘gentle’ employers, who 
had the ‘welfare of their workpeople really at heart’. In face of such conflictual state, the 
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Church should instil their divine teaching of eternal truths into the ‘hearts of their people’:  
‘‘My duty to my neighbour is to love him as myself, and to do to others as I 
would that they should do to me.’’ Let them preach and practice that Christ 
like unselfishness which so opposed to the spirit of the world and treated with 
ridicule. ‘‘Seeks every man the things of others,’’ and thus the spirit of Christ 
in Christian men will bind together these opposing forces, and bring peace 
and concord over these troubled waters. Where strife and conflict unhappily 
exist, let the clergy be the messengers of conciliation, peacemakers, and not 
partisans.  
 
The scheme of arbitration boards was considered to be the best remedy, while it was too 
much to expect it as a panacea for all difficulties. It would not succeed unless both capital 
and labour were prepared to ‘make some concession’. Fox believed that the teaching of 
political economy was imperative to remove ‘distrust and suspicion’ grown between 
capital and labour, because much of strife ‘is caused by ignorance of its most elementary 
and fundamental laws’.282  
The belief in the role of Christianity to inject the spirit of conciliation into the industrial 
relations persisted in the late 1880s. H.H. Snell at the Wycliffe Congregational Church 
maintained that it was not for the interest of trade unions to hamper the employers, who 
would ‘always remain master of the situation’. The problem was something more than a 
matter of the wage rates. A ‘little more confidence and conciliation’ was necessary, 
because ‘moral considerations undelay the whole subject’. To achieve this was a ‘struggle 
for self’ and, for him, what meant a moral act was the preparation for ‘an unselfish work’ 
which would raise the condition of the country. The development of moral qualities would 
encourage the progress of civilisation from the ‘selfishness of animalism to the 
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unselfishness of brotherhood’. To sum up, the ultimate purpose of their divine teaching 
was to revive mankind strengthening ‘kindly, friendly, sympathetic bonds’:283 
Frederic Harrison said three years ago ‘‘Positivism in the air,’’ meaning that 
that view of humanity as a brotherhood, and of life as the only available field 
for the exercise of religious qualities, was extending more and more. He was 
glad to believe that Mr. Harrison was right as far as he meant it; but he wished 
he could say ‘‘Christianity is in the air.’’ Christianity was not on the side of 
any class, but on behalf of all classes or rather Christianity was to abolish the 
enemies of classes, raise up those that are low down, extend to them all means 
of development, bind men together, and enfranchise them in the kingdom of 
the good. 
 
These commentaries of the clergymen exhibited the fact that the religious discipline of 
the rule of law, which, in the case of industrial relations, aimed at constraining the 
authoritarian force of the economic law, was on the fringe of dissolution in face of the 
enormous power of class struggle. This concern was also expressed by the liberal 
economists, such as L.L. Price for instance, who also believed that industrial reform was 
dependent on moral reform.284 In Industrial Peace, Advantages, Methods, and Difficulties, 
he argued that mutual concession was preferred to authoritative arbitration, and not in the 
least, the compulsive legislation. It would be a ‘very powerful reason’ to exclude ‘law 
and lawyers’, if there was to be ‘any genuine feeling of conciliation as the result of acts 
of conciliation’.285 From this point of view, the growth of federative organizations would 
make it difficult for capital and labour to share the sense of ‘identity of interests’, because 
their representatives were prone to become circumspect by looking for protection of their 
sides as their own ends. Under this circumstance, they could not help but agree with the 
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terms ‘on the negative ground of the injury and irritation caused by a strike, rather than 
on the positive basis of an acknowledged identity of interests’.286 In the process, other 
members of employers and workers began to show subservient attitudes towards 
capacities of the negotiating parties, who possessed exclusive information about funds, 
organizations and trade knowledge. Therefore, the ‘general’ arrangements between the 
representatives tended to ignore innumerable local and sectional differences, as long as 
securing peaceful settlements by arbitration and the sliding scales was based upon awards 
in accordance with uncertain criterion of ‘general state of trade’. This calculation of the 
average rates would place disastrous pressure of bankrupts upon the employers of small 
capital, when they needed to pay the same amount with the other large-scale employers. 
Price believed that the best means to restore the mutual confidence between capital and 
labour was to create the institutional fabric of the boards of conciliation:287 
It would rather be necessary, it appears, to create a number of little boards of 
conciliation, and to institute a number of minute sliding scales in each district; 
and this might entail considerable expense. …And so the advantage of the 
official experience and influence of the central executive may perhaps on a 
representative basis be satisfactorily combined with local variety of detail. 
The difficulty then of instituting a system of conciliation is certainly increased 
by these circumstances, but is not rendered insuperable.  
 
It was still dubious whether setting up the ‘a number of little boards’ of conciliation as 
the institutional force was effective to restrain the growth of the rule of the economic law. 
In Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace, published in 1906, A.C. Pigou showed his 
concern about the increasing economic demands for creating the large corporate bodies, 
which would end up in breaking moral engagement, creating distrust and generating the 
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attitudes of cynical indifference between capital and labour.288 The establishments of the 
mutual boards between their representatives were certainly useful for raising the 
standards of morality, but the peaceful settlements would likely to turn out as the 
incongruent separation between industrial and communal interests.289 Since artificially 
settled wage rates resulted in placing additional burdens upon production, which was in 
theory dependent upon quantity of commodity and its price, the extraordinary cost 
incurred by the ‘close corporations’ would be the loss of optimum efficiency of the labour 
market and finally imposed upon communities, which could no longer hope to meet their 
economic prospects of substantial benefits. While Pigou agreed with the idea that the 
cultural fabric of society like altruistic and societal manners was produced only by the 
voluntary institutions including trade unions and employer’s federative bodies, he still 
seemed to believe that they were hardly meaningful for making up the gap between the 
economic and communal interests, quoting Marshall’s observation that the monopoly of 
labour by trade unions was carried out at the expense of the general community and real 
wages of workers.290 After examining the way to determine ‘fair’ wages, agreement 
process and frameworks of collective bargaining, he began to look into the state 
intervention as a possible solution to the problem. The focal point was how the 
compulsory framework of arbitration could deliver effective legal sanctions. Although 
the extension of authoritative bodies was favourable for ousting unscrupulous employers 
undercutting healthy industries, he considered that there was a risk of fostering the 
formation of political cliques, whose monopolistic activities were in the end inimical to 
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the interests of consumers. The compulsory measures were likely to increase cautiousness 
among employers who were afraid of penalty by not meeting their criterion, and to lead 
to the fear of growing unemployment. Hence, Pigou made a conclusion that ‘on the whole, 
it does not appear that ‘‘authoritative extension’’ is a policy worthy of adoption – at all 
events in a country which has held aloof from authoritative arbitration in general’.291 
In order to address the economic dilemma of the widening gap between the industrial and 
communal interests, in which heavier economic costs due to the growth of corporate 
bodies was burdened upon the public, Pigou suggested that in the case of industrial 
disputes what was in need was the scheme which compelled capital and labour to submit 
their differences to the arbitration board without gaining the consent of the other. Since 
industrial stoppages would necessarily affect the amount of consumption, welfare of life 
and economic networks, the top priority had to be placed on preservation of industrial 
peace as the matter of the community as a whole. However, it was obvious that, like the 
question of tariff reform, any compulsive measures were not soluble, insomuch as they 
were inclined to be evaded as much as violated by cunning of both capital and labour and 
resulted in an increase in a ‘litigious spirit’ evoked by such tendencies of industrial 
discord.292 For Pigou, securing industrial peace by resorting to the legal remedies or 
external sanctions would boost their class consciousness and, therefore, the state 
intervention, whether they were judicial or executive, would become a catalyst for the 
class partiality:293 
…there is tendency for the evil to spread. Political division is pressed into the 
lines of class division, and an increasing prominence is given in the thought, 
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both of electors and of their representatives, to sectional as opposed to 
national interests. …If the regime of coercion has been inaugurated, not under 
the joint auspices of employers and employed, but on the independent 
initiative of men recently defeated upon the field of economic conflict, the 
probability that these unfortunate results will occur is very great. 
 
In the state of the separation between the moral and economic law, the tripartite 
relationship between capital, labour and consumers seemed to go through the endless 
cycle, in which the greater they promoted the producers’ interests, the heavier the 
economic burden imposed upon the public would become. In the case of promoting the 
latter’s interest, what was waiting for was the culminating division between corporate and 
rank-and-file interests after severe economic competition. Thus, in the age of modern 
national economy, reliance upon the role of the state to adjust the economic interests 
between the three economic agents was going to be increased. This chapter saw the 
intellectual discourse of Millian political economy, which guaranteed liberal pluralism in 
the voluntary procedure of collective bargaining. Such Christian act was expressed by the 
rights and duties determined between capital and labour. However, once the productivist 
principle of co-operation became the ideological basis of the voluntary collective 
bargaining, the religious discipline of the rule of law was violated as a result of the 
growth-oriented market principle claiming the precedence of capital and the materialist 
expansion of national economy. In this framework of co-operative production, 
Mundella’s Protestant sentiment of free labour – the right and liberty of individual 
workers to be able to purchase their daily loaf to do their service for others – was almost 
deprived of its raison d’etre and the humanitarian culture of the reciprocal relationship 
based upon the rights and duties between capital and labour would be difficult to gain a 
purchase in the intellectual discourse, especially in the modern discipline of economics. 
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Chapter 3 Corporation, Trust and Labour 
 
3.1. Decline in Free Trade and Reformism of Historical School  
In the mid-nineteenth century the voluntary principle of collective bargaining was the 
institutional programme aiming at building the bridge of trust in society. At the 
culmination of Victorian liberalism, it was the rule of law in market economy of free trade, 
restraining the free operation of impersonal market force and safeguarding individual 
independence of labour in the communal interests. On this basis, there was the mid-
Victorian ideological idea of co-operation, which supported the idea of market 
equilibrium by the three economic agents – capital, labour and consumers. Their moral 
synthesis was secured, when reciprocal, religious and economic sentiments were invoked 
by the public, by which communal interests successfully constrained the ascendancy of 
utilitarian values. The Victorian Liberals considered that the establishment of the 
voluntary scheme of collective bargaining was conducive to producers’ ethical sense of 
co-operation and that the voice of consumers acting as public opinion carried out 
harmonious distribution of wealth inside the commonwealth. As the institutional bulwark 
of free trade in labour, its voluntary operation was also believed to ensure latter’s ethical 
virtue to receive and provide a fair day’s wage for a fair day’s work without resorting to 
intervention by the central authority. This economic subculture of free trade was 
accomplished by the neutral legal framework of trade unions, which enabled them to 
bargain with their employers on equal terms – the development of the contractual 
relationship between capital and labour. The Liberal industrialists acknowledged the 
cause of trade unionism as valuable for raising the moral standard of working classes, 
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whereas trade unionists aimed to protect fair conditions of work and to reason out the 
problem of overproduction. With their increased proclivity for deepening mutual 
understanding, the voluntary process of collective bargaining facilitated peaceful 
settlements of industrial disputes and their reciprocal obligations – ‘rights and duties’ 
between capital and labour – fostered their shared sense of common good within the rule 
of market economy.   
This chapter is going to examine a reformist tradition of economic history in the work of 
Frederic Maitland, William Cunningham, Langford Price, Herbert Foxwell and William 
Ashley. It argues that their political economy was designed to advance the concept of 
economic organisation of labour, in which producers could identify their interests with 
consumers. In the mid-Victorian period, the liberal virtue of economic organisation of 
labour was a safeguard of the public spirit in the private sphere. This chapter aims to show 
that their intellectual acknowledgements of working-class associations corresponded to 
what John Stuart Mill expected as a base of the civic virtue of individual independence 
in the mid-nineteenth century. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Mill, as a supporter 
of religion, considered that the religious diversity was secured in market economy by 
associational efforts of individuals and his followers depreciated the atomistic doctrine of 
utilitarian individualism, as they thought that economic rationality was premised on the 
community-centred proposition of their self-less and altruistic virtues.294 This religion of 
humanity in the sense of Millian political economy became the ideological buttress of the 
trade union laws in the 1870s. The voluntary scheme of collective bargaining formed the 
esprit de coups of moral economy, as it served the public good by preservation of unity 
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of the tripartite economic agents – capital, labour and consumers.  
However, the institutional problem of trust arose, when its framework experienced a 
decline in the voluntary market culture of free trade and lost the past credence to its 
efficacy to reach the public good. The denouement was marked by the increased 
importance of economic incorporation – endowment of legal personality with a corporate 
entity, which, as a result, undermined the basis of the neutral state. According to Johnson, 
the legal framework of corporate capitalism – the legislation of joint-stock company with 
limited liability – was endorsed, when judicial interpretation in the common law 
acknowledged the practical significance of the legal personality of corporation. In 
adopting the principle of limited liability there was a perplexed backdrop of the common 
law tradition, which he calls ‘inherent uncertainty’ or ‘moral ambiguity’ factored in 
conferring the general right of incorporation. Johnson’s historical focus upon institutional 
developments of modern corporate capitalism is predicated upon the premise that the 
operation of market was neither natural nor neutral and habitually constrained by law and 
custom. Since the common law tradition gave considerable discretion for judicial 
interpretation, it was important for him to bring into focus juridical trends to evade 
judgment of full liability and, in determining its limits, to blur the distinction of legal 
personality between ‘fictive’ corporation and ‘real’ individuals. This nitty-gritty of 
Johnson’s historical approach to institutional and legal partiality concludes that in judicial 
cases of limited liability judges were initially reluctance, but gradually attached to the 
principle of caveat-emptor. In this way, the law permitted remission of individuals from 
substantial responsibility.295 
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Efflorescence of incorporation occurred around the late nineteenth century, since the rise 
of labour movement led to a decline in freedom of contract. In need of institutional barrier 
to protect property, proprietors turned partnerships into the incorporated form of joint-
stock companies with general limited liability.296 In face of the rise of corporate culture, 
Liberal and Conservative scholars took differential approaches to the public interest. 
Sharing the common intellectual background of Oxford collectivism, which flourished on 
the influence of T.H. Green’s philosophical idea of social organicism, they developed 
Green’s philosophy of public service by way of corporate and positive institutions in 
divergent ways.297 Their ideological fault-line was conspicuous along their party politics. 
While the Conservative party strived to gain political legitimacy of tariff reform in 
promoting the interest of producers, the Liberal party attempted to hold up their position 
as the ideological vanguard of the interest of consumers, persisting with the stronghold 
of the principle of free trade. In the light of the public interest, this chapter discloses, 
visions of historical economists were more careful about defending the pluralist 
institution by regulating the impersonal force of market economy with the public good. 
Even though the growth of modern corporate economy was accompanied by the shift to 
professional or scientific expertise, they believed that the growths of economic 
organisations would guarantee the collective liberty of working classes in the corporate 
society, reconciling producers’ with consumers’ interests in autonomous society.  
For linking the idea of historical economists with that of the public interest, it is important 
to look into the rise and fall of the economic culture of free trade and to understand its 
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contextual formation of social virtue of trust in Britain. The popular economic principle 
of free trade became the ideological bastion of civil society after the repeal of the Corn 
Laws. Its political discourse, which was evolved in association with the political identity 
of consumers, appealed to the advancement of Britain’s distinct civil politics, when it 
succeeded in undergirding the powerful presence of civic-consumers and calling forth the 
neutral governance in trade. Thompson has argued that at this juncture the voice of 
consumers as the deity of positive conception of public opinion formed a liberal 
consensus, as the verity of classical political economy was overshadowed by the 
theoretical validity of public opinion. When both positivists and historical economists 
discounted the idea of utility maximising rationality of the economic orthodoxy, the 
institutional framework of voluntary collective bargaining was theoretically approved and 
the power of public opinion, whose voice was equivalent to the consumers’ interest, was 
going to adjudicate industrial disputes.298 Thus, the Liberal programme to forge the link 
of trust between capital, labour and consumers was reckoned to secure the public interest, 
when its voluntary procedure of collective bargaining enabled a community of consumers 
to enforce producers to correspond to their demands.  
As to the decline in the voluntary market culture of free trade, Trentmann has shown that 
the economic policy of free trade gave up in pursuing the Cosmopolitan vision of 
Cobdenism and opted for more feasible terms of free imports in face of the international 
growth of protectionism. Nonetheless, free trade politics in Britain, in which civic-
consumers were identified with public morality and their interests were sacred, persisted 
and re-flourished in the Edwardian period. They denounced monopolistic control of 
 
298 Thompson, op.cit., ch.4 
140 
 
producers as selfish materialism as much as moral and public deterioration. The concept 
of the neutral state was finally retrograded, when the government initiated the national 
control of consumption from the period of the First World War by establishing the 
Ministry of Food and later the Consumers’ Council.299 In relation to the downturn of the 
liberal consensus, Thompson’s study of the intellectual conception of the rational public 
of consumers places a strong focus upon Marshall’s fear for fractured unity of the public 
in confrontation with the intrusion of materialism. As a marginalist economist, Marshall 
did not circumvent the political power of public opinion as the yoke of ultimate 
indeterminacy in the market principle. In his intellectual speculation to overcome a 
difficult condition of imperfect competition, he signified utility of consumers as an 
economic regulator, which endorsed the importance of trade unions as an apparatus in 
reflection of the direct influence of public opinion.300  
Historical economists took a different path from the empowerment of the utilitarian creed 
of consumers. Public opinion was the positive conception, which, with its holistic and 
inclusive aptitude, embraced even universalistic and individualist neo-classicism. In the 
departure from the voluntary market culture of free trade, historical economists also 
evaluated the growing influence of public opinion, but showed different epistemology 
from neo-classicism, which saw the sacred property of labour as ‘the ghost of custom’ for 
encapsulating moral constraints of the public in the private sphere. They believed in the 
mutual and reciprocal relationship of rights and duties between producers – capital and 
labour – as the means to curb segregation of production from the rational voice of 
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consumers. Koot’s general overview has shown that in contrast to hypothetical nature of 
deductive theories the inductive reasoning of historical economists was inclined to 
distinguish practical dimensions of the national and communal interests.301 Hence, they 
thought that the idea of public opinion would develop a role of custom of producers into 
the neo-mercantilist framework for economic coordination. Rather than commending 
either the local-based framework of collective bargaining or growth-oriented models of 
co-operative production and joint-stock companies of limited liability, their outspoken 
advocacy of protectionism championed economic organisations of labour for 
reconciliation of market economy with the public good in the sense of securing market 
equilibrium between production and consumption not by the force of authority, but by the 
autonomy of corporate bodies under the guidance of public opinion in the crisis of 
voluntary market culture of free trade.  
However, as Trentmann points to the strong adherence to free trade politics in the 
Edwardian period as liberals’ moral doctrine, what their ideological clash with the 
Conservative political economy of tariff reform brought to the fore was unexpected 
revelation of the precarious and ambiguous legislative status of trade unions in light of 
incorporation of labour. As mentioned in the last chapter, as soon as the trade union laws 
in the 1870s secured unions’ rights to carry out free collective bargaining with their 
employers, there were conflictual demands enunciated even by some fractions of trade 
unionists for revamping the conventional practice of trade unions and moulding it into 
co-operative production or joint-stock company of limited liability as the ideal means of 
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co-operation. In this discourse, the conventional programmes of trade unionism – halting 
overproduction and limiting the number of apprenticeship – were seen as deleterious to 
the public interest, since these were antiquated measures, which were irrational and 
monopolistic enough to limit the accumulation of material wealth for the improvement of 
the condition of labour. The old liberal premise of the locally- and communally-based 
collective bargaining was not seen to achieve the public good. This increasing propensity 
of producers to adopt the capital-centred rhetoric of co-operation was accompanied by 
the growths of up-to-date measures of co-operation in practice such as sliding scales and 
joint boards.302 In front of the corporate turn, the liberal watchword of free trade in labour 
lost its legitimacy to reconcile market economy with communal interests. 
Rather, a democratic call for legal and judicial equity of incorporation into joint-stock 
companies with limited liability would end up in stressing a drawback of a double-edged 
proposition of the Trade Union Act of 1871. As mentioned in previous chapters, collective 
action of workmen had been unlawful, as it was seen to be in restraint of trade – an 
obstacle to economic activities of individuals. When trade unions won their legal 
recognition, they gained legitimacy not only as a providential institution for guidance of 
moral order, but also as institutional apparatus to assure working class right to higgle in 
the economic market. The voluntary solution under the legislative neutrality was a 
landing point of such conflicting capacities of trade unionism – co-operative framework 
and economic liberty of individuals. However, this bilateral proposition as the moral and 
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economic institutions developed into a theoretical paradox in giving the incorporated 
status to labour. Under the 1871 act, the legal status of trade unions avoided full 
incorporation as commercial bodies, which required strict conformity to the public 
regulations and the extension of the Friendly Society Act was applied. If demands for 
incorporated limited liability had been made more powerful, positions of labour could 
become less stable, since the corporate officialdom could not take into consideration the 
voluntary market culture of free trade, in which civic culture of working class radicalism 
cultivated the social virtue of trust in the voluntary framework of collective bargaining.  
Although Johnson has presumed that the rise of labour movement triggered the transition 
of partnerships to joint-stock companies with limited liability, the freedom of contract, 
by which individual workers could secure their rights to exercise freedom to exchange 
their property of labour, was in the liberal tradition grounded on the voluntary framework 
of collective bargaining. When the voluntary solution lost its self-governing function in 
free trade economy, criticism was gradually posed upon the legal status of trade unions. 
After the Taff-Vale judgment of 1901 enunciated adverse verdict against trade unions, 
which some trade unionists showed a support, the bilateral conceptions of trade unions 
were no longer esteemed to be responsible for the public interest in the corporate 
capitalism.303 Their conventional exercise of freedom of contract, which had been the 
buttress of the social virtue of trust in the voluntary market culture of free trade, needed 
a reform adjusting to the emerging condition. 
Trade unions were successful in gaining the charters of the 1870s by rectification of the 
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iniquitous legal status of labour. Certainly, the subversion of ‘feudal’ laws, such as the 
combination acts, master and servant acts and the common law conspiracy theory, had an 
equivalent meaning of shaping the free labour market in pursuit of legal and institutional 
equity. In the backdrop of the people’s call for the state as an even-handed guarantor, 
there had always been an underlying current of the liberal movement, which had 
demanded in history the reform of inequality, immorality and monopolies against the 
ancient regime and advanced the principle of free trade as the mainstay of the laissez-
faire state after the French Revolution.304 This rallying cry for the laissez-faire economy 
had almost a synonymous meaning with the liberation of religion from the state.305 The 
Non-conformist demands for voluntary associations of labour and their co-operative 
framework with capital had meanings equivalent to achievement of working-class 
independence as much as liberal institutions for individual rights and liberty.306 Such 
triumphant mood of Nonconformist liberty – demands for individual rights and equality 
before the law – was, according to Hill, possible to harken back to the period of the Civil 
War in the late seventeenth century. Anglo-Saxon inheritance of the common law 
tradition and local democracy had been the long-lasting bulwark of English liberty after 
the Norman Conquest.307  
However, it was also an ineluctable fact that the freedom of contract was indebted not 
only to the legal and institutional equity, but to the function of economic organisation of 
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labour. The working-class right to exchange their property in free trade was granted as a 
result of the rise of trade union movement in the mid-nineteenth century. The legal 
recognition of trade unions was grounded upon liberals’ endorsement of people’s 
associational efforts as the means of a transmitter of morality as much as a safeguard of 
religious diversity in market economy. As Herbert Spencer regarded freedom of contract 
in industrial societies as a main vehicle of progress from the fiscal military state, the 
intellectual discourse of political economy had always endorsed free trade in labour.308 
Even Robert Owen and Thomas Chalmers, taking approaches of polar opposites to market 
economy, believed that political economy would help to develop the contractual 
relationship between capital and labour. Both Joseph Hume and J.R. McCulloch, whose 
political economy was denounced by E.P. Thompson as wirepullers of freedom of capital, 
gave support to the early working-class radicals such as Francis Place in the repeal of the 
Combination Acts in the 1820s.309 In the case of the trade union charters in the 1870s, 
Mill and his circle provided scientific and historicist legitimacy of the trade union 
programme. In this way, ideas and practices of political economy, which Walter Bagehot 
called a basis of ‘the common sense of the nation’, had always grounded the pathway to 
freedom of contract. 310  This chapter shows that historical economists played this 
traditional role of ‘friends of labour’, when their political economy of tariff reform sought 
to secure the working class right of freedom of contract by rebuilding the pluralist 
institution of economic organisation of labour to restrain market economy in face of the 
rise of modern corporate capitalism.  
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The Conservative party was identified by Ewen Green as the party of ‘property, Empire 
and the Church’ in the late nineteenth century. It strived to construct their own political 
programme in face of the crisis of free trade and sought to forge their identity as a party 
unifying propertied interests. Seeing New Liberal challenge of ‘class’ and ‘sectional’ 
politics as danger against its Anglican stronghold, they did not favour alteration of the 
power balance in the society. Hence, the tariff reform became their mainstay as 
‘economics of political integration’: imperial preference was offered to increase benefits 
of the empire and to entice the new propertyless electorate. Conservative protectionism, 
as a revenue device, aimed to foster the social harmony by economic unification – the 
interest of ‘res republica’ had to be given priority to economic rationality of individuals, 
because, due to protectionist counterparts in the continent, the cosmopolitan order of free 
trade was likely to render domestic industries less profitable and hamper effective 
distribution of resources inside the nation.311 The Conservative political economists like 
Cunningham, Foxwell, Price and Ashley strived to redefine producers’ rights and duties 
in their own manners. By examining their appreciation of the liberal conception of public 
opinion in instituting economic organisation of labour, the chapter shows that their 
economic coordination was distinguished from the totalitarian control of production by 
the central government. Rather, their primary aim was to resuscitate missing liberal virtue 
of trust in a corporate form. Nonetheless, to understand pathology of trust in Britain after 
the common law’s embrace of the incorporated limited liability as the general right, it is 
important first to shed a light upon the making of trust in England and its contradictory 
characteristic to the modern corporate system by looking into Frederic Maitland’s history 
 
311 Green, op.cit. 
147 
 
about institutional formation of trust and its relation with the common law tradition.  
 
3.2 Frederic Maitland and Making of English Trust 
Frederic Maitland examined the legal system of England on the institutional formation of 
trust and corporation. Maitland was a legal historian, who with Cunningham, sought to 
reform and protect the Historical Tripos at Cambridge in confrontation with the intrusion 
of Marshallian economics.312 His chief concern was to open up a debate about meanings 
of legal personality between ‘fictitious’ corporation and ‘real’ individuals. It developed 
into his historical approach to the very essence of incorporation in England, whose 
distinct characteristic was later pertinent to the precarious legal status of trade unions. In 
an essay, ‘Trust and Corporation’, published in 1904, he dug into the historical origins of 
culture and law of trust, which, with its highly contextual expediency, had been embodied 
by institutions prescribing the relations between beneficiaries and trustees. The legal 
institution of trust, all in all, represented ‘all the generality, all the elasticity of Contract’ 
and was cultivated out of ‘certain requirements of English land law’. The growth of trust 
as trading corporative bodies in the U.S. was a form of ‘its last exploit’.313  
The concept of trust was developed in the English law, which was the comprehensive 
judicial system with no segmental separation between the private and public law. 
Conventionally, there had been differential legal reparations applied to immovable and 
movable property due to customs and rules rooted in the rigorous primogeniture and the 
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jurisdictional authority of the Church. Movable or personal property were not treated as 
subsistent ‘real property’ until the mid-nineteenth century, so the breach of trust in this 
case was not classified into unlawful possession, but into application of personal action 
for compensation. This distinction between immovables and movables was dwelled on 
the idea of trust – the right to hold property in trust – as a real right, not contractual, so as 
‘a kind of property’.314 Hence, the right of trustees in England had a sense close to ‘equity’ 
rather than stipulative conditions of property right.     
The conventional procedure of granting trust was developed informally, when 
Englishman’s atonement for his sinful soul was evinced by his will of conveyance of his 
land to his daughters and younger sons. The trustees were to hold it ‘to his [the 
landowner’s] use’. The concept of ‘joint ownership’, derived from German’s 
Gesamthandschaft, helped trustees to fend off direct intervention from the lord: trustees 
by accrescence of a new trustee could deter the lord from claiming his right to escheat the 
property. In as early as the fourteenth century against the claim of the king the old courts 
of common law decided to ‘look the other way’, since the practice of trust was already 
prevalent among lawyers. The court of chancery, a ‘reserve of extraordinary justice’ for 
the king, took action for his interest, but, apart from scandalous cases of dishonesty, it 
only enforced trustees to comply with the duty of trust. Hence, ‘if the Court of Chancery 
saved the Trust, the Trust saved the Court of Chancery’.315 
The beneficiary’s right was limited to an incorporeal thing – an estate ‘not in the land, but 
in ‘‘the use’’’, since the trustee had a ‘true ownership’. On occasion of inheritance, the 
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‘notice’ was given in trust for the beneficiary and it was a problem of trustee’s ‘conscience’ 
to undertake the ownership: his ‘conscience’ was the ‘basis of the equitable jurisdiction’. 
Hence a collective entity such as a corporation was not a recipient of trust, since it was 
not regarded as having ‘conscience’. The concepts like ‘equitable ownership’ or 
‘ownership in equity’ were developed for the expediency of the beneficiary, as trustees 
held the legal ownership.316 The trust relationship was not based on obligatory or private 
contracts, in which each was bound to respect mutual rights. In this way from the landed 
aristocracy to newly prosperous commercial classes, well-to-do people enjoyed benefits 
of the trust in the service of equity. Hence, the ‘testamentary freedom’ reached its 
culmination to the extent that the trust became most ‘commonest institutes of English law’ 
and almost equivalent to the contract. Short of German Gemeinschaft, community of 
ownership, the trust was flexible concept which, for instance, in auxiliary extended to 
one’s wife after marriage as ‘mistress in equity’ and in this manner gave Englishmen the 
‘liberty of action and experimentation’ in terms of creating institutions and 
foundations.317  
Hereafter, the juridical problem of personification came to the fore for an autonomous 
institution. At one time in the medieval age the concept of ‘corporation sole’ was applied, 
but lawyers were disposed to attribute the ownership of land to a natural man and not to 
unsubstantial speculation of personification.318 For this purpose, a concept of ‘charity’ 
was developed into charitable trusts in the early seventeenth century. If there was a 
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charitable cause, Zweck, which was reasonably beneficial to the public, a ‘trust for a 
Zweck’ solved the problem of personification of ownership and made it possible for an 
owner to pass ‘special purpose funds’, Zweckvermogen, to an indefinite mass of 
individuals. Since there was no judicial theory by which the state could be the last 
proprietor of all charitable trusts, ‘the interests of the trust would be fully represented by 
the trustees’ in the interests of the ‘richest and most powerful class of Englishmen’.319    
As far as religious liberty was concerned, religious societies were endowed with trust by 
the state-church. This meant that since incorporation was equivalent to access to 
‘privilege and exceptional favour’ in England, the charitable trusts were applied to them. 
The state did not see these religious societies as corporations, but ‘natural persons’ as 
trustees, who were ‘more conscientious when they are doing acts in their own names’.320 
Hence, Maitland argued that the element of institution, beside that of co-
operation[Genossenschaft], was important for the notion of ‘charity’, as the charitable 
trusts appeared to be ‘their various ideals of ecclesiastical polity under the shadow of our 
trusts’. 321  There was a strong thought of a ‘jurisdiction’ of Genossenschaft among 
Englishmen, so in case of dishonesty against Zweck any sorts of unincorporated 
Genossenschaft – not only religious bodies, but clubs like Inns of Court, Lloyd’s Coffee 
House and the London Stock Exchange – were not accused of ‘question about personality’, 
but protected behind the ‘trustee wall’ as private societies. If there was ‘no’ charity, a 
‘purely individualist theory’ was applied to private societies insomuch as the trust ‘must 
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be a trust for persons’.322 
Maitland distinguished this English type of unincorporated societies from German 
Gesellschaften [partnership], since English clubs had closer sense to ‘society’ than the 
relations between persons for the business profit. The legal incapability to give fictitious 
personality restrained clubs from assuming corporations with limited liability: they had 
individuals with unlimited liability. One exceptional case was, Maitland points out, early 
twentieth century trade unions, whose organised action had to be ‘paid for out of the 
property held by its trustees’.323 Despite this inaugural custom, basically, members of 
private clubs were not subject to corporation law, since there was no legal personality of 
clubs:324   
The natural inclination of the members of an English club would, so I think, 
be to treat the case exactly as if it were a case of corporate liability. It has 
often struck me that morally there is most personality where legally there is 
none. A man thinks of his club as a living being, honourable as well as honest, 
while the joint-stock company is only a sort of machine into which he puts 
money out of which he draws dividends.  
 
Even after the Companies Acts lowered a bar of incorporation into joint-stock companies, 
the unlimited liability of their members had been adhered to by the courts as half-
measures. The kernel of the trust wall could suspend personal liability from mischief, but 
the joint-stock framework made it difficult for directors of companies to make a contract 
with individuals without limited liability. 325  Large ‘unincorporated’ joint-stock 
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companies were going to be registered under the 1862 act in fear of losing some of its 
liberty and autonomy.  
In contrast to the English tradition, whose endowment of trust was inclined to curb the 
growth of large-scale joint-stock companies, Maitland points to the institutional growth 
of trust in the U.S., which admitted unincorporated joint-stock companies to flourish. 
Since American corporations had faced opportunities to cause their immense fear against 
the suppressive state,  it was freedom of contract for trustees and shareholders to proclaim 
trust without binding each other for personal liability – with limited liability. This 
distinctiveness accompanied the institutional form of trust acknowledging large-scale 
unincorporated economic enterprises. Once the U.S. state decided to relax its posture 
against corporations, these economic bodies by trust began to assume incorporated 
capitalistic combinations, which made Englishmen to think as if ‘Germany is full of 
‘‘trusts’’’.326 On the other hand, the institutional relations between trusts and corporations 
were so old in England that the institutional growth of trust based on charity resulted in 
providing the English countries with their strong characteristics of quasi-corporate forms 
of municipal governance from the period of Henry VIII, which later made reformers see 
with repugnance as ‘trusts of a public nature’. The English tradition of the common law, 
with no severance between the private and public law, ratified the existence of 
unincorporated bodies. It was not until 1889 that the law expanded the interpretation of 
‘person’ by adding the act to the statute book:327 
In this Act and in every Act passed after the commencement of this Act the 
expression ‘‘person’’ shall, unless the contrary intention appears, include any 
body of persons corporate or unincorporate.  
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According to Maitland, the institutional development of trust in England was undergirded 
by the common law tradition, whose jurisdiction was based on trustee’s ‘conscience’. In 
regard with autonomous institutions, the endowment of trust took a form of charitable 
trusts and if no charity was exercised, personal liability was applied as natural persons. 
Freedom of religion was, thus, warranted by according the status of charitable trusts to 
non-conformist sects in the late seventeenth century. This was also the case of the 
nineteenth-century trade unions. The trade union charters of the 1870s endowed them 
with institutional structure of charitable trusts, when it proposed the voluntary scheme by 
expanding the Friendly Societies Act and remitting corporate responsibility. However, 
the historical watershed was marked, when the common law tradition, which had been 
the juridical bulwark of the voluntary market culture of free trade, embraced the law 
admitting a juristic remit to grant legal personality to fictitious corporations, which 
broadened interpretation of legal personality to regard the latter as a ‘real’ person.328 From 
this time on, the English custom of the common law internalized a juridical dilemma 
between individualism and corporatism. The salient point is that the traditional concept 
of trust in England, which had been obligated with unlimited liability, met a serious 
challenge from the modern corporate capitalism, in which the incorporated form of joint-
stock companies was inclined to yield to demands for the principle of limited liability. If 
the law called for incorporation of private societies on behalf of business profits, the 
customary proceedings of trust were likely to falter, since the distinction between ‘private’ 
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and ‘public’ bodies was at any rate eradicated in law.   
The institutional convention of trust in England was the bastion of liberal conscience, 
which consisted in the principle of unlimited liability applied to the unincorporated 
organisations. The voluntary market culture of free trade was owed to this practice, as 
trade unions were precluded from prosecution as a corporate body by shielding their funds 
from penalties of illegal actions of their members. However, this liberal consensus on 
trust in free collective bargaining was gradually eroded before apprehension over trade 
unions’ legal status reached a peak in the Taff-Vale judgment of 1901. Its prelude got 
under way, when problems of poverty and unemployment gave rise to public discussion 
after the period of economic depression in the 1870s. The tariff reform movement was 
triggered by sugar industries, which were outcompeted by their protected continent rivals. 
Social pressure for deviation from the orthodoxy of free trade was increased, as the Fair 
Trade League denounced the free trade politics under the aegis of the Tory party. The 
labour movement from the left also called for the central regulation. In association with 
the Social Democratic Federation (SDF), the rise of new unionism opened up class-based 
politics and sharpened antagonism with old unionism.329 While both old and new unions 
aspired to take control over production, their differences lay in approaches to the labour 
market and the latter’s legislative measures such as the eight-hour bill led to sectoral 
conflicts. 330  From Joseph Chamberlain’s deflection from the Liberal Party to Keir 
Hardie’s establishment of the Independent Labour Party (ILP), a new tide of labour 
 
329 Clegg, Fox & Thompson, op.cit., 
330 Reid, ‘The Division of Labour and Politics in Britain, 1880-1920’, pp.150-58. Hobsbawm 
admitted free trade orientation of trade unions and a smaller role played by socialists. (E. 
Hobsbawm, ‘‘‘New Unionism’’ Reconsidered’, in Mommensen & Husung, The Development of 
Trade Unionism, pp.13-22) 
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politics marked a shift in their demand for liberty, which deflected from the conventional 
practice of trust as much as from the voluntary market culture of free trade.   
The traditional presumption of English liberty – the common law and local democracy – 
remained to be the mainstay of the TUC’s pro-liberal stance.331 Thane has shown that 
trade unions were supposed to be an aid for individual independence and formed a 
progressive force with other radicals and socialists on common welfare programmes in 
local and municipal collective governance.332 However, while the TUC, as the main 
platform of labour politics, clung to the laissez-faire principle in pursuit of neutral 
governance, it could not circumvent centripetal forces of trade unions. The growths of the 
national and federative bodies and industrial-wide framework of collective bargaining 
dwindled trade councils and their local and municipal influence, since local affairs were 
no longer discussed in local boards, but in the central joint conference by officialdom 
composed of delegates of capital and labour. Its federative business administered national 
funds and took the place of local branches.333 The legal status of trade unions was called 
into question, because its immunity from corporate responsibility was increasingly 
construed as ‘privileged’ as the growing distrust was manifested for the economic 
orthodoxy of free trade.  
Juridical counteraction was galvanized. A war-time regulation of the General Order of 
1883 made it possible to charge a penalty on unincorporated institutions, applying 
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liability of ‘representative action’ to individuals. The Royal Commission on Labour in 
1894 discussed whether it was feasible or not that full rights and obligations of 
corporation were appropriate for the legally abided collective bargaining.334 From the 
mid-1890s trade unions experienced a judicial backlash under the influence of the Liberty 
and Property Defence League. It aimed to protect ‘free labour’ of blacklegs by restricting 
coercive picketing of trade unions.335 The case of Temperton v. Russell broke into unions’ 
privilege, as the court applied the ‘representative character’ to union officers. In the cases 
like the Lyons v. Wilkins and Charnock v. Court trade unionists were charged for an 
aggressive picketing. These waves of allegations against trade unions undermined the 
voluntary practice of collective bargaining and diminished its original prospect.  
The most striking case was the Taff-Vale judgment in 1901. A sanction of corporate 
liability was imposed on the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (ASRS) for tort. 
At the peak of the Boer War, the Taff-Vale line was a vital link between steam coal 
collieries and ports of seaborne logistics supplying resources to South Africa. After 
Ammon Beasley, the manager of the railway, placed hardline and cost-cutting pressure 
on trade unions, the ASRS launched a strike, in which the Board of Trade intervened and 
terminated. In a lawsuit, Beasley demanded an injunction reversing the conventional 
accord on the legal status of trade unions. During a hearing, Lord Halsbury re-
implemented the procedure of the court of equity, which used to supplement the common 
law until the 1873 Judicare Act coalesced the two juridical traditions, setting up the single 
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supreme court. In prosecution of union representatives, civil conspiracy of representative 
action was applied to trade unions and full corporate responsibility was imposed on their 
collective funds. In consequence, they were placed under a constant risk of civil suits.336 
Such judicial setback was furthered by cases afterwards such as Quinn v. Leathem, Giblan 
v. National Amalgamated Labourers’ Union and Glamorgan v. Denaby. Beveridge, the 
Liberal Lawyer, remarked in the first case that the adverse trend almost reached ‘a 
fundamental denial of trade unionism’.337  
In face of judicial backlash, the TUC strived to maintain the orthodoxy of full-scale 
voluntarism. However, their penchant for unions’ unincorporated status was not seen as 
favourable even by the liberal sympathizers of trade unions like Asquith, Haldane, 
Sydney Webb and John Ludlow. All of them believed that a new legal status of corporate 
capacity was necessary for trade unions. It was important for some trade unionists, like 
Bell, Pickard, Burt and Sexton to achieve the legislative incorporation as a useful means 
to win employers’ recognition. Nonetheless, they finally turned to support the voluntary 
politics of the TUC, once grasping the scale of damage imposed on union activity through 
penal fines.338 Ben Tillett’s proposal for introducing the system of compulsory arbitration 
was opposed by trade unions’ strong resistance against the ‘judge-made law’.339 Public 
opinion was sympathetic to the cause of the TUC. It was striking for the public that the 
increased role of the government from the 1890s overlooked their right to be consulted. 
Thompson has argued that such supportive attitude of public opinion enabled a swift 
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passage of the Trade Disputes Bill in 1906. The state intervention was seen as assertion 
of moral authority and restoration of the total immunity secured ‘the right of combination 
…in the interests of the community’. Therefore, radicals insisted labour’s right, which 
was grounded on the liberal principle of equality before the law, and denounced the 
‘judge-made law’ as the agency of ruling capitalists. They had a strong faith in public 
opinion, which ‘could perform the requisite regulatory functions in a fairer, more efficient, 
and more democratic fashion’.340  
The 1906 Trade Disputes Act brought back the juridical condition of trade unions before 
the Taff-Vale judgment, guaranteeing trade union’s rights of peaceful picketing and 
immunity from civil actions for conspiracy. In maintaining the unincorporated legal status 
of trade unions, this restoration of full voluntarism underlined the institutional practice of 
trust in the common law tradition. However, this liberal triumph did not mean successful 
recovery from the demise of the liberal consensus. In the circumstance of increased 
distrust for the voluntary market culture of free trade especially after the rise of new 
unionism, the institutional convention based on the individualist principle of unlimited 
liability was no longer satisfactory to form a trustful relationship between officialdom 
and working classes. The official rationales of the voluntary scheme of collective 
bargaining in the 1870s – transmission of moral order and the principle of political 
economy to voluntary associations – were not validated as the safeguard of the public 
interest. As Trentmann has pointed out, the unilateral operation of free trade was restricted 
by the influx of foreign products protected by tariffs, subsidies and new forms of capital 
organisations like trusts and cartels. Imports of sweated and dumped products resulted in 
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making division of interest between producers and consumers.341 With the growth of New 
Liberal politics, there were increased demands from producers for legislative regulation 
of production. The Liberal party did not adhere to the neutral principle, when Lloyd 
George’s liberal budget indicated their commitment to a crusade against unproductive 
class by its policy of land reform and legislative attempts of ‘servile’ state. A statist 
faction of the labour left, as one strand of the progressive alliance, sought to repeal private 
ownership as the means to control monopolies before the first world war. They believed 
that working class independence was achieved by and an outcome of nationalisation of 
railways and mines and central control of wage rates and working conditions.342 There 
was less proclivity for resorting to the voluntary solution than before the 1906 act with 
the growing suspicion about self-governing function of free trade. In this progress of 
epistemological discrepancy between the public predilection for free trade and the 
corporate turn in the market economy, historical economists put forward their 
perspectives, which aimed to resettle an institutional practice of trust and form a 
consensus between producers and consumers.  
 
3.3. William Cunningham and Trust  
In face of the fact that the voluntary framework of collective bargaining was no longer a 
liberal safeguard of the public interest, historical economists redefined rights and duties 
of producers in modern corporate capitalism. This attempt involved a challenge to the 
mid-Victorian concept of public opinion in the expectation of its more broadened role in 
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seeking equilibrium between producers and consumers. Maitland gave an emphasis on 
‘private’ societies in England as source of self-governance and distinguished them from 
incorporated bodies of German Kartell, which was based on the obligatory relations with 
the German state. However, the problem of trust arose in England, when there was 
difficulty in preserving ‘morality’ of trust under the banner of free trade. As one of 
representative historical economists, William Cunningham, a vigorous clergyman, 
showed his concern about degradation of commercial morality and elaborated his 
organicist and corporate framework of neo-mercantilism for the purpose of regulating 
unbridled progress of powerful private societies. Its competence to meet the public 
interest was dependent on the force of public opinion. Cunningham’s disparagement of 
individualism as the doctrine of dissenters led to his disdain of universal attributes of the 
abstract science. The latter’s shift in evaluation of utility caused a trouble in the English 
tradition of good governance. Hence, for Cunningham, it was not the neo-classical 
economic science but public opinion, under whose guidance state intervention was called 
for the common weal, which was essential for cultivating personal attitudes to social 
duties.   
Cunningham insisted importance of the guild society and their associational rule in trade. 
While Marshall saw it as sacrificing the public interest leading to sectarianism, 
Cunningham, in his three volume work, The Growth of Industry and Commerce, argued 
that it was a traditional duty of the guild society of craftsmen to regulate industry and 
commerce so as to leave ‘comparatively little room for fluctuations’. This was one of 
‘common religious duties’ of most industrial and commercial institutions in the medieval 
period and their disintegration meant losing checking institutions, which opened up 
greater opportunities for capital speculation. Cunningham saw that the growth of 
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capitalist system influenced commercial morality, because after the breach of medieval 
regulations induction of economic fluctuation provoked a situation, where what was fair 
and just in terms of wage rates and price was no longer determined under control of 
personal relations between producers and consumers, but by free competition. There was 
no moral compulsion imposed by either party in the process of exchange and owning 
purchasing power became the only means to saturate the desire of wealth.343   
Cunningham proceeded in a dialectic manner of rise and fall of industrial order and 
reached a conclusion that state intervention in private interests was the only means to 
control economy for the public good after the breakdown of guild society. 344  The 
mercantile system implemented commercial policies and individual enterprises were 
liable to check evils of overproduction and over speculation – removal of causes of 
depression and fluctuation, which finally achieved ‘well-ordered’ trade.345 Since this tide 
was reversed after the publication of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations in 1776, 
Cunningham’s distrust in the economic orthodoxy was significant. In particular, he 
showed a grave concern about an outstanding role of the laissez-faire economy separating 
economic from political arena: by this means Smith and classical economists provided 
capitalists with ‘greater freedom from restriction of any kind’ in the name of economic 
science.346 As a result, the advancement of free trade eroded the mercantile fortress of 
well-ordered trade of the last century.  
 
343 W. Cunningham, The Growth of Industry and Commerce – During the Early and Middle 
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With his confidence in the humanitarian tradition of Toryism, Cunningham disavowed 
the theory of classical economics in particular for its flaw in the idea of ‘personal welfare 
of individuals’, which was imperative ‘for the continued maintenance of sound national 
life’.347 John Stuart Mill’s ‘On the Probable Futurity of the Working Class’ compensated 
partially this ideological downturn, but did not offset its defect. In consideration of human 
welfare, socialism gave rise to the state intervention, but Cunningham distinguished 
temporary and worldly welfare of materialism from appeals for idealism of religion: he 
believed that in order to comprehend the sine qua non of individual welfare, the most 
important point was not individuals’ material and physical conditions, but their ‘political 
wisdom’ with the sense of common weal, which would refrain individuals from misusing 
the ‘well-being of the community as a whole’. It was obvious for him that the latter was 
essential for fostering ‘personal attitude towards social duty’.348 
On the basis of Cunningham’s idealist belief in religion as the means to arouse the public 
spirit, there was his empathy with Thomas Aquinas’ theological treatise of the eternal will 
of God – trinity of natural, human and divine law.349 In Politics and Economics, published 
in 1885, Cunningham attempted to develop his own perspective of political economy, in 
which his historicism attributed reasoning of economic study not to deductive 
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methodology of universal maxim, but to ‘the current morality of a society’. By this means 
he intended to delineate a historical trajectory of ‘gradual recognition’ of private property 
in a polity ordained by God. When the sovereignty was imparted by His priest, ‘trust’ was 
conferred upon the reigning monarch by ‘common consent’ – the monarch was throned 
not to rule over his fellows, but entrusted to discharge duties for ‘each and every human 
being for whom Christ died’. In the English tradition of good governance, the prosperity 
of industry and commerce, in place of either ecclesiastical authorities or the power of 
monarchs, had successfully observed the conditions of peace and security. In the 
thirteenth century, accorded by ‘royal favour’, the holy deed of trust was embedded in 
commercial customs of British traders by ‘taking on themselves a duty’. This enabled 
them to settle lawsuits over industry and commerce in ‘one town after another’ rather than 
bringing them to a distant court or sheriff. As far as legislature was concerned, the royal 
assent was granted to industrial and commercial communities for their ‘actual 
experience’.350   
One crucial difference of godly life from the Roman civilisation was the Christian 
church’s struggle to ennoble practice of labour as a religious duty. For Cunningham, 
exercise of labour was identical with maintaining ‘a true discipline for subduing oneself 
to an earnest God-fearing life, and true means of serving God in the World’. This 
Christian virtue of labour was well embodied by the constitution and regulation of guild 
society of craftsmen, in which members worked together ‘for the honour of their trade’: 
this meant that they devoted to seeking ‘what was fair between the workman and the 
public’ and exercised authority ‘to see that this fair standard of work and of pay was 
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adhered to’.351 However, Cunningham was not hesitant to argue that since there had been 
few attempts in the English tradition to encode the divine law into a scriptural basis of the 
constitution, it lost its validity as a decisive authority in guiding men to lead the Christian 
life after the Reformation.352 The grace of God was no longer conferred to the monarch 
via the ecclesiastical hands, but the royal authority was intrusted in ‘an agreement with 
the people’. At this juncture, he considered that the foundation of religious duty to obey 
God was rested only on the natural law and in this condition the authority’s breach of the 
law of individuals was regarded solely as its failure to bring happiness to the people as 
John Locke suggested: In the hope of happiness of obtaining a security for individuals 
and their property, what held the people together to rectify social evils was, henceforth, 
‘private interests’, and this ended up in shifting the relationship between the monarch and 
the subjects from the one, in which the grace of God was anointed, to the one as a matter 
of expediency dictated by ‘private convenience’.353 
The pre-eminence of private interests was marked, when the introduction of machinery 
rendered triumph of capitalism and the traditional order of industrial regulation was 
replaced. The decline in trust became fatal, when increased activities of human beings to 
pursue their private interests were in conflict with those on behalf of national wealth or 
of the community. It was, therefore, a role of the state to show where the ‘true interest’ 
lay. The predominant economic policy of laissez-faire had been first applied for the 
national good, but security of natural liberty did not turn individuals to fulfilling a duty 
of trust. It was detriment to society, insomuch as identifying individual with national 
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wealth. Since ‘self-regard could not be relied on unless it was enlightened’, free traders 
in view of maximising consumers’ interests failed to treat national wealth ‘with constant 
reference to national life, and unless this is done there may be grave defects in husbanding 
the resources of the nation’.354 It was important for the civic life to discover the interest 
in common and this was made possible by the ‘duty of the wise statesman’ to ‘interfere 
with the free play of individual self-interest’. Thus, Cunningham advocated the principle 
of ‘National Husbandry’ as a counter-theory to the laissez-faire economy, which did not 
take account of ‘the probable injury of posterity’.355  
For Cunningham, the breakdown of industrial order was tantamount to disruption of the 
system of free competition, as large capital holders were likely to purge other rivalry and 
established a position as private monopolists. The principle of National Husbandry was 
designed to meet the interest of the public by assessing probability of state intervention 
in the light of current morality reflected in political institutions, laws and public 
discussions. When calling into mind the life of posterity, the principle combined an 
‘abstract counsel of prudence’ with ‘physical means of well-being’ and in the end 
conjured up ‘one concrete image’ of duty as a ‘firm platform on which to rest axiomata 
media that shall serve us in seeking to judge of the right or wrong of any piece of 
legislation’. The principle was endowed with credibility not by the state authority making 
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use of laws and constitution but by reinvigorating public opinion of the nation – ‘the 
hearts and work of the present generation of citizens’:356  
Public opinion is in this land the ultimate court of appeal; when public opinion 
is fairly aroused on any point, changes in the law are sure to follow. Public 
opinion may be shortsighted in detecting an object which is important for the 
general interest: public opinion may be unwise in the manner of pursuing an 
object, and for those who feel the pressing danger of error in these directions 
it may be the greatest of all duties to try and enlighten and direct the public 
mind: but public opinion is the supreme authority which makes itself felt, and 
to its decision the individual citizen must conform. 
 
In contrast to hypothetical maxims of abstract science, public opinion, despite its 
possibility of error and injustice, was the ‘supreme authority in matters of legislation’. It 
would build complementary relationship with the state: while the citizens moulded and 
altered a posture of the state, the latter exerted an influence on the public in terms of moral 
conduct – ‘‘‘No man liveth to himself alone’’, and the State is concerned in seeing that 
every man performs that minimum duty which public opinion demands of every 
citizen’.357 There might be a possibility of conflicts between the state and public opinion 
in the progress of national order. In this way, paying due attention to possible injury to 
posterity, Cunningham’s principle of National Husbandry aimed to resuscitate the missed 
divine law by the force of public opinion, whose guidance imbued individuals with a 
sense of trust and encouraged to perform responsible social duty.   
By the means of promulgating a sense of trust, Cunningham sought to reanimate the spirit 
of labour movement. He hoped that the working force could organise themselves in the 
way the old guilds did. Despite having guild societies as its precursor, trade unions were 
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inclined to indulge in ‘selfish-heroism’, when the latter did not aim at reconciliation with 
the public interest, but at demanding protective legislation ‘for the sake of the body of 
workers alone’. While still effective as an antithesis of laissez-faire, this ‘class’ pursuit 
of ‘the well-being of the workers in a trade’ was equivalent to ‘postponing the interest of 
the individual to the interest of the class’.358 In adherence to the free trade principle, all 
the working class movements in England – trade unions, friendly societies and co-
operative movement – had a common characteristic of dedicating themselves to ‘the 
maintenance of a high standard of comfort’. While giving ‘better opportunities of welfare 
to the masses of the people’, this concept of welfare materialism, Cunningham insisted, 
led to their severance from the ‘common weal’ – the well-being of the community as a 
whole:359    
The difference come into clearer light when we turn from questions connected 
with the diffusion of material wealth, to the moral elements which are 
involved in the idea of well-being. In all economic conceptions there is 
relativity; while on the one side there are material objects, on the other we 
have the human beings by whom these objects are used; varieties of 
disposition and temperament must introduce considerable differences in the 
aims they cherish. These are perhaps of greater importance with respect to the 
influence exercised on subject peoples, than in connection with the condition 
of citizens themselves.  
 
Hence, Cunningham posed a question about legitimacy of free trade. The growth of 
protectionism allowed rivals and colonies to become efficient and influential and this new 
commercial environment, he argued, undermined free competition of small capitalists. 
What had been discerned as ‘common estimation’ in the process of market higgling was 
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no longer meaningful, since ‘it is not possible for all the buyers and sellers, …, to meet 
on the same spot; the old methods of securing publicity are inapplicable’. That being the 
case, Cunningham indicated the coming of new business management by large economic 
organisations to control the process of production and distribution:360  
The growth of trusts in America, which are profoundly affecting English 
industry, both by their example and by the competition they carry on, is in 
many ways alien to English commercial tradition. The sentiment of publicity 
in transactions, and the competition of buyers and sellers in a market, has 
never obtained such a hold in America as it had in English life. The medieval 
dislike of forestalling and regrating – of private bargaining outside the market 
– never seems to have crossed the Atlantic; and there has in consequence been 
greater opportunity for organising systems of control, which embrace the 
production of the material for some manufacture and the distribution of 
production by retailing agents. 
 
It is questionable whether the growth of American trusts was feasible to assist 
Cunningham’s objective to resurrect the divine law of trust in English societies. When he 
stressed the importance of individual attitudes to ‘common weal’ or ‘public good’, the 
point at issue was their moral obligations – public duties and responsibilities, both of 
which were fostered by positive laws of the sovereign state. This meant that subordination 
of private interests to public welfare was vital for industrial coordination. From this 
viewpoint, Cunningham continued to denounce the orthodoxy of political economy, in 
which natural liberty of individuals was consecrated, since the economic policy of laissez-
faire, once successful in replacing vested interests, was likely to see a society as a self-
acting mechanism of free individuals to pursue their own interests. Rather than leaving 
individuals to maximize self-interests and establish private monopoly, the state 
intervention elicited by the force of public opinion was paramount importance to 
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promulgate trust by entrusting individuals a responsible social duty. In his later work, 
Cunningham argued that Britain’s sustention of free trade economy resulted in boosting 
economic expansion of German Kartells, which were successful in exploiting other 
nations.361 Collective action was necessary for checking individual enterprise, since ‘it 
can no longer be assumed that the free play of private interests gives us a result which is 
identical with the public interest’.362 In association with private industrial enterprises, the 
state was required to reduce economic fluctuations and put a harness upon competition 
between economic giants like trust organisations. It was difficult to reach compromise 
unless ‘each is aiming at the Common Weal apart from private interest’ and instead of 
legislative measures ‘which favour the development of the community as a whole’, ‘class 
legislation’ was likely to be adopted.363 Formed under the sovereign state, the common 
weal could project communal interests through national policy. Hence, it was perilous to 
distinguish economic from political and social life of human beings as neo-classical 
economics did. It was a problem of ‘religion’ to cultivate an individual sense of ‘duty and 
responsibility’ for the common weal and empirical science taking account of nation’s 
traditions and ambitions would help this aim.364 For Cunningham, liberty and obligation 
had to be reconciled.  
 
3.4. Collectivism and Public Opinion of L.L. Price and H.S. Foxwell 
Cunningham’s insistence on restoration of religion of individuals was based on trust – an 
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ecclesiastical sanction of public duty and responsibility for the common good. His disdain 
of universal applications of economic science resulted in his strong emphasis upon the 
role of custom facilitating collective action for industrial coordination. In this sense, the 
force of public opinion was induced to propel the state to frame a national policy. This 
meant that public opinion was the source of not voluntary, but collective remedy. 
However, it is misleading to receive literally that different approaches to science between 
the inductive and deductive discipline were reflected in their contrasting languages of the 
concept of public opinion. In practice, until Chamberlain’s proclamation of tariff reform 
made neo-classical economists declare the Free Trade Manifest in 1903, no clear-cut 
antagonistic feeling was shared between the two schools. As Koot has hinted isolation of 
Cunningham among historical economists, others like Langford Price, who was trained 
by Marshall at Balliol, and Herbert Foxwell did call on a more rational concept of public 
opinion in their works than Cunningham.365  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Price adhered to the voluntary principle and was a 
tenacious advocator of free collective bargaining for industrial peace.366 In his article 
‘The Relations Between Industrial Conciliation and Social Reform’ he furthered this 
argument to the extent that moral reform of individuals was indispensable for its operation, 
which was out of reach of government’s social and industrial reform. The institutional 
instalment of collective bargaining could not remove the root cause of industrial disputes, 
insofar as these were always rested on ‘tone and temper’ between masters and men 
towards each other.367 To change the situation, Price pointed to the significance of two 
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powerful factors of the day – trade unions and public opinion. He considered that the 
force of public opinion would exercise ‘moral compulsion’ and lead employers to gradual 
acceptance of trade unions and bargaining with their employees, which turned out to be 
peaceful negotiation between the two parties.368 
Like Cunningham, Price considered that the force of public opinion was efficacious in 
consolidating the roles of custom and habit of producers as advancing their collective 
action. However, his conceptual usage of public opinion was not expected to provide 
economic coordination, but prompt market competition as a determinant of rates of wages 
and prices. This meant that Price did not mean to offset the impersonal force of market 
economy by collective engagement of public opinion: the economic competition carried 
out not by individuals, but by corporate bodies. From this viewpoint, institutional practice 
like conciliation, arbitration and sliding scales were the means to precipitate employers 
and employees to accord with the market principle, while promoting their mutual 
conciliatory attitudes in bringing out industrial peace and moral reform. In short, these 
collective procedures were reckoned to increase economic efficiency, elasticity and 
adjustability in the market economy:369  
It is for these reasons that conciliation – with free, informal and speedy 
discussion and decision between masters and men, is to be preferred to the 
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more elaborate, formal, and necessarily lengthy proceedings before an 
arbitrator; and that the intermittent awards of an arbitrator, or determinations 
of a board of conciliation are to be placed on a lower level of advantage than 
the automatic and sustained regularity of a sliding scale. Conciliation affords 
more opportunity for frequent discussion and rapid decision; a sliding scale, 
during the time of its continuance, obviates the necessity for discussion or 
decision at all on major points. It is from this point of view as superior 
logically to conciliation, as conciliation itself is to arbitration; for in this sense 
it is more elastic – more rapidly and easily adjustable.  
 
In the background of Price’s adherence to collectivism, there was his concern about the 
economic legitimacy of free trade. Since the cosmopolitan value of free trade was 
threatened by the rise of nationalism, he considered that it was difficult to promote general 
welfare. When the principle of free trade made an exception to its policy of state 
intervention in industry and trade, it endorsed an increase in state revenue by taxation in 
forms of customs and excise duties in reaction to fiscal exigency caused by either military 
or public expenditure. Despite the fact that this was not a move to protectionism, Price 
argued, it was no longer plausible for the general public to make a judgment about 
whether the state functioned successfully without making discrimination against or giving 
special treatment for certain commodities. It still looked flawless in theory, but in practice, 
either exceptional abilities or knowledge of expertise was required for checking its sound 
operation of free trade and preclusion of protection.370 In order to advance the public 
interest, the rigid adherence to free trade provided no small safeguard ‘against enfeebling 
corruption or endangering error’, while the perfect neutrality of the government was 
hardly preserved.371  
Hence, Price acknowledged other forms of collective combinations such as profit-sharing 
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and co-operative production and a new monopolistic organisation of trusts as the means 
to overcome shortcomings of free trade economy. In particular, its defective theory of 
‘international division of labour’ was liable to renunciate ‘essential or desirable elements 
of national life’, which were ‘nationally useful’, but not ‘internationally indispensable’.372 
The increasing trends to promote economic organisations would avoid falling into this 
pitfall of the economic orthodoxy. To give credence to collective capacities was the 
means to protect national economy. Nonetheless, Price did not expect collective bodies 
to hamper the operation of market economy. Rather, he anticipated increased productive 
efficiency in pursuit of unbridled market competition: these collective bodies were 
envisaged to ‘effect certain economies in production’, as they would reduce ‘some waste 
in free competition’. Thus, the idea of economic rationality was kept in Price’s discourse 
of political economy. At the bottom of his rationale, there was a firm conviction that it 
was delusory to see only the interest of consumers in advancement of free trade, as much 
as that of producers in advocation of protectionism. Insomuch as the same individual were 
fulfilling duties not only as a producer, but also as a consumer, ‘the interests like the 
persons, of consumers and producers may be artificially parted, but in the nature of things 
they were connected’.373  
Herbert Somerton Foxwell suggested a vision of public opinion, which was oriented to a 
rational corporatist concept. In denial of a view that theoretical and historical approaches 
were opposing principles, he argued that the growths of intellectual spheres in economic 
analysis were mutually interactive and complementary processes eroding the ideological 
bastion of the classical political economy. Quoting Proudhon’s dictum, ‘perfect 
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competition results in monopoly’, he believed that the force of public opinion would grant 
economic legitimacy of  reorganizing industry and trade. Since the public had accepted 
trade societies and their industrial legislation, it was not implausible to redirect economic 
policy towards  ‘corporate action and public control’.374 Unfolding his liberal corporate 
principle, Foxwell aimed to show that voices in demand for the development of corporate 
society were not all raised from the socialist middle-class in Irregularity of Employment 
and Fluctuations of Prices, published as early as in 1886.375  
Foxwell’s chief concern was how to stabilise economic fluctuations, as his motive was 
inspired by George Howell’s statement that political economists were required to suggest 
not solely a way to increase wealth, but to avoid ups and downs of market economy, 
which ‘may change fifty times a day’.376 ‘Altruistic and social feelings’ of individuals 
were essential for cementing a social fabric and these were defensible by fending off 
injurious economic turbulence. This was made possible only by the formation of 
industrial combinations. By this means, people in socially weaker positions were able not 
only to protect themselves by cultivating their customs, but to react or accommodate to 
new economic situation by exerting ‘such feelings’ in full strength.377 Since opportunities 
for reckless speculation and irresponsible management were legion in the period of 
limited liability, the regularity of employment was more valuable than an increase in 
income in terms of enhancing self-reliance and preventing speculation.378 To this end, 
Foxwell suggested a twin pillar of his economic policies – financial bimetallism for a 
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sustainable system of banking and advancement in the system of publicity for bypassing 
misdirection of economy and rash-speculation. These measures were considered to 
mitigate commercial depression and restore the healthy operation of economy, by which 
‘liability should be better proportioned to responsibility’.379  
The growth of corporatism was vitally important, since ‘future economic reform must 
proceed on the two lines of Organisation and Publicity’.380 Collective action rendered it 
possible to counteract an increase in the size of market economy, cushioning harms of 
destructive competition and deep volatility. It also provided a supply of useful 
information in guidance of the public. Nonetheless, while admitting the state institutions 
as effective for giving greater publicity of market transactions and exercising public 
control, Foxwell did not discard his belief in efficacy of the market principle. He was 
fearful of ‘tyranny of the majority’ over individuals and this would happen, when state 
intervention failed to maintain a certain level of production. To prevent this, Foxwell 
argued that the force of public opinion was expected to function as the ‘ultimate and 
supreme’ expression to protect the common weal from private aggression without 
bestowing on the state a full right of direct control. Hence, the more administrative control 
was decentralised, the better voluntary organisations, either trade or municipal bodies, 
could operate under control of public opinion ‘with due intelligence and with practical 
efficiency’. By ‘organisation and publicity’ it was possible to draw upon the ‘best and 
most effective influence of public opinion’ in defiance of political corruption and cut-
throat competition in market economy.381  
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At the bottom of Foxwell’s rationale, there was his firm conviction that ‘the interest of 
the producer is as important as the interest of consumer’. He withstood Jevons’ criticism 
against the expansion of civil services, since it was doubtful whether ‘pecuniary loss to 
the taxpayers’ was ‘of more importance than the ruin and misery of the employed’. Free 
traders’ adherence to the economic orthodoxy was impolitic, because ‘in pursuit of mere 
cheapness more vital objects may be sacrificed’.382 Hence, it was more urgent for Foxwell 
to enable workmen to reap benefits from regular employment and turn their attentions to 
the common interest of their trade in association with their employers. The larger a scale 
of industry or business became, the more powerful public opinion of the employed was 
rendered, because large capital required more skilful and trustful labour to participate in 
business and this was likely to lead to steadiness of employment. Behind Foxwell’s 
compliment to producers, there was his appreciation of guild society of the medieval 
period, whose removal, he lamented, was a ‘purely negative policy’.383 While voluntary 
settlements by conciliation boards and sliding scales were useful for workmen to secure 
their positions in organisations in free trade economy, the current condition of increased 
competition between employers hampered promotion of conditions of labour in 
workplace and rendered it difficult to regulate industrial output. To moderate economic 
competition, Foxwell argued that it was important to advance the common interest of 
trade. While showing a favour to developments of productive co-operation and profit 
sharing, he felt that it was difficult to regulate industrial concerns without legislation. By 
adopting a corporate framework, trade as a whole could reap the best benefits and 
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workmen could foster ‘solidarity of interest’ in face of foreign competition.384  
For Foxwell the growth of trade organization had to be accompanied by that of publicity. 
The latter was crucial for deterring corporate society from falling into corruption and 
inefficiency. Bringing about either complementary or contrary effects to economic 
organisations, the greater publicity would give the public easy access to records of market 
transactions like statistics of employment, income and consumption. 385  The ideal of 
corporate society was achieved by extensive publicity and this was also the essence of 
democracy, as far as public opinion was influenced and galvanised the state authority to 
open channels of information:386 
The essence of democracy is not so much government by the many, which is 
impossible, as publicity which makes public opinion effective, and public 
interests supreme. Nothing is more certain that, with the advance of 
democracy, publicity must become the order of the day. Publicity and 
organization, no doubt: but publicity, I think, even more than organisation. It 
is the necessary protection against fraud, against falsification, against 
oppression: the first condition of self-help as well as of intelligent charity. It 
is even more indispensable as the exterminator of corruption.  
 
Foxwell suggested a concept of public opinion, which would protect the public interest 
by administering corporate institutions. In contrast to Price, who expected efficacy of 
market economy, Foxwell had deep suspicion about its advancement, since he did not 
view the modern market economy as a field of universal competition, but as of social 
composition: market prices, wage rates and profits were not determined by economic 
competition by individuals, as the old orthodoxy presumed, but by interdependence of 
 
384 Ibid., pp.81-2 
385 Ibid., pp.81-2 
386 Ibid. pp.86-9 
178 
 
individuals. This meant that ‘every man’ was, more or less, ‘dependent on others for the 
means of economic action’ and it was misleading to adopt an economic policy of non-
interference, because it was no longer a fortress of ‘general freedom of individuals’ but 
of the situation, which entitled ‘the freedom of the strong to prey on the weak’. Foxwell, 
therefore, posited the corporate concept of public opinion to elicit submission of 
individuals to the common interest by way of regulations and publicity. The issue at stake 
was not substitution of socialism for individualism, but, in his words, how to ‘socialise 
the individual’. To achieve this end, nothing was more effective than organisation and 
publicity as ‘the first rank of social duties and socialising agents’. Foxwell believed that 
public control would not ‘destroy more freedom than it creates’.387 
Despite the insistence on public control, Foxwell did not discard the idea of economic 
rationality. While showing a belief that free competition resulted in monopoly, his theory 
of corporate governance, which was based on the guidance of public opinion, had a 
purpose to lubricate market transaction by precluding the central government from direct 
control of economy: the force of public opinion was expected to take a balance between 
economic coordination and efficiency of production. However, Foxwell’s credibility of 
the sense of economic rationality was lessened after the war. When he wrote an obituary 
of William Cunningham in 1919, he confessed as follows:388  
I remember that in early days I was in constant though friendly controversy 
with him on this point, and found his position unintelligible. It seemed to me 
that there was no necessary opposition between the theoretical and the 
realistic habit, as the example of Jevons so brilliantly showed. But on further 
consideration I have not only learnt to understand Cunningham’s mistrust of 
economic theory, but find myself more and more inclined to move in his 
direction.  
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Foxwell kept in his mind that the fact that Cunningham stood by tariff reformers ended 
up in doing ‘himself and his real aims something less than justice’ as his argument was 
distinct from other protectionists in the continent such as Colbert and List.389 He did not 
clarify a detail in the obituary, but in a paper ‘The Nature of the Industrial Struggle’, 
issued two years earlier, he suggested a reason behind Britain’s different economic 
environment. In the growing trend of economy of scale, unbridled competition was likely 
to create monopoly and boost predatory business activities at the international level. In 
face of such situation of ‘survival of the fittest’, the English economic system of 
individualistic capitalism confronted a serious challenge of ‘trade war’, in which national 
trade policy was vital for successful competition. Since industry and trade were placed 
under control of large-scale economic combinations, there was a room for the state to take 
a hand with them, by which a support of immense resources from the state exacerbated 
predatory competition between nations. This economic warfare made it difficult to 
separate industrial competition from military wars, as they strived to inflict productive 
power of rival countries. Under this circumstance, ‘the weaker to go to the wall’ after 
struggles between bureaucratically managed economies. Hence, Foxwell, for the sake of 
defence, was literally more ‘inclined to move in’ Cunningham’s direction and required 
economic coordination ‘on a national scale, supported by a national economic policy’. 
However, it is important to stress that Foxwell aimed at reducing predatory competition 
‘to a minimum’ and stripping ‘exaltation and worship of the State’ from economic 
activities. In contrast to scientific and systematic methods of continental rivals, Foxwell 
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held on to a firm belief in the public control of corporate governance, in which economic 
organisations of trusts were exposed to the eyes of the public, which were sensitive to 
inspection, control and risks of conducting trades.390  
 Sceptical about economic legitimacy of free trade, both Price and Foxwell provided their 
contexts of political economy, in which the force of public opinion was expected to 
increase the role of custom to strengthen collective capacities of producers, like 
Cunningham suggested. However, they did not disparage efficacy of economic rationality. 
While Price gave whole credence to beneficial effects of market economy, Foxwell 
discussed its importance in preventing the central authority from taking direct control of 
corporate economy. At the bottom of their rationales, there was their firm convictions that 
the interest of producers was as important as that of consumers. Their equilibrium was 
safeguarded by the developments of economic organisations. In face of the growth of 
protectionist economy in international trade, both intellectuals did not wholly rely on the 
voluntary system. In particular, Foxwell’s insistence on corporate governance as an 
essence of modern democracy was so persistent that he anticipated its role as a 
countermeasure against the bureaucratic control of economies in the period of trade war 
between nations.       
 
3.5. William Ashley and State Intervention 
Historical economists suggested their visionary concepts of public opinion, whose 
influence was expected to make collectivist approaches to the public good. They believed 
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in inculcating the producers’ sense of trust for reviving the role of custom of guild society, 
as a catalyst for economic coordination. Their discourses of political economy were, thus, 
based on how to advance national welfare in the age of corporate capitalism. This 
proposition sought to infuse the liberal concept of public opinion in the principle of 
general limited liability. The latter’s collision with the traditional liberal value of the 
individualist doctrine of unlimited liability was so significant that the economic 
orthodoxy of free trade lost its credence as moral economy, since in corporate capitalism 
it was no longer possible for the state to retain its neutral attitude to individual interests.391 
In this circumstance, the voluntary practice of trade unions could not gain economic 
legitimacy in protecting workmen’s freedom to exchange their property of labour. 
Adherence to free trade in labour served rather to make breach in its cultural premise to 
foster the reciprocal and altruistic sentiment between capital and labour. It was, therefore, 
a main concern of historical economists to revamp economic organisations of labour in 
the soil of corporate society and to cap it with the rule of law – market equilibrium 
between producers’ and consumers’ interest for the public good. Public opinion called for 
producers’ custom to tame economic fluctuations, which expectedly led to appearance of 
socialised individuals with regular employment.  
However, it is unequivocal that their collectivist solutions were not successful in gaining 
practical legitimacy. Alborn’s survey has revealed how much degree such public 
sentiment of economic coordination was aroused in joint-stock politics in the late 
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nineteenth century. He has argued that joint-stock politics had played an important role 
of intermediate buttress for the public interest by staving off populistic turmoil between 
the state and the people from the period of the East India Company to the late Victorian 
railway companies. However, Britain’s limited progress in the incorporated limited 
liability had its deep root in its democratic tradition, which had been opposed to formation 
of the public in incorporated forms. Despite a republican rationale behind advocacy of 
the general limited liability, it did not give rise to a large-scale economic organisations of 
trusts, but provided small companies and commercial communities with financial self-
sufficiency. The growth of corporate bodies was circumscribed to service sectors like 
banking, insurance and investment and to network industries like telegraph-telephone, 
railways and public utilities.392 In response to consolidation of the banking sector in the 
1890s, a number of industrial firms moved into the incorporated status, but they were still 
inclined to take forms of local and voluntarist politics in a small commercial entity and, 
therefore, likely to end up in ‘inefficient and unprofitable’.393  
Alborn has argued that the less a democratic tendency was shown in joint-stock 
companies, the more a political role of directors was increased. This meant that when 
financial security was not coupled with democratic participation, directors as ‘a small 
expert class’ were more disposed to fulfill their public duty by reflecting not parochial 
but broader interest. A case of railways after 1880 was a specific example of handling 
economic balance of the whole nation. The amalgamated framework of railway 
companies was successful in neutralizing joint-stock politics and getting around demands 
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of both traders and railwaymen. Management by the state was seen to cause ‘pork-barrel’ 
politics and fall into a populist pitfall of class legislation, so companies needed ‘self-
government and self-management’. Until the political coordination of joint-stock 
railways faced financial difficulty in the interwar period, ‘expert-classes’ of directors, in 
association with public officials, committed to the public welfare in sacrifice of their self-
interests in a more effective way than accommodation to judge-made laws.394 Hence, 
Alborn has insisted that ‘companification’ was requisite for the public good, as joint-stock 
politics, instead of private activities, was contributive to the state formation. Britain’s 
strong tradition of local and municipal republicanism had an adverse effect on demands 
for national efficiency.  
Despite the fact that the local ‘republican’ model of management was ceded to a less 
political stakeholder-director relationship, there was still the immovable common-law 
tradition, whose rule of competition was ever premised to be the source of industrial 
combinations. Robert Donald, a Liberal journalist, argued that the industrial associations 
in England were in a scattered state owing to the strong tradition of free trade economy. 
In comparison with trusts bodies in the U.S., which was developed under the protectionist 
policy, they were barely successful in decreasing wasteful competition. As the ‘safety 
valve’ against monopoly and price inflation, the principle of free trade was attributed to 
its specific economic culture of excluding combinations. However, as long as the 
common law was applied equally to domestic and international trade organisations, the 
strong economic culture of free trade in England circumscribed their companies to the 
‘economies they can effect’ and a lack of efficient management was fatal for their 
 




Henry Macrosty, a Fabian thinker, referred to how significant the common law tradition 
was in the formation of industrial culture. As long as market activities were carried out 
under ruling codes of customary practices, it was important to develop a standardised 
system for commercial and common purposes in trade and industry. Nonetheless, in the 
common law tradition the legal status of industrial combinations like trusts was made 
unlawful in restraint of trade leading to monopoly. It did not totally repudiate the right of 
combinations, insomuch as it was equivalent to that of individual traders. Hence, 
amalgamated bodies like trusts carried out their economic activities like an engagement 
of a single trader, according to ‘the right to trade freely’: competition, however violent it 
was, was not ‘contrary to public policy’.396 In contrast to German Kartells, which were 
granted with full legal personality and combined by regulations with other members, 
Macrosty pointed to a ‘fragile’ character of ‘non-recognition of associations by the law’ 
in the common-law tradition, since individuals or members of associations were allowed 
to act freely and arbitrarily for their personal interests. Under this circumstance, there 
were ‘disintegrating forces’ in action:397 
Whatever may have been the period for which an association was originally 
formed, no member need belong to it or observe its rules a day longer than he 
likes. Nothing can keep him to his contract except a sense of honourable 
obligation, and that does not always resist the temptation of an advantageous 
order. This fragility is increased by the almost invariable incompleteness of 
an association, which very rarely includes all the competitors in a district. 
Some are always left outside to profit by cutting prices a shade below the 
association rates, or it becomes profitable for another district to invade the 
territory of the combined traders.  
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If the common-law tradition blocked up a way to economic coordination by industrial 
associations as in restraint of trade, the theoretical presumptions of historical economists 
could not gain legitimacy in the English law. This meant that in the rise of modern 
corporate capitalism, corporate bodies, like individual traders, engaged with their 
economic activities, but their economic competition did not form a counterpoise against 
monopoly, rather was supposed to boost it. As long as economic organisation of labour 
could not gain legal recognition, the cushion to protect the public interest was torn up by 
speculative market activities, since there was no institutional bulwark, which was 
projected to reconcile market economy. Labour force was exposed to its more severe and 
suppressive pressure and, in the end, cornered to a more unstable condition. The 
legislative re-instalment of the pre-Taff Vale condition of trade unions unveiled their 
precarious position in a decline of the voluntary market culture of free trade. When they 
were spurred for competition, their legislative status as charitable trusts did hardly comply 
with the promises of the acts in the 1870s – economic co-operation and education of 
reciprocal and mutual market behaviours, but acted ironically as a catalyst for social 
division, which became conspicuous during the great industrial unrest before the war. Its 
unincorporated status insinuated their preclusion from stakes of corporate economy.     
In reaction to the ‘British collective action problem’ – low levels of industrial 
concentration, weak organisational capacity and cut-throat internal competition – the 
British government proposed a national frameworks of nation- and industry-wide 
collective bargaining. The state began to take a mediational role in industrial disputes and 
aimed to shape sustainable industrial relations in a way of devising the national system, 
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which was deemed to be compatible with the traditional voluntary market culture of free 
trade. After the economic downturn in the late Victorian period, traditionally strong 
industrial sectors like textiles, coal, iron and steel, shipbuilding and engineering 
confronted intensive competition in the international trade. Some resorted to extreme 
measures for cost-reducing and increasing output by undercutting and sweating. This 
long-lasting adversity heightened trade insecurity and evoked strikes. In consideration of 
decentralised characteristics of these industries, in which trade unions had exerted a 
significant influence on labour process from the mid-Victorian period, this collective 
laissez-faire system aimed at leading each organisation of capital and labour not only to 
acceptance of procedures of collective bargaining, but also to agreements without direct 
state regulations. In this way, Britain’s conventional labour-intensive mode of production 
averted restructuring of labour process based on German and U.S. models of scientific 
and bureaucratic management. However, Howell has argued that this collective laissez-
faire model of state intervention resulted in heightening employers’ stake in the labour 
process and undermined the autonomy of local labour practice by turning trade unions 
into the police of their members.398  
Historians have challenged this collective laissez-faire model of state intervention in view 
of class politics. Fox has argued that the state admitting the relentless pursuit of ‘private 
rationality’ run counter to the national interest. The formal procedure of collective 
bargaining, while establishing industrial peace at corporate levels, could not take account 
of rank-and-file opinions of working classes, but imposed on them institutional 
regulations and obligations, which led to disparities of wealth, status and respect.399 On 
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the other hand, Wiener has asserted that privileges gained by trade unions in the policy 
of collective laissez-faire resulted in a decline in the industrial spirit of entrepreneurs. The 
British culture of gentrification created an economic barrier between the flourishing 
financial and old-fashioned manufacturing sector.400 These historians have attributed the 
rise of class society to a political repercussion of the collective laissez-faire policy. The 
passage of the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 underwriting the common-law tradition placed 
the state in a dilemma between their traditional laissez-faire attitude and apprehension for 
the national interest. While the state endorsing free collective bargaining, the quasi-
privileged status was granted to delegates constituting the national- and industry-wide 
level of collective bargaining. The predicament arose over whether individuals could 
pursue their freedom in society.    
However, a salient point is that it is misleading to accuse the collective laissez-faire 
system of marking triumph of either the orthodoxy of free market economy or the socialist 
principle of collectivist regulation. Rather than reflecting government’s wavering faith 
between individualism and collectivism, the outcome of class politics was derived from 
whether there was an institutional problem of trust, which failed to reconcile market 
economy with the public interest. Perkin has suggested that there was an institutional 
continuum between individualism and collectivism. Even in the dogmatic individualist 
principles of Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, the state intervened on behalf of 
‘freedom of the individual to pursue his own interest’. In line with the meaning of positive 
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freedom – ‘not merely freedom from state control but freedom to enjoy rights and 
privileges’ – the law was liable to make a difference in distribution of freedom in society. 
Perkin has argued that in case of collectivism, its label would be applied to society, in 
which the state accorded such liberty to more wide-ranging constituents than certain 
privileged individuals.401 Therefore, posing a question of class politics in the collectivist 
society, the issue at stake was whether the state was successful in endorsing liberal rights 
of individuals without maximizing or restricting certain atoms of self-interests, and was 
oriented to the public good. The move of entrepreneur M.P.s from the Liberal to 
Conservative party did not represent either the supremacy of individualism or failure of 
collectivism in the corporate governance, as it was the institutional order of trust, which 
finally refrained the managerial authority in party politics from class politics in violation 
of collective liberty of certain individuals.  
From this point of view, historians of industrial relations propounded problems of 
institutional order under the corporate governance. They maintained that industrial 
relations were shaped by institutional competition between tripartite interests – the state, 
capital and labour. Zeitlin has argued that in response to international and domestic 
pressure the state had to operate in a ‘janus-faced’ manner. Obliged to manage national 
economy, it had to forge interdependent relationships with subordinate interest groups.402 
In this process, the organisations of labour began to play a more dominant role in 
industrial relations403 Redman’s dissertation has revealed that the rise of the professional 
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civil service and its scientific, but still imperfect, approach to industrial mediation 
replaced the conventional wisdom of the neutral state. This ended up in boosting 
institutional competition between capital and labour for the political influence. The ‘class’ 
sentiment was accrued, when either employers or working classes faced a situation, in 
which they could not wipe out suspicion against the government promoting the interest 
of their opponent.404 Their examination of the tripartite relations suggested that in the 
process of consensus-making a struggle for political influence was more important than 
the voluntary procedure of collective bargaining, as long as in administration of corporate 
governance, the state had to take a balance between the national and private interest.    
However, in consideration of the reformation of trust, it is imperative to draw attention to 
the institutional order of economic organisations. An approach had to be made to rebuild 
economic organisation of labour in aim to reconcile market economy with the public 
interest. The institutional clash between economic culture of individual and collective 
liberty posed an obstacle in the way to establish equilibrium between producers and 
consumers in corporate governance. In rebuttal of Wiener’s class-based theory of 
gentrification, F.M.L. Thompson has argued that the mid-Victorian enterprise culture had 
been grounded not on the upper-class hegemony, but on the rise of associational 
movements, in which religiously inspired societies like that of evangelicals disseminated 
virtues of respectability for business including ideas of self-help, self-reliance, thrift, 
abstinence, hard work, diligence and perseverance. In this sense, entrepreneurs shared a 
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common moral ground of economic culture, which favoured economic values like free 
trade, competition and minimalist government.405 A cause of social division did not lie in 
the decline of the industrial spirit, but rather in a change in this economic culture due to 
the growth of business firms. Bureaucratic control of enterprise was required to separate 
them from family management and to adopt more inhuman systems. 406  In light of 
corporate governance, a new spectrum of public opinion, which called for the state as an 
even-handed guarantor of collective liberty of labour was expressed not by progressive 
liberals, whose predecessors were the main protagonists of its cause in the 1870s. James 
Thompson has made an enquiry into political thoughts amidst the great industrial unrest 
before the war and revealed various views of distributive justice in fiscal controversy 
from free traders to tariff reformers. In this discourse, the moral force of public opinion 
was a regulator of industrial disputes, but could not cast aside a doubt of class politics 
insomuch as MacDonald and Snowden dismissed pluralist frame of mind by reckoning 
working class syndicalist as neglecting the interest of consumers.407 In the Conservative 
tradition, on the other hand, William Ashley wrote a report for the public interest in face 
of the industrial unrest and revealed his vision of liberal corporatism, which gained 
limited purchase at that time and thereafter.  
William Ashley believed in ‘socialised capitalism’ of the nation as a remedy for social 
division. Under the influence of the state, corporate institutions became ‘a buffer between 
individuals and society’.408 What he saw during the industrial unrest in the 1890s was an 
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indifferent attitude taken by the majority of better-to-do people, who put questions of 
industries ‘impatiently aside’. The lack of common enthusiasm portended the division of 
the nation and class struggle and would lead members of the community to living ‘side 
by side, ‘‘envy, hatred, and malice, and all uncharitableness’’’. 409  Hence, Ashley 
considered that it was a problem of religion to make up for the social gulf and that the 
issue of social organisations could not be left outside the sphere of science, since the 
orthodoxy of the market principle was ‘indeed merely another and pseudo-scientific term 
for the struggle of interests which leads to the social war we deplore’.410 An economic 
organisation could not be ‘made at all in self-contained village communities, as socialists 
presupposed, but required ‘much exchange of products between place and place’.411 If 
‘ultimate test of justice is good of the community’, the right of private property should be 
left unfettered and he denounced the socialist premise of public control of production.  
To this aim, Ashley was resolute in calling deductive theories into question. Making 
criticism of the modern socialism for embracing Ricardo’s theory of value of production, 
in which the amount of capital was proportionate to that of labour in total, he also pointed 
out theoretical pitfalls of Marshall’s marginal theory of distribution, since the notion of 
margin was ‘not much more than a verbal description of the superficial facts at a particular 
point of time’.412  For Ashley, these deductive theories rendered economic situations 
unhistorical, insofar as their static theories overlooked a fact that expressions of human 
desires were not homogeneous, but varied phenomena. In examination of their causes and 
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effects, marginal principles could not evaluate values, which were cultivated in historical 
and social contexts, since economists would find their complexity to reach a single point 
of unanimity. Therefore, economic history was by any chance a means to protest ‘political 
economy of utility’, when its abstract theories promulgated corrupted standards of 
‘morality’ in child education.413 Ashley believed that historical economists, scoping out 
problems of science, would offer collectivist and institutional studies in revelation of ‘the 
life and movement of whole industries and classes, of creation and modification of social 
mechanism, of the parallel progress and interaction of economic phenomena and 
economic thought’.414  
Ashley developed his thoughts of economic organisations throughout the 1890s. In 
‘Methods of Industrial Peace’, he pointed out the growth of entrepreneurship as a result 
of prosperity of co-operative production and profit-sharing and warned that this change 
would outmanoeuvre the old cause of trade unionism. While making an argument that 
education of public opinion was important, he held that Mundella’s scheme was still 
efficacious to protect workers’ freedom of contract.415 In the late 1890s, Ashley began to 
place his intellectual focus upon intermediate organisations for regulation of economic 
competition. By making an analysis of Aristotle’s Politics and his concept of ‘Barter’, he 
aimed to shape a concept of natural state of trade by distinguishing it from speculative 
practice in accumulation of wealth. The introduction of currency enabled limitless 
increase in wealth and property in markets catering for both goods for ‘use’ and for 
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‘exchange’. Ashley considered that Aristotle sought to develop a midway by shaping an 
intermediate form of trade, in which economic exchange was still accorded with nature 
and was serviceable for household, but nothing to do with acquisition of ‘limitless 
quantities of money’.416 Two years later, Ashley issued ‘The Tory Origin of Free Trade 
Policy’ and assessed Tory opinions against the Whiggery measure of the balance of trade, 
which had an outcome of ‘extremest[sic.] intensification’ of protection by prohibiting 
either French and East Indian imports. He argued that the progress in general balance of 
trade was in the long run more important for international trade than judging its balance 
on a singular basis, which provided the basis of universal applications of natural 
advantages in particular trades. Tory’s mercantilist perspectives, in which commercial 
freedom was guaranteed by increase in trade, were philosophical forerunners of Adam 
Smith’s publications.417  
An American experience in the late 1890s provided Ashley with a firm belief that it was 
impossible to reverse a general trend of the growth of capitalistic combinations even by 
a series of anti-trust laws. Under this circumstance, such legal restrictions accelerated 
economic competition between large scale bodies and in the end led to emergence of 
monopolistic conditions untrammelled by ‘any immediate fear of competition’. Since 
prices were no longer determined by competition, monopolistic bodies could take 
coordinative action by restriction of production and fixation of price.418 Ashley believed 
that by such dynamic feature of the American industrial spirit, business entrepreneurship 
in function gained ‘maximum of importance’ and what this environment fostered was an 
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upsurge of their ‘industrial individualism’.419 In the case of unleashed pursuit of self-
interest, he considered that it was a role of the state to control prices and protect 
consumers.420  
Ashley’s interest in economic organisations bore the fruit in the publication of The 
Economic Organization of England in 1914. As a historical economist, he shared the 
sense of importance of the guild system as a clue to solve the present labour questions, 
since the mainstay of industrial control was obligated to fulfil ‘the general satisfaction 
alike of the general public and of ‘‘the workers’’’.421 For Ashley it was in the 1890s, when 
new paradigm of industrial control was required. It was hopeful that the modern state 
made use of corporate organisations in the matter of contracts between capital and 
labour.422 Quoting T.H. Green’s axiom that ‘mere freedom from restraint’ was distinct 
from ‘freedom in the higher sense – the power of men to make the best of themselves’, 
Ashley did no longer maintain that the principle of collective bargaining would solve all 
labour problems. Rather, in face of the great industrial unrest, there was always a risk of 
industrial conflict, as long as both sides made a bargain on behalf of their immediate 
interests. Despite the developments of various types of economic organisations such as 
co-operative production, profit-sharing and limited liability joint stock companies, he 
believed that these expedients could not solve the problem of modern capitalist system. 
The remedy would lie in the economic organisation, in which there was a unity between 
‘state regulation from above’ and ‘spontaneous combination from below’.423 He saw the 
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formation of economic organisations of trusts ‘as natural as the rise of the gild of the 
factory’, which resulted from ‘the inherent striving of capital towards profits’ and 
developed ‘the good side of humanity, the impulse toward mutual assistance and the 
desire for stability’. In terms of regulation of production, capitalistic combinations could 
meet demands of labour, for whom ‘steadiness of employment is far more important than 
the amount of remuneration’. If industrial peace was an urgent thing to secure, it was 
necessary to have a strong solidarity of interests not only among labour, but in association 
with employers.  
Economic condition of consumers was a lingering concern in Ashley’s argument of 
economic coordination, because in the age of capitalistic combinations unrestricted 
competition no longer provided necessary safeguard of consumers, but brought about 
monopoly. This meant that there was a certain risk of communal interests. Provisions of 
large capital on machinery in joint-stock companies separated the two elements of 
production – capital and labour – and their ‘profit-seeking impulse’ was inimical to the 
public interest, since commercial policy and mechanical equipment were of main 
concerns to management. Hence, ‘labour conditions are apt to be left out of account’, as 
the management tended to obtain labour in cheap and easy conditions. In the modern 
corporate capitalism, in which ‘conscience’ of managers was ‘weakened by a conflict of 
apparent duties’, it was essential to form the ‘strong combinations on the side both of the 
employing concerns and of the workpeople’ .424 In a case study of E.J. Smith’s experiment 
in England to form an industrial association in the metallic bedstead industry, Ashley 
argued that it was successful not only in harmonising interests of producers, but also in 
 




planning to give to the public constant detailed information about the trade. In regard with 
social welfare, it was tenable to make checks on prices as well as managements of 
employment and wage rates: ‘Certainly, if combinations continue to flourish, publicity of 
accounts will be the only alternative to State interference; and if it is not voluntary, it will 
be compulsory’.425 The economic coordination had to be shielded by the state, which was 
intelligent and alert enough to protect the interests of community.426  
Ashley was resolute in repudiating the philosophic idea of natural liberty, which Smith 
injected in the discourse of political economy as the liberty of individuals to pursue their 
own interests. He was concerned about such unrestraint condition developed a less 
conscious state of human beings. Despite the fact that commercial liberty as summum 
bonum called forth free trade in labour, the current problems presaged the crisis of 
political economy. Hence, Ashley bemoaned bigoted attitudes of British intellectuals, 
who ‘intended to veto any serious reconsideration of the commercial policy of this 
country’. 427  Their effort to uphold Smith’s universal application of industrial and 
commercial humanity ended up in ‘the vain task’, insofar as abstract principles were 
‘seldom more than the generalisations of common sense’ and short of causes and effects 
in market economy.428  Ricardo’s replacement of Smith’s theistic tenor by power of 
utilitarianism was still circumscribed by its short-sightedness owing to a static approach 
to one moment of economic condition, which failed to take account of future elements.429 
Thence, in the eyes of Ashley, the flourish of German historical school was the 
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wholesome antithesis. On the labour question, while English economists legitimised the 
factory acts as ‘exception which did not engender their general principle’, their German 
counterparts saw that a ‘concession on this point ought to involve a readjustment of the 
whole mental attitude’. In short, the latter rendered the absolute doctrine into one of 
relative paradigms, which reached a truism that freedom and interference were not 
incompatible values in science:430 
If in this field, optimism broke down; if, in this field, the ultimate interests of 
society needed to be defended against the immediate interests of individuals; 
if, in this field, the State had a positive part to play; then no longer could it be 
maintained as a general principle that ‘‘natural’’ economic forces always 
worked out to the best result; that society could be safely trusted to the 
individual pursuit of self-interest; that the State had no right to ‘‘interfere’’. 
 
Ashley argued that by including what Smith degraded – human reason – natural character 
of human beings was saved and that no ‘modern civilised state’ could survive without 
hampering ‘immediate individual desires and impulses’. 431  The principle of natural 
advantages in free trade was a ‘comparative’ and not ‘positive’ idea, insofar as such 
advantages had been shaped by unfavourable historical events like slavery.432 Rather, he 
considered that the government legislation was liable to influence the amount of capital 
home and abroad. The neo-mercantilist policies of protection and tariff reform were 
beneficial in the age of large-scale production, since by the government interference it 
was possible to preserve the industrial spirit of the nation. Therefore, he showed 
disapproval of the British Labour Exchange, whose political basis was provided by the 
theory of the internal transferability of capital and labour under the condition of free trade. 
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He insisted the importance of governmental measures to take account of a contemporary 
economic condition that the mobility of labour was slower and less flexible than that of 
capital, since a protracted period of unemployment led to demoralisation of labour:433  
When a long-established industry in England has been seriously damaged – 
as has, of course, occurred again and again – by changes in foreign tariffs, it 
has, I think, seldom happened that it has entirely disappeared. It may 
permanently contract into narrower dimensions, and in the next generation its 
place in a particular town may be taken by another and newer industry. In this 
case its disappearance will have been attended by an amount of suffering and, 
what is worse, of demoralisation…. …the deterioration of character which 
does so easily beset workpeople during protracted periods of unemployment 
or underemployment is at least as important as a fact as the blessings of the 
subsequent rebound. 
 
While New Liberal repugnance of the rule of capital turned them to pursue limitation of 
producers’ right in the form of land reform, Conservatives took a different approach to 
the City’s cosmopolitan finance: they saw the growing power of capital as the cause of 
the increased level of unemployment. Conservative political economy premised that free 
trade would end up in monopoly which would limit the amount of employment and that 
its cosmopolitan finance would corner domestic producers into unstable conditions, as 
the labour market was incessantly exposed to heavy pressure from foreign competition. 
The separation of financial sectors from manufacturing would worsen the problem of 
sweating and move Britain to ‘living off its capital’. 434  Contrary to the consumerist 
politics of free trade and gold-standard, the Conservative politics valued producers’ 
interests by planning to increase employment for the national prosperity.435 It was their 
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rationale that collectivism would develop the national interest and that the sense of 
citizenship was indivisible from morale of unselfish devotion to the common good.  
Two different lines of economic policies in Edwardian party politics resulted in 
differential theoretical approaches to industrial disputes. The Unionist Social Reform 
Committee (USRC) published a report in 1914, of which Ashley wrote a draft.436 The 
committee argued that it was the Tory tradition in relation to the growth of trade unionism 
to provide an economic safeguard of communities by harmonising the state with their 
interests. To this end, they considered that it was important to protect the interest of labour, 
at the expense of which free trade economy expanded.437 Since the system of compulsory 
arbitration could not cope with the industrial unrest, the conservative cause counted on 
the idealist formation of the common interest between capital and labour, on which the 
force of public opinion put pressure. In order to promote the national well-being, the 
committee sought a way of industrial peace, in which the force of public opinion could 
adjust the common interest of capital and labour to that of communities.438 This reformist 
solution was going to replace the principle of free trade, which could not overcome the 
problems of cheap labour and cheap production.439 It was obvious that the extensions of 
the framework of collective bargaining, e.g. profit-sharing, could not become an answer 
to a wave of strikes and lock-outs. Hence, in lieu of responding to ‘narrow’ and ‘sectoral’ 
industrial concerns, it was a role of the state to develop a comprehensive way to reach 
industrial peace. It was inevitable for them to make an advancement in public opinion and 
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in economic organisations of capital and labour, insomuch as trade unions were not 
responsible for damage and immune from legal compulsion.440  
The report pointed to a role of the Board of Trade as a mediator of industrial disputes. 
Eliciting a good sense from deputies of capital and labour, the Board strived to put 
forward public suggestions for a settlement and in this process an educated and informed 
voice of public opinion had to be reflected.441 Such function was also expected in defining 
minimum wages under the Trade Boards Act of 1909 and the Coal Mines Minimum Wage 
Act of 1912.442 In this way awards of industrial tribunals were grounded on the force of 
public opinion, which formed an agreement between capital, labour and the community. 
The committee was opposed to exertion of coercive force in their administration. They 
believed that the expanded role of state intervention would result in ‘the employment of 
a more regular force at higher wages and under better conditions’.443  
On the other hand, the minutes of the Rainbow Circle, which was composed of 
progressive reformers, showed their growing concern over free trade economy and 
insisted ‘the necessity of union between religious and social affairs’ in seeking 
solution.444 Paying a tribute to the mid-nineteenth century ‘religious revolt’ against the 
Manchester School as injecting the ‘idea of brotherhood’, the circle’s New Liberal agenda 
advocated a cause of ‘the greatest liberty of the greatest number’ by developing J.A. 
Hobson’s theory of underconsumption, in which ‘ultimate duty’ of the state was to 
‘guarantee work & wages to those willing to work’.445 In face of the industrial unrest, the 
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circle proposed a system of compulsory arbitration for ‘fairer distribution of the fruits of 
labour’ in reference to a case in New Zealand. In this framework, the force of public 
opinion was adopted as a complement of scientific credibility in decisions of arbitrators. 
The progressive plan to ‘conciliate the commercial classes generally’ did not call for 
challenge to the capitalist system, but for judgment of its results. This meant that the 
present condition of maldistribution of wealth was to be rectified, when the ‘community 
controls the three factors of production, in the interest of all’ – land, capital and labour.446 
The progressive circle gave credit to collective solution offered by the Board of Trade, 
but this implied its distributive function in public control of monopolies and they 
discounted private ownership, as economic organisations of trusts were seen as enemies 
of small employers and labour.      
Severity of the industrial unrest upset the Liberal administration. Lloyd George thought 
that it was unavoidable to adopt the compulsory measure to settle industrial disputes. He 
had a concern that a large-scale stoppage would damage the national economy, so strived 
to avert the national railway strike in 1907, for which he introduced the successful 
Railway Conciliation scheme. The hardest moment were spasmodic strikes occurred in 
South Wales and in Northumberland and Durham coal mining industries after the 
enactment of the Miners’ Eight Hours Act of 1908, because the act led to confusion with 
conventional practices of export-oriented coalfields in north-east and South Wales. In 
target of foreign markets, these areas adopted different work shifts from other coalfields. 
In particular, the Cambrian Combine’s Rhonndda pit proceeded an anomalous custom, 
which had its origin in settlements of migrant workers from the late nineteenth century. 
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While pit-by-pit negotiations in the north-east mining were successful in some degree for 
eliminating a fear of outburst, breakdown of the conciliation board in Cambrian Combine 
culminated in long-term strikes, which persisted for ten months in 1910. When a 
temporary truce was agreed, some activists launched a campaign for minimum wages and 
this movement developed into a nation-wide movement of the Miners’ Federation.447 
When the national strike was announced in March 1912, the Liberal administration 
including Asquith, Lloyd George, Edward Grey and Sydney Buxton held a series of 
conferences with delegates of employers and trade unions, but ended up in vain. The 
Liberal government introduced the minimum wage bill and under the Coal Mines Act of 
1912 minimum wages were fixed by regional joint boards. Finally, the act alleviated 
miners’ discontent and terminated the national strike. This Liberal’s decision for the 
extension of regulatory power marked a watershed in history of liberalism. Lloyd George 
later mentioned that ‘Asquith’s declaration for a minimum wage sounded the death-knell 
of the Liberal Party in its old form’.448 What this statement implied was the end of 
traditional liberalism, which had a synonymous meaning with the end of the voluntary 
market culture of free trade. 
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 Ch.4 The End of Liberal Pluralism 1900-1930                         
 
4.1. From Liberal Corporatism to Corporate Pluralism 
This chapter aims to examine the limited progress of the intellectual tradition of liberal 
corporatism in Britain. Historical economists suggested their idealist corporate visions in 
reflection of positive conception of public opinion. Their standpoint was ‘liberal’ 
insomuch as their appreciations of public opinion were projected to achieve the public 
good through inculcating the sense of trust among producers, which was conducive to 
rational production in counterpoise to the central control. In face of economic urgency of 
incorporation of labour, historical economists addressed a way to ensure collective action 
of working classes in corporate economy. Backing protection by tariffs, they aimed to 
assure autonomy of labour by remoulding the liberal institution of economic organisation 
of labour into the neo-mercantilist framework. In terms of conducting economic 
coordination under the guidance of public opinion, collective liberty of working classes 
was undergirded by its autonomous function. From this viewpoint, it is misleading to see 
visions of historical economists as identical to the continental counterparts of totalitarian 
protectionism and, hence, Britain’s introduction of fiscal policy based on tariff reform – 
imposition of import duties and imperial preferences – in 1932 was not the Tory triumph 
of protectionism in their long-lasting tussle with free traders. Historical studies on free 
trade have been inclined to overlook this point, when they stressed imperial effectiveness 
of tariff reform.449 By dissecting the growing concept of economic co-operation in the 
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progressive movement, this chapter reveals that both free traders and protectionists 
imbibed the capital-centred discourse of productivist co-operation. Hence, the liberal 
visions of historical economists, whose concept of liberal corporatism was designated to 
make reconciliation with market economy, was displaced by the rise of growth oriented 
framework of corporate pluralism.  
Unfolding the end of free trade perspective, Trentmann has underlined persistence of the 
laissez-faire relationship between the state and market as the main cause of Britain’s lapse 
in the growth of corporate politics. In association with voluntary and popular associations, 
its passionate commitment to free trade failed to nurture modern economic organisations, 
whose organised interests were to help mediate interests of individuals, so departing it 
from ‘alternative orders of democracy such as pluralist corporatism’.450 Orthodox liberal 
assumptions of individualism and the market principle were shared even among early 
tariff reformers, as they introduced protectionism as the means to safeguard market 
competition short of incorporation. Trentmann has ascribed this outlook to the business 
structure of British industries, which preferred family firms to incorporated status of 
limited liability. Therefore, party politics could successfully contain the growth of 
corporate politics, despite the fact that business interests had already turned their back on 
the fiscal orthodoxy of free trade before Chamberlain’s announcement of tariff reform.451 
For the institutional lapse of corporate politics, this chapter, instead of emphasising the 
ideological hegemony of free trade orthodoxy, seeks its cause in malfunction of 
collectivist policies in the market economy of free trade. The flowering of new liberal 
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social reform resulted in dismissal of the pluralist premise that autonomous economic 
organisation of labour accommodated the public interest. In light of the state’s neutral 
stance to market economy, its advancement of professional and scientific expertise of 
incumbent bureaucrats, rather, ended up in providing a collectivist basis of production in 
an orderly organised economic system, discounting the practice of empirical and 
conventional wisdom.       
While it was not until the post-Second World War period that Conservatives introduced 
the Keynesian deficit finance, both the Labour and Conservative party began to consider 
a dirigiste attitude of Keynesian political economy in the 1930s. Fiscal reform for public 
works, which Keynes called for with a revenue tariff in 1930, presaged the Keynesian 
macro-economic reform of demand management by inflationary control. 452  This 
momentum against the deflationary politics of free trade was fomented by the intellectual 
endorsement of the productivist strategy, which was epitomised by producers’ 
rapprochement between progressive employers and trade unionists in the late 1920s. 
While Trentmann has examined the pressure of post-First World War internationalism 
and wartime experience of production as twin catalysts for erosion of free trade, this 
chapter unfolds Britain’s internal conversion in the intellectual discourse.453 There was 
the progressive turn from consumerist politics of free trade, in which consumers were 
equivalent to the national interest as ‘one trade in politics’, to productivist politics, which, 
incentivised by international co-operation and industrial reorganisation of domestic 
production, provided producers with a theoretically rational guideline for coordinated 
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capitalism. This shift in the idealist notion of progressivism was set in motion by both 
Liberal and Conservative political economy of William Beveridge, Arthur Steel-Maitland 
and Harold Macmillan and bequeathed to the Keynesian Revolution of the mid-twentieth 
century.454 On this premise, this chapter places a particular focus on the making of what 
Green has pointed out as ‘intellectual perfectionism’ – the triumph of abstract and 
deductive approach to corporate pluralism in economic rationalisation.455 In this process, 
the productivist language of economic rationalisation replaced the voluntary voice of 
public opinion, whose liberal role in early Conservative political economy was an 
informed source of inductive methodology, evaluating the experience cultivated by 
customs, institutions, laws and cultural virtues as the means to find out the common 
interest in policy-making. At this juncture, the liberal corporate form of collectivism as 
the bulwark of the public interest was demolished by the macroscopic rhetoric of 
corporate pluralism, which promoted economic protection not for the self-defensive 
economic coordination by trust, but that for the prosperity of national economy.    
The liberal tradition of free trade, which was characterised by the consecrated interest of 
consumers, ensured the labour right of freedom of contract, when the trade union laws of 
the 1870s legitimised the voluntary operation of collective bargaining. This economic 
subculture of Victorian society was an outcome flowing from the revivified current of 
radicalism, whose demands for individual rights and equality before the law were asserted 
against the ancient regime in the seventeenth century. However, this long-lasting 
condition of Non-conformist liberty, based upon the common law tradition and local 
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democracy, was hampered, when the growth of corporate society called for the economic 
incorporation of labour into the legal principle of limited liability. As the Common Law 
tradition acknowledged the legal personality of corporation, the voluntary practice of free 
collective bargaining placed the latter under difficult condition, entangled in its judicial 
dilemma between individualism and corporatism. Despite the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 
absolving trade unions from corporate responsibility, they got into difficulty in securing 
the market equilibrium between capital, labour and consumers in corporate economy. 
Insomuch as the legal status of trade unions was grounded on the institutional premise of 
voluntarism, the legislative embrace of the principle of limited liability led to conflict 
with the conventional practice of securing the public interest in the tradition of free trade. 
A problem of British social virtue of trust arose, when its traditional premise of free trade 
could not be effective in ruling out monopoly and crippling economic combinations. 
Since the common law tradition permitted speculative market competition by collective 
bodies, which served to establish monopoly in market economy, the voluntary framework 
of collective bargaining did no longer endorse the autonomy of trade unions. 
On this premise, the last chapter examined corporate visions of historical economists. In 
face of economic urgency of incorporation, their approach to corporate economy 
suggested a crucial role of economic organisation of labour as the means to ensure 
collective action of working classes. In England, institutions of trust were evolved in 
association with their strong sense of charity and in the guise of an unincorporated 
organisations. It had prescribed personified ownership of the land in trust on the basis of 
unlimited liability as an attestation of liberal conscience. When the principle of general 
limited liability granted the incorporated status to labour, the voluntary practice was 
susceptible to corporate interests and no longer assigned to define rights and duties to 
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share the sense of common good with their employers. In the context of historical 
economists, the positive conception of public opinion, with its holistic and inclusive 
character, was appreciated in a different manner from universalistic and individualist neo-
classicism. To reconcile the impersonal force of market with the common good, it 
demanded autonomy of corporate bodies as the institutional bulwark of collective liberty 
of the working classes, who were granted the incorporated status. By this means, 
historical economists suggested pluralist visions of economic coordination by 
establishing a channel of intermediate organisations between the state and communal 
interests. However, in practice, their aim to rebuild trust by the neo-mercantilist economy 
was cast aside, as the rule of competition, besides Britain’s limited progress in 
incorporated limited liability, hampered their legitimacy. The report of the USRC 
committee saw that in face of industrial unrest, it was a role of the state to seek a ‘common 
interest’ between capital and labour and provide economic safeguard of the latter, at the 
expense of which free trade economy made an advancement. For historical economists, 
the issue at stake was not material welfare of working classes, but their industrial spirit 
as a catalyst for enhancing trust to perform social duty to each other.456 
In defence of free trade, the Edwardian progressives developed the ideology of free trade 
by linking to social reform. As a safeguard for democracy and the rights of community, 
they sought to maintain the neutrality of the state and fend off organised cliques and 
vested interests from domineering politics. In this attempt to reconcile morality of free 
trade with the world of protectionism, they had recourse to state intervention in the right 
of property via direct taxation. 457  This New Liberal collectivist principle, hence, 
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abandoned the laissez-faire nature of liberalism and forged its organicism by taking 
account of Henry George’s land nationalisation. Land reform was aimed not only to cover 
the fiscal expense of the Boer War, but to increase benefits of peasant proprietorship. 
Instead of underlining free exchange of individual producers as in classical liberalism, 
this collectivist innovation of people’s budget enshrined consumers’ right of cheap food 
by reductions of import duties as much as people’s welfare by progressive policies, like 
minimum wages, labour exchanges and nationalisation. Its aspiration of consumers’ 
interest marginalised the old-rhetoric of free-trade, whose individualist tenor insisting 
self-help, low taxation and free competition won a massive appeal to small proprietorship 
in the mid-Victorian period. Rather, the New Liberal politics attracted lately registered 
working-class electorate, who saw free trade as the best means to defend from oppressive 
aristocracy, high wages, cheap prices and political autonomy of working classes. 
Promoting redefined liberal values of peace, community and consumer welfare, free trade 
formed the national identity of Britons and became a secular religion in the Edwardian 
period.458 
As to politics of industrial relations, the New Liberal policy of collective laissez-faire 
overshadowed liberal perspective of historical economists. It held out the voluntary 
practice of collective bargaining by the state undertaking a mediational role in industrial 
disputes. In order to contain large combinations of producers, its programme promoted 
social welfare and strengthened the distributive function of the state to make equilibrium 
between production and consumption. Setting the national or industry-wide framework 
of collective bargaining, short of direct state regulations, this adherence to quasi-laissez-
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faire model of industrial relations developed a rift between officialdom and civic culture 
of rank-and-file unionists. The dissolution of pluralist perspective arose, when demands 
for the corporate interest took over the voluntary process between capital and labour 
organisations. By developing the concept of corporate bias Middlemas saw that an 
ideological fault line between liberal corporatism and corporate pluralism appeared, when 
the state formed a public consent and consummated a harmonious condition without 
taking into consideration wisdom of public opinion. The central control was successful 
in claiming to gain a public consent or tolerance by ‘opinion management’. Under the 
rule of free collective bargaining, equivalent to the constitutional status for trade unions 
and employers’ organisations, the quasi-laissez-faire regime was conditioned to disclose 
political ambivalence. The state could draw on these governing institutions, which 
remained untied with its compulsory regulations, to form quasi-corporate pressure to 
stabilise industrial relations.    
The growth of corporate bias was rooted in Britain’s voluntary culture, which evaded the 
state level administration of industrial relations. Distinct from totalitarian constitutions of 
the continental counterparts, the collective laissez-faire system acknowledged trade 
unions and extensive shop-steward movement and achieved uninterrupted production and 
benefits without utilisation of incorporated framework.459 However, Middlemas argued 
that the voluntary voice of public opinion was gradually given less weight in the process 
of industrial regulations. As in the Taff-Vale judgment, the state initiative was reflected 
in preservation of economic and social order and propaganda agencies of party politics 
contrived to valorise authority of state intervention by making an appeal to its neutrality 
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around the time of the First World War.460 The post-war industrial turmoil entrenched the 
corporate bias, since the government placed public opinion under control of scientific 
methodology for industrial regeneration.461 Despite the failure of industrial parliament 
like the National Industrial Conference and Whitley Councils, the government tended to 
commit themselves to avoidance of political change and class conflicts by encouraging 
the triangular co-operation between the state, trade unions and business interests.462 This 
process disrupted the voluntary pluralist system and stripped the ‘countervailing power 
of the public to control government’.463 Steel-Maitland already noted in 1926 that in the 
use of the Industrial Court ‘the only sanction behind its findings is public opinion – which 
is in fact of very little weight in any but the most important disputes, and even then most 
uncertain in its operation’.464 The climax arrived, when the TUC admitted the managerial 
hegemony of the government introducing the legally coercive industrial arbitration and 
its managerial budget between 1941 and 1943.465 Setting corporate goals through official 
expertise of the state bureaucracy, ministers and civil servants with their bargaining 
partners played a central role in administration and legislation of national policy in place 
of the classical democratic system of parliamentary politics. This chapter examines an 
intellectual and institutional groundwork of this development of authoritarian manoeuvre 
of collectivism.  
 
 
460 Ibid., ch.1-6 
461 Ibid., pp.376-7 
462 Ibid., pp.122-3, 380 
463 Ibid., p.367 
464 Ibid., p.353 
465 Ibid., p.374 
212 
 
4.2. Unemployment and William Beveridge 
The Conservative vision of corporate society, based on tariff reform, gained a limited 
purchase in confrontation with the marginalist revolution in economic theory. When the 
New Liberal engagement in conservation of natural liberty demanded idealist infusion of 
state action for the cause of ‘justice’ in grievous conditions of poverty and inequality in 
free trade, they adopted marginalist accounts, which Hobson identified as ‘the modern 
mathematical incarnation’ of natural liberty. 466  Neo-classicism provided the liberal 
orthodoxy with a scientific paradigm and ‘egalitarian and consequentialist dimensions’ 
of utilitarianism was evolved in critique of land ownership in the late Victorian and 
Edwardian periods. It helped to shape New Liberal definition of the role of the state. 
Thompson has pointed out that ‘the advent of marginalism reinforced the view that 
maximizing utility required attention to distribution, particularly through the taxation 
system’.467 In consideration of the relation between the state and the people, New Liberals 
developed their organicism and introduced their original concept of the community, in 
which the state was assumed to be ‘an ethical polity’ – ‘the embodiment of the ethical life 
of the community’.468 In this context, public opinion, in consumerist terms, played a role 
of linkage between politics and society and as an economic regulator it endorsed the 
Labour Department of the Board of Trade to make a statistical survey on industrial 
relations. 469  The progressive discourse of minimum wages complemented this New 
Liberal revision of free trade in the light of poverty and inequality. 
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In the 1906 election popular politics of free trade swept aside Chamberlain’s tariff reform 
programme. Prosecution of the Boer War provoked outrage of free traders. To cover its 
budgetary deficit, New Liberals proposed their collectivist principle of free trade 
accompanied by increase in the state revenue by direct taxation. In this refined version of 
free trade, it was a duty of the government to ensure people’s welfare through land reform. 
Such Edwardian liberalism formed an ideological unity. It became a rallying point not 
only of liberal and labour progressives, but also of pro-Boers and Liberal imperialists, 
both of whom aimed for expansion of the free trade empire.470 Political rhetoric of free 
traders enshrined the consumers’ right of cheap food and aimed disempowerment of the 
vested interests. Contrary to Conservative collectivism, which valued the national interest 
of producers by introducing tariff reform and bimetallism, free trade consumerism was 
grounded on cosmopolitan finance by gold standard as an incentive to a fall in price. The 
popular discourse of political economy legitimized unilateral free trade as an only rational 
principle, which defended the ‘cheap loaf’ and free breakfast table – symbols of liberal 
society after 1846. With the radical programme of land reform, free traders protected 
autonomy of civil society as well as politics of active citizenship from claims of old and 
new absolutism – aristocracy and organised interests of producers. In this way, New 
Liberalism developed the moral-political conception of free trade into the organicist 
framework, in which ‘citizen-consumer’ disseminated co-operative value of commerce 
and brought about social unity as a collective end of liberal-democracy by expansion of 
social utility of consumption.471 
 
470 Howe, Free Trade and Liberal England., P. Clarke, The Progressive Movement in England, 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, vol.24, 1974  
471 Trentmann, ‘Political Culture and Political Economy’, pp.229-33 
214 
 
To prevent malfunction of free trade, the New Liberal rationale of ideal citizenship called 
for the collectivist social reform. Harris has argued that the growth of social welfare was 
due to a shift in political thought, in particular increased infiltration of ‘idealism’, which 
aspired for the ‘ideal state’ based on ‘active citizenship’ and ‘popular democracy’. 
Promulgated by popular and voluntary organisations, such humane, rather than technical, 
discipline of idealism invoked moral and ethical minds of individuals and disposed them 
to social reform, which eventually set Britain’s modern and corporate framework of 
welfare system. In this process, it is misleading to emphasize a clash of ideals between 
individualism and collectivism. The growth of idealism was conspicuous not only among 
the discourse of Nonconformist intellectuals upholding libertarian individualism, but also 
among Conservative and Liberal, Labour advocators of central service of the state. In 
particular, political theories of the radical utilitarian wing of liberalism, including new 
liberalism and ethical socialism, helped to legitimate its dominance.472 In the welfare state, 
the rights of property were no longer immune from appropriation, but contingent upon 
national welfare managed by professional experts. Green’s idealism of property rights 
gave a cause of state intervention for ‘positive liberty’ – ‘the duty of community to 
develop those rights’ in a form of professional service to social justice and efficiency. 
The latter consisted of educated officials assigned by trust of society to act as a guarantor 
of individual liberty and obligated to persuade ‘the public and the state’. The concept of 
‘welfare state’, thus, depended on professional classes to provide alienated people with 
ideal citizenship in the name of relief.473  
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The New Liberal policy of industrial relations was based on statutory provision of the 
principle of collective bargaining and administrative compensation for unemployment 
through labour exchanges and the national insurance. The Board of Trade was designated 
to embody these ideals of the organicist economy. Mundella, as its president during 
Gladstone’s third administration, drew on efficiency of central control to maximize 
benefits of free trade in relation to foreign protectionist tariffs.474 Having a close tie with 
the TUC, he introduced consumer-oriented economic policies like the Railway and Canal 
Traffic Bill, which aimed to reduce railway’s freight charges and to set preferential rates 
for domestic industries, and finally succeeded in allotting executive power to the Board 
of Trade for settlement of industrial issues.475 Based on the final report of the 1891 Royal 
Commission on industrial relations, Mundella introduced a bill, which provided the Board 
of Trade with an initiative to set up the scheme of collective bargaining during industrial 
disputes. The Conciliation Act of 1896 enabled inspectors of the Board of Trade to inquire 
into conditions of trade and to play an advisory role in industrial mediation. In co-
operation with local authorities, they aimed to establish not temporary, but standing 
boards of conciliation and arbitration and settle industrial disputes by offering optimal 
solution, which was not legally binding.476  
Davidson’s study has revealed the way the Labour Department of the Board of Trade 
utilised statistical accounts. It did not suggest either eugenic or progressionist application 
of quantitative data to industrial issues, but empirical and environmentalist policies of 
officials. Their minimalist programme was planned to secure interdependence between 
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capital and labour by redefining their common interests. Hence, in provision of labour 
statistics, the Board of Trade prospected its conciliatory role as the means to educate 
public opinion, in preference to development of drastic politics changing the conventional 
relationship between the state and market economy. Lack of theoretical consensus in 
statistical analyses made it possible for officials to make rather ‘goal oriented’ approaches 
based on their value judgments than offering predictive prescription of aggressive 
scientism, which were seen as divisive as that of socialist schemes of public works and 
the national minimum. Such administrative rationale of the Board of Trade helped to 
establish a paternalist structure of stabilising industrial relations in the statutory provision 
of the boards of conciliation and arbitration.477  
There was an increased tendency among officials to see unemployment as a national 
problem and as failure of the administration to rationalise the labour market. With the 
extensive national budget, the efficient organisation of labour market and state-subsidized 
national insurance were their twin pillars of social reform to increase welfare of 
unemployed. Under the presidency of Churchill, the Board of Trade established labour 
exchanges with an aim to coordinate labour market into the national system by issuing 
statistics about employment. Furthermore, integrating administrations of labour 
exchanges, trade boards and industrial conciliation into the Labour department, William 
Beveridge, a young official of the Board of Trade, formed a basis of a national system of 
social insurance, which met a criteria of upholding industrial discipline and efficiency. 
Llewellyn Smith developed the system of compulsory insurance for working classes in 
three major industries – shipbuilding, engineering and construction. After the passage of 
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the National Insurance Act of 1911, the Board of Trade established a board constituted 
by a panel of referees from employers and workmen, who played a judicial role in cases 
of an appeal. The New Liberal ideal of social reform was advanced by the Board of Trade, 
which strived to reconcile administrative machinery with interests of both employers and 
workers without surrendering industrial efficiency.478  
 Beginning his career in the Board of Trade after receiving an offer as a full-time official 
from Arthur Wilson Fox, who, with Churchill, was interested in implementing labour 
exchanges, William Beveridge aimed to take an initiative in introducing a policy of more 
radical state intervention. Beveridge was regarded as a ‘leading authority’ of 
unemployment questions and engaged in educating public opinion about the topic as a 
correspondent to the Morning Post. He first attempted to apply the principles of classical 
political economy, but came to thinking it more useful to focus on more practical and 
quantitative aspects of the problem. Hence, he sought a recourse to statistical and 
sampling methodologies. When Churchill introduced the Labour Exchanges Bill, it 
adopted Beveridge’s suggestion of the central, regional and local administration of the 
system, which made the Board of Trade possible to ‘collect and publish information about 
employment, and to frame regulations for labour exchange management’.479 The system, 
in the end, handled the problem of supply and demand, which was ‘not altogether out of 
relation to one another in amount but different often in kind’, and was expected to contain 
the revolutionary sentiment of socialist agitators. Llewellyn Smith’s compulsory 
unemployment insurance scheme, which formed the second part of the National Insurance 
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Act, drew upon Beveridge’s papers on the Poor Law Commission. Extending the tradition 
of Benthamite utilitarianism, Beveridge’s nation-wide system increased the capacity of 
the government to absorb and integrate forces of jobless into society.480  
Compiling a series of lectures in Oxford in 1908, Beveridge’s publication of 
Unemployment: A Problem of Industry outlined his salient principle in regard with state 
intervention in the labour market and this later became the standard text about the subject 
across much of the political spectrum, including the ILP. Beveridge believed that the 
question of unemployment could not be solved by estimating public expenditure of the 
Poor Law relief, but should be addressed as incompleteness of industrial organisation, 
which required in the course of reform some change in conventional thoughts and customs. 
Hence, he made an approach to industrial methods of how to remedy maladjustment 
between supply of labour and demand for labour and bring out efficacy of the labour 
market. A cause of unemployment could not be attributed either to overpopulation or 
amount of industries, since neither suggested intelligible relevance to good and bad 
moments of employment.481 Since there was contemporarily an enough amount of wealth 
to satisfy the whole existing demands for production, Beveridge agreed with Hobson’s 
theory of underconsumption and considered that cyclical fluctuation was triggered by a 
failure to put an adequate amount of capital onto production, which was usually in excess 
of existing demands. From this viewpoint, formation of trust organisations to halt market 
competition had an adverse effect, since they rather held abundant reserve of both capital 
and labour. On the contrary, it was required to tackle the problem of underconsumption, 
a supposed root-cause of trade fluctuation, by breaking into over-savings. Having a 
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recourse to natural adjustment by market economy would make a balance between supply 
and demand by lowering prices of commodities.482 
Beveridge suggested his remedy of labour exchanges, seeing the problem of 
underemployment as that of business organisation holding excessively ‘a reserve of 
labour power to meet fluctuations’.483 It would unify the labour market and helped to 
achieve decasualisation, since disintegrated labour market gave a cause of an increase in 
aggregate reserve of labour power. By this means, it was possible to cut further down an 
irreducible minimum of unemployment, since employers could now hire labour from 
different places. The Unemployed Workmen Act of 1905 did not replace difficulties of 
relief works derived from management expenses, separation of deserving from 
underserving recipients, providing incentive of self-help, and its liability to grant more 
favourable conditions than regular work. 484  Therefore, Beveridge argued that it was 
essential for the state to humanise industrial conditions before promoting relief works, 
since it was misleading to grasp a cause of unemployment as a matter of emergency 
emanated from trade depression, but more understandable to see as economic 
disorganisation, by which industries failed to reabsorb casual workers:485  
The solution of the problem of unemployment must consist, therefore, partly 
in smoothing individual transitions, partly in diminishing the extent of the 
reserves required for fluctuation or their intervals of idleness, partly, when 
this plan can go no further, in seeing that the men of the reserve are properly 
maintained both in action and out of it. The problem is essentially one of 
business organisation, of meeting without distress the changes and 
fluctuations without which industry is not and probably could not be carried 
on. It is not a problem of increasing the mere scale of industry. It is not a 
problem of securing a general balance of the demand for labour and the 
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growth of the supply – for this general balance is already secured by economic 
forces – but one of perfecting the adjustment in detail. …New industries 
…may or may not bring increased prosperity. All history shows that a rising 
demand for labour is no cure for unemployment.  
 
This frame of mind was connected to Beveridge’s renunciation of a ‘Right to work’ – 
provision of ‘useful work’ by the state. It was not a temporary measure to act as reservoir 
of labour, but it was obvious that it failed to conduct business in respect to substantial 
value of work and public deficit it burdened.  
Before the state offered remedial employment to involuntary idleness, a more crucial step 
had to be taken by establishing a marketplace of ‘Exchange’, where people who supplied 
and demanded labour were put into contact by an integrated and consolidated institutions. 
Organising labour market by the network of labour exchanges was efficient in gathering 
and spreading information about employment and replaced the old custom of tramping 
by individuals. By mastery of unemployment, the state could prevent economic loss 
incurred by mismatch between the supply and demand and avoid losing opportunities of 
production. The policy of ‘decasualisation’ calculated the minimum number for work at 
the head office of labour exchanges and regularised and stabilised life of individuals, 
making them accessible to the same job. However, this decasualisation process involved 
a risk of hardship imposed upon labour, as it provoked an increase in industrial efficiency 
and employers’ business did no longer need to bear reserve of labour. Hence, Beveridge 
argued that until decasualisation was achieved to a substantial degree, subordinate 
institutions in relation to job-training, emigration and public works like the scheme of 
afforestation and national workshops had to counterbalance its operational demerits.486 
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With a guarantee of mobility and adjustability, the efficient management of labour 
exchanges could secure ‘organised’ fluidity of labour market and the growth in 
production. With the support of public opinion, labour exchanges could offer employment 
with reasonable earnings and afford a remedy of underemployment: ‘The Labour 
Exchange thus opens a way of ‘‘dispauperisation’’ more human, less costly and more 
effective than that of the ‘‘workhouse test’’ – the way of making the finding of work easy 
instead of merely making relief hard’.487 
Beveridge’s principle of labour exchanges represented a strong influence of the tradition 
of political economy, but Beveridge pointed out Adam Smith’s theoretical and practical 
defects as its negligence of the force of friction involved in the process of economic 
competition:488 
The object of labour market organisation is the close, continuous and 
automatic adjustment of existing demand and supply over the largest possible 
area. The weakness alike of theory and practice in regard to unemployment 
in the past has been the assumption that this adjustment was already 
substantially secured; in other words, that the force of friction might be 
neglected. The demand for labour has been taken for purposes of our 
argument as if it were single and concentrated; the supply of labour as if it 
were infinitely mobile and adaptable. The demand is, in fact, broken up by 
distinctions of place and quality, and subject to perpetual change and 
fluctuation. The supply is rendered immobile by ignorance and less adaptable 
by every year of age. Adam Smith and his followers were right in emphasising 
the mobility of labour as a cardinal requirement of industry. The practical 
application of their teaching has been inadequate because it has been confined 
to abolishing visible and legal obstacles to motion, such as laws of settlement 
and of apprenticeship. It has left untouched the impalpable but no less real 
barriers of ignorance, poverty and custom. If friction and the waste involved 
in friction are to be eliminated from the labour market, there must be, not 
mere absence of legal obstacles, but organised and informed fluidity of labour. 
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This institutional materialisation of the supply and demand was, as mentioned above, 
consummated by organisation of labour exchanges, which built an efficient network of 
industrial reserve of labour. This central operation of labour market made it easier to 
introduce later the national insurance scheme as much as the amended Poor Law, since it 
could concentrate and grasp demands for labour and facilitate pivotal management, which 
was empowered to spread burdens of unemployment ‘over all the men of the trade’ and 
this would ‘make the burden tolerable’. 489  Despite workmen were required to 
accommodate an increase in efficiency to follow demands for labour and engage in 
production in the modern organisation, however, Beveridge was confident at a belief that 
such social policies would be ‘less and less necessary’ and that temporary relief be 
brought by a ‘function of industry’ in the future. If the central management could succeed 
in reduce wasteful reserve of labour, self-supporting industries would be able to tide them 
over during periods of depression. It would not limit individual liberty, as ‘the heaviest 
stress of competition will fall where it can be borne with the least suffering and where it 
is most needed to prevent stagnation’. Its premise was set upon Beveridge’s theoretical 
understanding of supply and demand in labour market: while ‘the demand for labour 
cannot be stereotyped save in a stagnant industry’, ‘the supply of labour may be made 
immeasurably more capable of following and waiting for the demand’.490 In order to seek 
the balance of supply and demand under the central control, hence, while the intelligence 
unit of labour exchanges took into consideration information about demand for labour, it 
left accounts of its supply-side out of its attention:491   
It is a policy of making reality correspond with the assumptions of economic 
 
489 Ibid., p.230 
490 Ibid., p.235 
491 Ibid., p.237 
223 
 
theory. Assuming the demand for labour to be single and the supply perfectly 
fluid, it is not hard to show that unemployment must always be in process of 
disappearance – that demand and supply are constantly tending to an 
equilibrium. The ideal for practical reform, therefore, must be to concentrate 
the demand and to give the right fluidity to the supply. 
 
4.3. The National Minimum and The Webbs  
Upholding the principle of free trade, the New Liberal governance attempted to safeguard 
efficacy of market function by the statutory institutions. The organisation of labour 
market was arranged by the legislative provisions of collective bargaining, labour 
exchanges, and compensatory schemes such as the national insurance and administration 
of wage floors. However, historians have pointed out that such New Liberal organicist 
approaches to the labour market did not result in the situation, which professional civil 
servants had estimated as rational. Rather than an increase in reconciliation between 
market economy and municipal interests, these measures of administrative mediation 
gave rise to the institutional competition for political influence between federative 
organisations of employers and workers.492 Using the literature on industrial relations to 
rethink historical relationship between the state and industries, Melling has examined 
impact of politics of state welfare upon British convention of freedom of contracts based 
on the voluntary scheme of collective bargaining. His survey unveiled a fact that the 
national schema could not successfully dovetail with the established, but declining, at that 
moment, private system of workplace welfare. For instance, in the process of 
implementing and operating labour exchanges, it was requisite for officials of the Board 
of Trade to form collective relations with approved organisations representing capital and 
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labour respectively. Furthermore, the scheme of national insurance encouraged 
employers to introduce into a hierarchical structure of workplace a section of employees, 
who were labelled as ‘white collar’ and specialised in clerical, supervisory and 
negotiating roles. In short, when the state set a normative order in relation with individual 
or collective rights of citizens, there arose institutional competition by political actors 
including federative business of both employers and workers.493    
This organicist approach to the labour market by installing mediational institutions, which 
became a political expedient after the strike waves in the 1890s, did not lead to a general 
consensus of industrial relations. One of the most notable cases, in which the Board of 
Trade met employers’ resistance, was Penrhyn’s decline of the Board’s request, when the 
North Wales Quarryman’s union called for higher wages and trade union recognition.494 
In confrontation with collectivist reform such as the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the 
Coal Mines Eight Hours Act, and the National Insurance Act, employers showed different 
reaction. While the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce demanded the Continental style 
of regulative social legislation, the Association of British Chambers of Commerce and 
the Engineering Employers’ Federation (EEF) supported welfare policies as necessary to 
improve economic efficiency. The majority of employers, however, were hostile to the 
national programmes as they still preferred private welfare system: according to Hay, they 
sought to justify ‘the existing hierarchy of enterprises, their unitary ideology and … the 
inequality of the distribution of power and property’.495 Showing support to Charles 
 
493 J. Melling, ‘Welfare Capitalism and the Origins of Welfare States: British Industry, 
Workplace Welfare and Social Reform, 1870-1914’, Social History, vol.17, no.3, Oct., 1992 
494 Clegg, Fox & Thompson, op,cit., p.213 
495 R. Hay, ‘Employers and Social Policy in Britain: the evolution of welfare legislation, 1905-
14’, Social History, vol.2, 4, 1977 and ‘Employers Attitudes To Social Policy and the Concept 
of ‘‘Social Control’’, 1900-20’, in P. Thane (ed.), The Origins of British Social Policy, London, 
225 
 
Macara’s Employers’ Parliamentary Association, such employers called for traditional 
rights of free trade liberalism, since it was consumers, upon whom their increase in costs 
was finally imposed.496   
In face of increased international competition and its pressure upon national economy 
especially on crucial industries such as coal and railways, the Board of Trade was inclined 
to secure returns on capital at the expense of trade union interests. The Conservative 
presidents like Charles Ritchie and Gerald Balfour sought to make use of the 1896 act as 
the means to vent working class grievance and to coerce trade unions to take a line with 
the government.497 Between 1906 and 1914, when Lloyd George, Churchill and Sydney 
Buxton took office, the Board of Trade made intervention in 10 per cent of all industrial 
disputes, 85 per cent of which were reckoned to be ‘major’ problems.498 There were few 
trade union representatives appointed as arbitrators and conciliators and the majority of 
them were dominated by professional or upper classes like lawyers, architects and senior 
civil servants, who carried out bargaining procedure on the basis of ‘the basic factors of 
supply and demand governing prices and costs within an competitive economy’. 499 
Howell has argued that the Board’s initiative to set up industrial relations institutions had 
an administrative purpose to overcome the collective action problem, which was rooted 
in decentralised market structure based on fragmented ownership of small producers. By 
this means, the Board of Trade, taking a leading role to reach national or industry level 
collective agreement rather than introduce direct state regulation, forged the ground of 
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increased managerial authority, which by promoting harmony with trade union officials, 
was successful not only in undermining autonomy of shop floor, but also in gaining 
control of the labour process. This construction of industrial relations institutions 
rendered easier industrial restructuring through mergers and transition to bureaucratic 
management, which heralded the rapid modernisation and rationalisation in the 1930s.500   
In the case of sweated industries, which were inept to form sufficiently strong industrial 
organisations, the National Anti-Sweating League made an effort to enact the Trade 
Boards Act of 1909, by which trade boards constituted by employers and union 
representatives along with officials set ‘industry-specific’ wage floor and conditions. 
These conclusions of bargaining institutions were legally bound and expected to improve 
efficiency of trade, which ultimately turned them into the autonomous procedure of 
collective bargaining. The Board of Trade was initially sceptical about the idea of 
compulsive measure, but Churchill introduced a bill as a deterrent to market failure in 
four industries – chain-making, tailoring, paper-box making and lace.501 Thompson has 
shown that marginalist economists such as Marshall and Pigou developed the popular 
intellectual discourse of the high wage theory, insisting its practical efficacy of enhanced 
productivity in relation with improvement in supply factors. In this discourse, the politics 
of minimum wage gained its support especially among the heterodox economists such as 
the Webbs and Hobson for ‘denunciation of parasites as a hallmark of radicalism’. The 
discursive dominance of high-wage theory made the progressives acknowledge the 
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limited setup of trade boards as the means to produce efficiency gains.502     
It is worth noting that before 1914 the British progressive movement developed the 
voluntary function of trade unionism side by side with their increased demands for 
statutory regulation. The Labour party endorsed and entertained collectivist reforms such 
as minimum wages, unemployment relief, eight-hour day and old age pension, 
particularly after the affiliation of the Miners’ Federation of Great Britain (MFGB), 
whose aim was nationalisation of coal-mining. While administrative costs of collectivist 
reforms were reckoned to be covered by Lloyd George’s 1909 fiscal policy based on 
progressive taxation, the TUC was still kept suspicious about social reforms, as they had 
possibility to emasculate their industrial action and aligned themselves with the Liberal 
programmes of Lords’ veto, free trade and Home Rule in the 1910 general election.503 
When severity of industrial unrest upset the Liberal administration, socialists campaigned 
for the statutory regulations like the national minimum, as they were frustrated by partial 
procedure of collective bargaining.504 In particular, experience of large-scale stoppages 
in railway, coal-mining and engineering made it more likely for the Board of Trade to 
introduce some coercive regulations to limit the harm upon national economy. However, 
rather than adopting the statutory minimum, they reacted to problems of national 
emergency by expanding the scope of the 1896 act, as Churchill established the Standing 
Court of Arbitration in 1908 and Buxton the Industrial Council in 1911. Both were aimed 
at forming the formal and standing machinery of collective bargaining, but failure of these 
national or industry-wide tribunals revealed incompetence of the Liberal administration 
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to intervene in industrial disputes, which led to their enactment of minimum wages by the 
Coal Mines Act of 1912 under the pressure from the Miners’ Federation. In his imposing 
title, The Strange Death of Liberal England, George Dangerfield argued that the pre-war 
industrial unrest was a series of producers’ rebellion against the New Liberal collectivist 
principle. With the deadlock of consumerist politics, the mid-Victorian humble 
watchword of working-class respectability – ‘a fair day’s pay for a fair day’s work’ – was 
overthrown.505       
While the demise of free collective bargaining increased the importance of political 
influence of federative bodies of employers and employees, the process resulted in the 
separation of interests between producers and consumers, insomuch as the New Liberal 
organicist approach of collective laissez-faire aimed at efficacy of market function – 
equilibrium between supply and demand for labour – by the state-tailored collective 
bargaining. Radicals did not see the New Liberal reforms as promoting the ‘national’ 
interest, but as programmes encouraging well-organised labour to turn away from the 
residuum.506 The federative business of trade unions caused the gulf between union and 
non-union workers. Hence, contractual terms defined in the procedure of collective 
bargaining would not guarantee ‘the welfare of the community’. This view was 
promulgated by the Webbs, whose Industrial Democracy was first published as early as 
in 1898. They believed that the federative operation of collective bargaining would fail 
to carry out equality and fraternity, because in such a ‘system of natural liberty’, it was 
consumers, not producers, who reaped direct benefits from products of free and 
independent labour. On the other hand, producers were exposed to increased pressure of 
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competition and only those in well-organised unions could obtain rewards, since 
‘whenever the economic conditions of parties concerned are unequal, legal freedom of 
contract merely enables the superior in strategic strength to dictate terms’. 507  In 
manipulation of rules, prices and distribution, they could not only oust new competitors, 
but were free from pressure of competition, which resulted in disrupting ‘freedom of 
trade’.508 The institution of collective bargaining, hence, due to its monopolistic position, 
clogged up the operation of a free market of labour, which would guarantee common level 
of wage rates as much as ‘perfect competition’. With emphasis on the marginal non-union 
workers, the Webbs considered that ‘the survival of fittest, is, therefore, so to speak, the 
result of a high wage rate’, which took place after the substitution of manipulative 
regulations of collective bargaining for the right of individuals to make a bargain with 
employers on equal terms.509 To halt this process, it was vital to suspend trade union 
function of negotiating wage rates.  
Hence, the institution of minimum wage was more practical solution than protectionism, 
which would undermine commercial and financial autonomy, to tackle the ‘sweating’ 
system and increase industrial efficiency and employment. As long as consumers 
demanded cheap goods, the unincorporated divisions of industries remained unrewarded 
but resorted to cheap labour. The latter were absorbed into parasitic conditions with 
meagre wages and came up against deterioration in their physique, intelligence and 
characteristics. The politics of the national minimum would guarantee their daily 
substance and raise standard of living. In this statutory minimum programme, trade 
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unions were no longer a direct stakeholder of collective bargaining, but going to play an 
educational role of workers on trade issues and undertake local supervision in promotion 
of efficiency of trade. Through active intervention from administrative authorities, it had 
an effect of removing drawbacks of freedom of contract – frequent occurrence of strikes 
and lock-outs. The Webbs maintained that, this legislative solution, deterring federative 
unions from plundering non-union individuals, would secure conditions ‘necessary for 
efficient citizenship’ of every trade and turn unions into national service by giving up ‘all 
claims to autonomy’.510 They saw the trade union charters of the 1870s as provision of 
privileges and their subordination to capitalist market economy. 511  The legislative 
regulation of their right of free collective bargaining was achieved by the enforcement of 
a minimum standard of wage rates, by which trade unions became a part of bureaucracy 
operating under the universal direction of the ‘Device of Common Rule’.512               
This socialist solution to harness the free operation of collective bargaining gained a 
limited purchase. Snowden commended the Trade Boards Act of 1909 as a historic 
‘departure from the old idea of non-interference with economic laws’.513 Nonetheless, he 
bemoaned the pre-war situation of socialism as ‘the present labour representation in 
parliament is there mainly by the good will of the liberals’.514 To gain the mass vote in 
the election the majority inside the Labour party chose the alliance with the Liberal party 
and gave support to its reform agendas before the war. MacDonald believed that deviation 
from the laissez-faire relationship between the state and the market would end up in 
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splitting not only the progressives, but also the working classes. He showed a concern 
about progressive’s proclivity for the high wage theory, as maldistribution would become 
irreconcilable with organic interdependence of communal interests by leaving out 
disorganised labour. For good citizenship, state intervention could not achieve people’s 
independence and direct legislative regulations would deprive the working classes of 
genuine enthusiasm for trade union activities. The better they received remuneration, the 
more deteriorated the meanings of trade unionism became, since the fundamental duty of 
the latter was ‘something higher and wider than trade union industrial demands. It must 
set these demand into a system of national well-being; the wage earner must become the 
citizen: the union must become the guardian of economic justice’. Therefore, the state 
intervention had to be circumscribed to the extent, to which it did not violate individual 
liberty and their independence.515 Admitting maldistribution of wealth as the fundamental 
problem of unemployment, MacDonald’s gradualism was manifested in his advocacy of 
the right to work, which was deemed to rectify maldistribution by increasing employment 
through public works.516   
 
4.4 The Wartime Regime and Henry Clay  
The New Liberal scheme aimed to organise industrial relations by legitimising the state-
led formation of collective bargaining. Their collective laissez-faire system increased the 
amount of federative and national-level business run by employers’ organisations and 
trade unions. This shifted the constitutional ground of collective bargaining from the 
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state’s neutral to organicist approach, which sowed a seed of class politics, once the 
institutional materialisation failed to take a pluralist form of corporate governance. The 
Webbs proposed their counterprogram of national minimum against the New Liberal 
consumerist politics of free trade, because the federative proceedings of collective 
bargaining marginalised the interest of alienated producers. From this viewpoint, the 
central control of production enforced trade unions to abrogate their function of industrial 
bargaining. Hence, the Webbs praised the emergence of national bodies of trade unions 
as a step towards the solidarity of wage-earners facilitating the introduction of the 
standard rate of wages. However, the progressive tradition upheld the voluntary system 
of collective bargaining. Reid’s study of differential sectors in shipyard societies of 
boilermakers and shipbuilders has suggested that despite the centralisation process, trade 
unions did not discard the bottom-up practice of industrial democracy from grass-root 
levels and their branches still could execute local or district level strikes.517 He has argued 
that in the period of the First World War the voluntary tradition of collective bargaining 
was successful in limiting the authority of the state. Increased pressure from trade unions 
inflamed internal divisions among the state departments and provoked its indecisiveness 
in terms of control over the labour market.518       
The outbreak of the war changed the pre-war scenery of free trade voluntarism. Its 
prosecution necessitated the extension of state power. Extravagant expenditure and 
conscription led to crucial resignation from the cabinet of John Burns, who, as a staunch 
progressive with underlying liberal orientation, had cast suspicion against the New 
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Liberal reforms such as Lloyd George’s budget and Beveridge’s labour exchange.519 In 
reaction to the shortage of skilled labour on munitions, the Board of Trade, forming the 
Committee of Production in 1915, took a measure to suspend proceedings of collective 
bargaining in non-essential industries by the Defence of the Realm Amendment Act. The 
pro-Lloyd George mandarins like Llewellyn Smith and Beveridge became cardinal 
members of the Ministry of Munitions, which took charge of directions in munitions 
production and regulation of labour. The Munitions of War Bill was aimed at extending 
Government control over war production by limiting collective bargaining. While the bill 
avoided prescription of compulsory terms, it imposed compulsory arbitration in cases of 
strikes and lock-outs. Mobility of workers was restricted without employers’ certificate. 
Britain’s voluntary culture sought ‘equity of sacrifice’, which, as a means of 
counterposition, also limited profitability of employers enforcing transference of excess 
profits to the Exchequer.520 Sharing an idea of top-down democracy with the Webbs, 
Beveridge was not hesitant to show his willingness to impose statutory restriction on free 
collective bargaining, as ‘he had long believed that the interests of the state and 
community should take priority over the interests of individuals’. The act was ‘merely a 
pale shadow’ of what Beveridge propounded in advance, as he thought ‘in peacetime the 
employers were generally top dog and so my business was chiefly to prevent the employer 
from exploiting his advantage unduly. In wartime the workman is top dog, and therefore 
my business (for the State) is to prevent the workman from exploiting his advantage 
unduly’.521    
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Reid has insisted persistence of the traditional voluntarist solution during the war-time 
negotiation. The act finally compromised after trade unions demonstrated their 
antagonism against industrial conscription with a strong influence of local bodies upon 
the process of collective bargaining.522 Union constitutions continued to operate as check 
and balances, under which official and ordinary members could reach a consent. This 
well-organised democratic convention did not happen in a socialist society, where trade 
unions became a ‘political counsel’, as experts with occupational knowledge would seek 
optimal efficiency to regulate the national labour market.523 A turning point was Lloyd 
George’s intervention in war-time production, which changed ‘the bargaining partner for 
many skilled workers from private employers to the state, and opened up new 
opportunities for organised labour to influence conditions through pressure on 
government’.524 In light of importance of politics, an ‘idealist’ unionist, John Hill, who 
used libertarian rhetoric against the New Liberal reforms, demanded equal terms with 
employers and was determined to stay vigilant about autonomy of trade unions to defend 
their conventional liberty in the industrial sphere. Reid explains Hill’s radical-liberal 
principle as based on collective self-organisation without state-interference. Hill set out 
injection of virtues of humanity and social justice into market economy and private 
property. At the root of his rejection of economic individualism, Reid continues, there 
was the tradition of old Dissents.525 This rationale was explicit in Hill’s phrase of ‘Co-
operative Commonwealth’, which drew on unified force of producers against parasitism. 
Hence, championed by the protestant leadership like Hill and Robert Knight, the 
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voluntary framework of collective bargaining was important for craft unions to achieve 
the harmonious relationship between capital and labour and enable the latter to take 
account of company accounts. Their firm belief in industrial co-operation in the radical-
liberal tradition was persistent in the Labour party’s New Social Order after the war, in 
which industrial organicism was crucial for production and for equitable distribution of 
wealth.526  
For the government it was necessary to keep a close tie with trade unions. With the help 
of Labour M.P.s they strived to maintain ‘business as usual’ by curbing outbreaks of trade 
disputes. In the process of ‘dilution’, which complemented unskilled to skilled labour to 
cope with shortage of labour in munitions production, rational management was adopted 
for labour control. Restructuring labour process by revision of manufacturing process, 
demarcation and demands for labour, installation of machinery, the government 
attempted to change significantly the conventional practice of industrial relations in 
Clydeside engineering and shipbuilding industries. Melling has argued that under the 
authority of the Munitions Act, roles of supervisory workers and foremen in these 
industries were shifted from customary responsibilities to ‘ambassadors of a servile state 
as well as the agents of unwelcome innovations’. In response to order from the state they 
imposed new industrial discipline on rank-and-files.527 The inflationary rise of cost of 
living during the war, climbed by degrees from the pre-war period, depressed payment 
and conditions of such clerical and technical workers and give them an incentive to form 
‘white-colour’ unions calling for wage increase with other working classes. In particular, 
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they participated in the campaign against the government for a 12.5 per cent bonus to 
skilled workers in engineering, whose wage rates were on the whole fixed at pre-war 
levels. Reid has shown that corporate activities in the war-time between trade unions, 
employers’ organisations and the state did not bring out homogeneity of experience. In 
terms of the working class, historiography diverged into two models – on the one hand, 
there were social democratic interpreters, who pointed to the rise of the benign state 
conducting social reforms from above. On the other hand, revolutionary interpreters gave 
an emphasis upon persistence of serious conflicts between officials and rank-and-files. 
Rather, Reid has argued that a salient point was that the most outstanding war-time 
working-class experience was the rapid spread of trade unionism, which was 
accompanied by the stronger institutional framework of collective bargaining.528  
Beveridge’s decision of intervention to restrict freedom of labour during the war led to 
further marginalisation of industrial employers. With the establishment of the Ministry of 
Labour in 1916, state officials who were responsible for the war-time administration of 
labour issues sidestepped employers’ demands and carried out sympathetic negotiations 
with trade unionists at both national and local stages. Reid has argued that in engineering 
and shipbuilding, at both national and local levels, ‘many workers now felt themselves 
for the first time to be direct employees of the state and almost all were entering into the 
new experience of successful bargaining with the government over wages, hours and 
working conditions’.529 The strong initiative of the state in the process of collective 
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bargaining was further promoted in chemicals, road transport, wool, railways, coal-
mining and public sectors. In confrontation with the serious curtailment of employers’ 
influence in workplace, Charles Macara, the president of the Master Cotton Spinners’ 
Federation and the Employers’ Parliamentary Association (EPA), established the Central 
Association of Employers Organisations in 1915 to ‘afford a means for bringing the 
industrial interest of the country as a whole into close relation with the government’.530 
After merging Dudley Docker’s British Manufacturers’ Association (BMA), he formed 
the Federation of British Industries (FBI), in which free traders from the EPA provoked 
an internal division with protectionists from the BMA. The EEF declined its affiliation to 
the FBI, since its leader, Allan Smith, did not agree with the FBI’s policy to cultivate 
strong relationship with trade unions. The EEF, hence, built an independent channel with 
the Ministry of Munitions, though they failed to stop Churchill from announcing the 12.5 
per cent bonus.531 
Behind Lloyd George’s coalition government, there was the business interest group. For 
instance, Eric Geddes, who used to be a deputy manager of North-Eastern Railway, was 
appointed to the Minister of Admiralty, after successful as a deputy Director of the 
Munitions Supply in multiplying and speeding up munitions production.532 When the 
Conservative ministers expressed their stronger aspiration for production than 
consumption, which Newton and Porter saw as pulling down the free trade axiom, they 
opted for interventionist policies in industrial relations.533 The FBI and EEF strived to 
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exert their influence upon the government via a channel of such businessmen ministers. 
The FBI’s labour sub-committee issued a report about rationalisation and reorganisation 
of industry. While they aimed to launch a welfare system under the joint administration 
between employers and trade unions and restrict the state interference to the minimum, 
the EEF insisted that the expense of welfare was unbearable for export industries 
struggling in foreign markets. Hence, it was a role of the state to bear its financial outlay. 
Setting up the National Confederation of Employers’ Organisations (NCEO), Smith 
gained FBI’s assent not only to give up their claims, but also to take a common 
counteraction against the pro-trade union policies of the Ministry of Munitions. They later 
agreed to form the British Commonwealth Union for the purpose of reconciling their 
differences in political creeds and its proposal gained a support from business interests 
insomuch as they took a lead in anti-socialist campaigns. 534  Despite their political 
accession, there was still a latent division in terms of economic policies. Macara clang to 
the belief that it was still requisite to set up an independent machinery, which enabled 
both capital and labour organisations to form co-operative relationship, since ‘much of 
the labour unrest that exists today has been engendered by the intervention of politicians, 
leading labour extremists to encourage the workers to make unreasonable demands, 
which, if agreed to, would ultimately be disastrous, not only to employers, but also to the 
workers themselves’.535 The war-time framework of compulsory arbitration ended up in 
dismissal of counselling capacity of practical advisors and this perversely led to 
inefficiency of trade.536 In his mind, the Industrial Council of 1911, consisting of the 
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chairman and equal numbers of experienced delegates from capital and labour 
organisations, was the archetype of co-operative machinery, insomuch as it satisfied, what 
he thought, three principles of criterion for industrial peace – the board of arbitration with 
practical men concerned, management of each industry on the basis of wholesale, rather 
than separate interests and conviction of public opinion for verdicts.537    
The war-time production policy by the coalition government upended the bias of 
industrial organisation from consumption to production. In the pre-war New Liberal 
policy, which was based on consumerist politics of free trade, the state intervened in 
industrial relations for the sake of the public interest by bringing out efficacy of market 
economy. The state, tailoring the standing framework of collective bargaining, mediated 
in industrial disputes and sought to comply with public opinion by employing statistic 
accounts. In the case of labour exchanges, labour market was organised under the state’s 
control by way of taking a balance of its supply and demand with the help of public 
opinion. Implementation of these schemes was considered to complement the liberal 
tradition of free trade, whose voluntary culture had been successful in economic 
coordination on its own. In terms of championing free trade, the New Liberal state 
intervention was carried out on behalf of the interest of consumers. However, as 
Beveridge acknowledged, the Munitions of War Act of 1915 turned the New Liberal 
premise of state intervention upside down into the interest of producers, whose 
conformity was vital for the national interest. In the Treasury Conference, officials from 
craft unions from engineering, shipbuilding, boiler-makers and pattern makers, acceded 
to suspend its conventional practice of controlling regulations of production and their 
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rights to strike in return for maintenance of wage rates and restoration of union rules after 
the war. Such war-time cessation of labour market, which Sharp expressed as ‘first 
departure from the prevailing system of voluntary settlement of trade disputes’, led to 
endorsement of full recognition of trade unionism, but provoked an irretrievable discord 
between national and local union representatives, who were discontent with 
compromising attitudes of their officials and especially with the Section 7 of the Act 
regarding the leaving certificate system. 538  Despite the pressure for more restrictive 
measures from the employer side, the coalition government decided to adopt a pro-labour 
amendment. The Munitions of War Amendment Act removed the notorious Section 7 and 
promised involvement of shop-floor level bargaining with a temporary rise in wage rates 
by expanding definition of munitions work.539 As a result, the government officials were 
sanctioned greater authorities to fix wage rates by the administrative order after setting 
up the Special Arbitration Tribunal.   
The aftermath of such a productivist turn of the organicist framework caused a serious 
concern among contemporaries. As mentioned above, the interest of industrial employers 
was kept out of the state bargaining procedures and their role was reduced to mere 
government agents. It is questionable that under this circumstance, the bona fide 
framework of voluntary collective bargaining was retrievable, if co-operative relationship 
between capital and labour was reinstituted, for which Hill and Macara aspired. With the 
publication of The Problem of Industrial Relations in 1929, Henry Clay, a liberal 
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economist who had been a temporary civil servant in the Ministry of Labour between 
1917 and 1919, sought to reveal problems of economic liberalism after the experience of 
the war-time regime. Clay developed his argument by attributing an immediate cause of 
industrial problems to ‘failure to agree on a price’ between sellers and buyers. The pre-
war customary practice of collective bargaining had helped to set standards adjusting to 
economic changes and its network ensured coordination of wages and conditions in 
different industries. Such stable system of customary relations was dislocated, once it 
faced a significant increase in prices, and this change resulted in undermining the pre-war 
bases of wage rates and caused inequalities between different industries. In this condition, 
federal organisations of trade unions became highly influential in determining wage rates, 
since there was a shift in the basis of bargaining to its bargaining strengths from the 
acceptance of custom. The outbreak of the war intensified this tendency of collective 
bargaining ‘until the pre-war customary basis was almost lost’.540 
The administrative order to fix wage rates during the war halted the spontaneous 
mechanism of collective bargaining – adjustment of wage rates to economic changes. In 
consequence, the arbitration scheme lost its credibility from trade unions, as the cost of 
living continued to increase. However, the influence of government interference was so 
significant that other voluntary settlements were to follow precedence of national 
awards.541 The Munitions War Amendment Act did not prescribe the provision of 12.5 
per cent bonus apart from time-workers, but claims for corresponding advance were 
pressed from piece-workers and led the Committee of Production to extension of the 
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bonus.542  Sliding scales in the iron and steel industries were paralysed and became 
inoperative, once the government fixed maximum prices for the products to restrain wage 
increase. It was possible to say that the conventional method of collective bargaining was 
preserved, since its process was operated by employers and employed with the Committee 
of Production as an independent arbitrator, but ‘in fact the normal control of wages had 
broken down’.543 The state became the ‘real employer’: ‘wage regulation… had become 
one of the most important functions of Government’.544 Since there was no uniform body 
controlling wage rates, wage standards were varied at the behest of departments and under 
their strong pressures perfect coordination was hardly secured:545 
On many occasions the Cabinet listened to an appeal from a contracting 
department or a trade union, and overruled a decision that had been dictated 
by the policy of co-ordinating wage settlements. …the Cabinet was not 
primarily or continuously a wage fixing authority; it did not understand, or, if 
it did, could not be relied on to bear in mind, the reactions which an isolated 
decision might have on wage demands that were not before it; it was 
influenced by considerations of political expediency rather than 
considerations of consistency in economic policy; its decisions, therefore 
were frequently illogical and inconsistent with one another, and represented 
rather concessions to the strength of the group demanding them than a 
recognition of the reasonableness of their claims.  
 
Despite the clause to restore the pre-war conditions, a fair adjustment to the commercial 
basis before the government interruption was unlikely to take place. In the light of the 
interest of consumers, the government forced employers to bear what strikers claimed for 
the increased wage rates. Transient war conditions increased demands for munitions 
production, which precipitated a shift from export industries to those of home and military 
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consumption. Maldistribution of labour occurred after such changes in wartime demands. 
In the post-war period, these expedient movements caused a difficulty in adjusting 
particular wage rates to efficient standards.546 Without coordinative action between the 
government, the General Council of the TUC and Confederation of Employers’ 
Organisations, withdrawal of wartime advances resulted in industrial disorder with 
revelation of malfunctioning sliding scales. To put brake on bureaucratisation, which 
rendered officials eligible to impose responsibility upon representatives from employers 
organisations and trade unions to conduct government programmes, such coordination 
was important. Therefore, Clay, based on the Whitley report, considered that dissolution 
of the state control in the post-war normalisation consisted in the Joint Industrial Council 
as an official standing consultative body between the state, employers and trade unions. 
The framework constituted ‘a public and official recognition of trade unionism and 
collective bargaining as the basis of industrial relations’. 547  It aimed to resuscitate 
voluntarism, which meant to utilise ‘the practical knowledge of the workpeople’, but was 
to operate on the ‘national’ basis and the Treasury and Ministry of Labour were attended 
to all councils. The issue at stake was to establish ‘clearly defined and generally accepted 
standard rates’ or ‘the legal enforcement of a particular wage’ in case of Trade Boards, 
without which the labour market was muddled by frenzy of unscrupulous bargaining. 
Despite apathy from well-organised unions, the extension of organised collective 
bargaining helped to improve industrial organisation among unskilled and semi-skilled 
labour, which reduced disparity in bargaining strengths between industries and facilitated 
to define effective standards of wage rates. It also determined to provide job-training and 
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welfare provisions for ex-service men.548  
Clay pointed out that the legislative provisions of collective bargaining, aiming at 
tailoring its state-centred industrial framework, which was first sanctioned by the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1896 and developed by the Industrial Courts Act of 
1919, resulted in empowerment of the authority of the Ministry of Labour. Despite its 
basic voluntarist principle, the duty imposed upon the government to prevent industrial 
disputes began to be intolerable due to a change in public opinion, which ‘tended[s] to 
hold Government responsible in any failure to keep industrial peace’. 549  Quoting 
Beveridge’s insight that, compared to unconditional contract in the nineteenth century, a 
load of complicate conditions was attached to it at the end of the century, Clay argued 
that the most difficult problems in administration of collective bargaining arose, when 
‘the Government was[is] expected to prevent stoppages without making them illegal, and 
was[is] blamed if the parties to a dispute in an important industry persist in their 
disagreement and stop the industry’. When there was no ‘common will’, which the state 
could apply to mediation, it seemed to be an unreasonable task for the state to ascertain 
alternative wage rates, on which both parties could agree. 550  As an expediency, the 
government was inclined to adopt ‘uniformity of pay for equivalent work by every means 
in their power’, which by the support of collective bargaining offered ‘fewest 
problems’.551 The war-time experience, during which the government was responsible for 
wage rates of ‘half the workers’, showed that ‘the correlative of direct wage fixing by 
Government was[is] some form of industrial conscription’, insofar as no accepted 
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principle or standard of remuneration was available.552     
This tendency of public opinion to call for industrial peace by state intervention meant 
the laissez-faire relationship between the state and markets was discredited, while the 
government was required to justify its action by referring to a justifiable principle. Clay 
believed in compulsory collective bargaining as the means to secure equality and preserve 
the bottom line of social wealth.553 With the progressive taxation, which would provide 
equality in consumption and social services for the lowest-paid workers, the government 
would be able to interfere with material conditions of the people short of breaching the 
essential bulwark of laissez-faire policy.554 Nonetheless, in contrast to the Labour party’s 
vision of extensive governmental enterprise, Clay’s ambition as a Liberal supporter of 
free trade was to exclude the government interference from economic relations between 
producers and consumers as much as between members of a different community – in 
other words, the restoration of industrial democracy based on an economic community, 
‘the organisation of which was neither established nor maintained by governments, and 
the boundaries of which do not coincide with those of any State’:555  
…the freedom to experiment, to establish new economic relations, to prove 
capacity for work by doing the work is an element in economic freedom that 
we undervalue today only because we have forgotten that it had to be fought 
for. As a principle of economic policy its essentials were simple; to keep the 
political and the economic organisation of society distinct; to develop 
international trade as a safeguard of international peace; and to rely on the 
social authority created by the economic organisation as a check and a 
counterweight to the social authority, created by the political organisation, of 
politicians and civil servants. As contrast with Socialists, who believe that 
every ill can be cured by a sufficient concentration of authority, the early 
Liberals were the heirs of the Whigs; they distrusted any concentration of 
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authority, and sought for checks and balances to prevent the abuse of 
necessary authority.  
 
Would it be possible to re-introduce a separation between politics and economy by staving 
off protectionist or socialist principles and making reconciliation of free trade with the 
laissez-faire policy? Clay pointed out that private enterprise was preferred to public 
enterprise, since it was more economical to meet the social end. If the community agreed 
on necessity of regulations, they could impose certain conditions on private enterprise 
like the Factory Acts. Moreover, protectionist policy was prone to limit the area and 
amount of commercial exchange, which impaired the ‘scope for initiative and choice and 
the free determination of economic relations by purchase and sale’. To reimbue the 
Liberal tradition of egalitarian sentiment of democratic community, private enterprise 
was more capable to meet demands by adjusting directly to price movement, which the 
demand power arranged by expression of human need and desire. However, the existence 
of inequality or class in society would prevent sound price movements, as much as 
everybody’s use of the means to direct production. It was undesirable to establish legal 
monopolies, which the socialist principle endorsed. The concentration of public authority 
could exercise power to subject economic organisations to the state and bureaucratically-
made inequality was more uncontrollable than that in private enterprise, since workers 
subordinated to public employers ended up in finding no alternative markets.556 The chief 
object of private enterprise was to rehabilitate individuals in the inequal society, which 
the laissez-faire state neglected, and to this end, ‘a direct pursuit of equality’ was more 
important than building a further network of bureaucratic organisations, which merely 
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increased duties and control of officials – ‘Capitalism abridges freedom less than the 
subordination of industry to a political machine that has lost its responsiveness to public 
feeling’. In case of industrial sectors, which required stable operation and public 
intervention in their character of monopoly, such as the railways, electricity, banking and 
alcohol manufacturing, it was preferable to avoid the direct participation by the 
government, considering its exertion of political interests. By setting up constitution 
abided by statutory rules in a joint-stock corporation, both shareholders and stakeholders 
could enter into agreement. Separation of economy from politics in this way could ensure 
distribution of wealth and encourage individual independence. Hence, Clay believed that 
under the progressive politics, private enterprise could make a reconciliation with the 
egalitarian democracy, for which Bentham and Mill aspired.557      
 
4.5. Progressivism and Industrial Peace by J.A. Hobson  
To revive economic liberalism, Henry Clay suggested the separation of economic 
activities from political interests, which was to be accomplished by the institutional 
progress of collective bargaining. The anomalous shift in the war-time production was to 
be backpedalled by the national framework of industrial organisation, in which the state, 
employers and trade unionists made adjustment to economic changes in the process of 
collective bargaining. An essential point of this assumption was restoration of the pre-
war basis of its voluntary framework. In prospect of the post-war reconstruction, the 
Whitley Committee was set up in 1916 to find out a way to roll back the war-time 
regulation of production. Its report conformed to the principle of the Royal Commission 
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of 1894 and aimed to promote the co-operative relationship between employers and 
employed, in which the state assisted in organising the institutional framework of 
collective bargaining. On this occasion, the standing body of the Joint Industrial Council 
was proposed as the means to facilitate industry-level adjustments in industries, which 
did not have the bargaining machinery. In addition, the 1909 Trade Boards Act was 
amended to extend its application, which was finally enacted in 1918. Both joint industrial 
councils and trade boards, taking account of national conditions, provided regular 
opportunities to settle industrial problems. In this way, the labour market was reversed to 
voluntary operation of collective bargaining without direct state intervention. However, 
the Whitley regime, confining the latter’s role into minimum, e.g. supply of information, 
confronted a difficulty in reimplementing the governing framework of voluntary 
adjustment particularly after the economic decline from the early 1920s. Despite its 
evasion of the compulsory measures like the legally-binding standing tribunal, the 
industrial court, which functioned as the last bastion of the voluntary procedure, could 
not establish credibility of verdicts, since its wage policy lacked consistency, wavering 
between criterion reckoning in haphazard fashion subsistence, fairness, or ability to 
pay.558                      
The failure of the National Industrial Conference (NIC) in 1919, which aimed to forge a 
national consensus of industrial regulations in hours of work, wage rates, procedure of 
collective bargaining and unemployment, was an ironical occasion that turned the policy 
of ‘home rule for industry’ into delusory one. Certainly, the conference’s preference for 
strict legislative measures, such as a 48-hour week, regulatory minimum rates and the 
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establishment of a national industrial council, were unorthodox requests for 
reconstruction. Its dirigiste approaches to the labour market could not gain support from 
both the NCEO and trade unions, both of which had such divergent interests that the joint 
committee of the conference could not at all find a landing point. Lowe argued that rather 
than the extension of Whitleyism, the NIC was the ‘a prime example of Lloyd George’s 
‘‘fondness for the grandiose scheme’’’, which breached the premise of joint industrial 
councils as the ‘sole authoritative voice of an industry’. In the end, the NIC lost 
administrative initiatives for a good governance, since industrial democracy was no 
longer seen by the government as an effective means to protect national interest, but as a 
‘constraint on its own authority’ insomuch as their fragmentary conditions obstructed 
‘reasoned consideration’. During the interwar years, nonetheless, what the government 
could demonstrate was its lack of capability to overcome economic difficulty by 
intervening in industrial issues.559         
In fact, after the day of armistice, the government initiated the process of deregulation by 
curtailing the wartime restrictions applied to both national production and consumption. 
The ‘back to 1914’ movement was buttressed by the reconstruction project under the 
fiscal trinity – the City, the Bank and the Treasury – to reinstate the policy of free trade 
in order to safeguard the international role of sterling. Deflationary pressure, which 
financial constraints provoked with anti-centralising sentiments, increased the importance 
of views of the Treasury in industrial relations institutions in place of the Ministry of 
Labour. The latter’s aim to tailor the national framework of collective bargaining was 
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attacked as ‘both destroy jobs by interfering in the labour market’.560 The government 
endorsed the Treasury to use budgetary discipline of ‘sound finance’ to limit the 
Ministry’s ability to accommodate industrial relations institutions. In reaction to an 
increased level of unemployment and unstable conditions of industrial societies, the FBI, 
seeking to avoid demise of progressive momentum without helps, proposed a financial 
pool deposited by railway profits. After the failure to introduce modernising project to 
nationalise transportation and electricity, Geddes by curtailing the authority of the 
Ministry of Transport passed the Railways Act of 1921 to secure the system of arbitration 
and the National Wages Board, both of which aimed for accommodation with trade 
unions.561 However, as the deflationary policy of decontrol was advanced, the political 
influence of employers’ organisations were gradually diminished, despite a number of 
anti-socialist businessmen entering Whitehall from the Conservative party after the 1918 
election. A new wave of industrial unrest arose and the Conservatives powerful in the 
post-war coalition took a hard-line attitude towards trade unions, sending police force to 
suppress strikes and enacted the Emergency Powers Act of 1920 to take management 
control during stoppage. When the Miners’ Federation called for national strike in 
demand for nationalisation and wage increases, the Sankey Commission was appointed 
as a buffer. The twin pillars of the Whitley regime – joint industrial councils and trade 
boards – were not functional as conciliatory instruments to remove underlying causes of 
industrial disputes.562  
Churchill’s appointment as Chancellor of Exchequer in the second Baldwin’s 
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administration assured the return to the gold standard in 1925 as the Treasury orthodoxy 
in finance. Overvalued sterling was forecasted to intensify economic competition at home, 
since it lowered price of import goods, and to make exporters disadvantageous in foreign 
markets. The deflationary scheme of free trade imposed considerable pressure upon 
industrial employers and required them to reduce costs of wage rates, which Alfred Mond, 
the progressive colliery owner and chemical manufacturer, saw as the ‘most fundamental 
cause of the industrial and political troubles in which we are involved’.563 In particular, 
its blow upon the traditional export sectors – coal, textiles, shipbuilding, and iron and 
steel – was significant. After the dissolution of the Triple Alliance on ‘Black Friday’ in 
1921, miners lost the war-time framework, which employed the central control in a 
constructive way. When owners sought further reduction in wage rates and extension in 
working hours, the MFGB demanded statutory regulation of living wages. The General 
Council of the TUC promised their support by calling for suspension of railways and 
transport of coal trade. Despite publication of the Samuel Report after the Royal 
Commission on the coal industry, the negotiation reached a deadlock. The great majority 
of trade union delegates agreed to support miners in the congress on 3rd May 1926 and 
lapsed into the ‘General Strike’ from 4th to 12th, involving the number of around 2,500,000 
workers from mining, printing, building, transport, iron, steel, chemical, paper, 
engineering and shipbuilding industries. It was obvious that the post-war reconstruction 
of free trade normalcy had failed.564 
Lowe saw this incompatibility between the orthodoxy of free trade normalcy and 
producers’ proclivity for the war-time anomaly as a clue to disclose Britain’s lack of 
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corporate nature. British government’s decline to ratify the international treaties of 
reduced hours of work, which was advanced in the mood of post-war reconciliation 
particularly after the establishment of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 
demonstrated their problem of industrial practice based on free collective bargaining to 
conform to standardized regulations. From their rejection of the NIC to that of both the 
original and amended version of the Washington Hours Convention at the ILO, the 
government could not impose ‘corporate bias’ by gaining consents of either employers’ 
organisations or trade unions. The dismissal of such a new international framework, 
however, did not mean the triumph of free trade normalcy, but the post-war dilemma 
persisted and was displayed by the minimalist approach of the government as much as 
ambivalent and strained attitudes of both parties to state intervention. Rather than the 
growth of the corporate state with governing institutions, their orientation towards self-
governing entities succeeded in excluding the national government from coercing its 
managerial prerogatives to a degree that breached the neutral principle held out by the 
civil service.565 Rodgers has corroborated this point of Britain’s exemption from the 
corporate commitment by examining a role of employers’ organisations, particularly that 
of the NCEO, in the political discourse of unemployment and social politics, which was 
stained by the traditional repugnance towards state intervention by the modern 
bureaucratic system. Among the three cardinal employers’ organisations in the period – 
the National Union of Manufacturers, the FBI and the NCEO – the latter’s main apostles 
were from the traditional export-oriented industries such as coal, cotton and shipbuilding-
engineering, hence, its strong disposition towards free enterprise and explicit antagonism 
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against socialism. As a remedy for the problem of unemployment, it demanded reduced 
costs of production not only by lowering the standard wage rates, but by containing post-
war development of social welfare, whose burdens were imposed upon industries. 
Including its withdrawal from the NIC, its strident class-conscious strategy was inclined 
to omit the consensus-making process in political and industrial co-operation, to which 
the FBI and trade unions were more attentive. Hence, in collaboration with the 
Conservative M.P.s, the NCEO took a hard-line attitude to the Labour-TUC proposals for 
public works. Its rationale was to consummate the ‘social decommodification’ of the 
labour market by reinvigoration of enterprise, competitiveness and the healthy 
economy.566 
From the time when New Liberals instilled the sense of idealist state as a bulwark of 
economic liberalism, the New Liberal engagement in the economic policy of free trade 
was no longer grounded on the state’s neutral, but on its organicist approach to market 
economy. Organising the voluntary framework of collective bargaining, the state played 
an arbitrary role to preserve the public interest by intervening in industrial disputes and 
adopting scientific methodology predicated on the marginalist gloss. Officialdom, 
upholding the principle of free trade, implemented legislative institutions to organise 
nationally-managed labour market and provide social relief. The exigencies of the war, 
however, necessitated the state to handle the constitutional status of free collective 
bargaining to meet the national interest. This changed the state’s attitude to intervention 
in market economy from consumerist politics to accommodating the interest of national 
production. The wartime execution of statutory laws to regulate labour market resulted 
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not only in substantial incorporation of trade unions, as granting them full recognition, 
but also in curtailing liberal disposition of industrial employers, since it undermined their 
influence in the procedure of collective bargaining. The national-level framework of 
collective bargaining frustrated the latter, particularly those, who were exposed to the 
increased pressure of economic competition and located outside the consideration of 
national interest. Despite their rejection of coordinating framework of post-war 
internationalism, the voluntary operation of collective bargaining was no longer 
conducive to the pre-war condition of securing the public interest. In place of pluralist 
governance, the organicist policy to organise national production ended up in substantial 
deprivation of autonomous function to regulate production from trade unions, which, 
absolved from corporate responsibility, were driven to claim against the government to 
protect their sectional interests after the war. Therefore, in condition that the reversal 
movement to free trade normalcy collided with trade union predilection for the war-time 
anomaly, it was imperative for the employers’ organisations like the NCEO to restore the 
liberal relationship between the state and market by reconstructing the co-operative 
relationship with trade unions. 
After the general strike in coal-mining, the dominant mood of the industrial circle moved 
towards co-operation. However, rather than calling for industrial peace having recourse 
to the liberal voice of public opinion as an economic navigator of the consumerist interest, 
the new co-operative movement was based on industrial rationalisation, which aimed to 
increase industrial efficiency in line with reduction in costs of production.567 The key 
protagonist of this co-operative movement was Arthur Steel-Maitland, a Balliol alumnus, 
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who became the Minister of Labour in Baldwin’s second administration. On labour 
questions, Steel-Maitland wrote his essay for Conservative tariff reformers in 1908. He 
argued that under the modern system of limited liability, the laissez-faire economy, which 
prospered by abolition of old regulations, was in need of reform adapted to the changed 
conditions, since ‘i[I]n this instance the theory that the individual was best left to look 
after his own interests has been found falsified in practice, both as regards the individual 
himself and the community in which he lives’.568 With feverish imperial ambition, Steel-
Maitland saw that the free trade theory was reduced to free import theory and that, hence, 
imperial organism was required to build the empire of free trade on the basis of the neo-
mercantilist system. Since, in this perspective, the advance of imperialism was 
complementary to that of social reform, his devotion to New Liberal labour legislation 
was outstanding in the Conservative party before the war: he was an active Conservative 
member of the National Anti-Sweating League and assisted enactment of the Trade 
Boards Act of 1909. While upholding state intervention as necessary, he was suspicious 
about public works. Rather, as the Minister of Labour, he insisted on the importance of 
industrial reorganisation and linked the problem of unemployment with improvement in 
industrial efficiency. This was what Steel-Maitland saw as the orthodoxy and was 
predicated on industrial protection through tariff reform: the return to the gold standard 
was malevolent insomuch as the policy of public works was impractical. To keep the state 
at an arm’s length from management of industry was Steel-Maitland’s salient point of 
industrial reorganisation. Distinguishing from socialist solution, he felt that after the 
general strike, industrial rationalisation had to be carried out as the basis of higher 
 




productivity for reconstruction of industrial co-operation. In this framework, the only role 
of the government was to act as an ‘honest broker’.569       
While the Lore Weir of the NCEO saw that deregulation of trade union restrictive 
practices was essential for new technological developments, trade union leaders such as 
Bevin, Pugh, Citrine and Hicks, the president of the TUC, wished for seats in managerial 
boards to discuss not only wages and conditions, but also general commercial issues with 
their employers. In addition to the fear from rationalisation process, trade unions at that 
moment suffered repercussions of the general strike, which were tangible in wage 
reductions and huge decline in the number of union membership. For business leaders 
from the NCEO and FBI, TUC’s consent on co-operation was beneficial, as it was 
prerequisite for their aspiration for industrial self-government to divert the TUC from 
making political appeals via the Labour party. Alfred Mond took a lead in his Imperial 
Chemical Industries to introduce rationalisation programme and negotiated with the TUC 
to hold a meeting for discussion about industrial reorganisation and future industrial 
relations with thirty-nine leading industrialists from large-scale enterprises. The Mond-
Turner Talks started in January 1928. It acknowledged the trade union status and decided 
to establish a standing wholesale body of collective bargaining – the National Industrial 
Council composed of representatives of the TUC, FBI and NCEO and the Joint 
Conciliation Board in case of expediency. Notwithstanding oppositions from some union 
leaders, the General Council of the TUC granted approval for the report. On the other 
hand, majority members in both the NCEO and FBI decided to oppose the report, since 
they were still reluctant to give recognition to trade unions and allow them to intrude into 
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either existing industrial relations machinery or their own managerial rights. In particular, 
antagonism towards the TUC shown by the EEF faction of the NCEO was so significant 
that the NCEO was eventually reduced to a limited role in a compromised form of a co-
operative committee and finally expressed opposition to the FBI’s initiative as much as 
to joint-talk with the TUC on the matter of industrial rationalisation and unemployment, 
since the EEF held a firm belief that ‘the discussion of labour displacement due to 
rationalisation would constitute an invasion of management prerogative’.570     
By promoting industrial reorganisation and adopting methods of scientific management, 
the progressive movement no longer fell back on the impersonal force of market economy, 
but replaced it with what Newton & Porter called the ‘visible hand’ of producers’ 
alliances.571 If its productivist evolution run counter to the consumerist rationality of 
‘countervailing power of the public’, then could the tradition of British democracy – party 
politics and parliamentary system – contain the progress of corporate politics and become 
a safeguard of the classical theory of free trade voluntarism? Trentmann has already 
argued that in the growing mood of international co-operation the post-war 
internationalism undermined the pre-war liberal confidence in unilateral free trade. In 
face of international trusts and oligopolistic conditions of world markets, new 
internationalism increased the role of politics in commerce for national defence and the 
international institutions like the League of Nations were expected not only to harness 
global capitalists but to regulate and stabilise trade relations between sovereigns. In this 
process, since each government was integrated into the system of economic blockades, 
freedom of trade was no longer deemed to be viable order, but equality of trade, in which 
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promotion of welfare collectivism came together with the rise of economic nationalism.572 
True, the Mond-Turner Talks was an imperial project launched by business interests in 
the Conservative party. Mond advocated a post-war programme of imperial unity under 
the auspices of economic protectionism. Producers demanded in the report influx of 
currency and flexible credit in British economy, both of which Churchill was going to 
limit by undermining the remit of the Bank of England, facilitating international 
movements of gold. Their incongruency with free trade normalcy made the committee 
exert pressure on industrial policies of the government and on the TUC to renounce its 
commitment to free trade. In this respect, the progressive movement took on an aspect of 
party politics.573    
Despite the fact that the New Liberal class politics encouraged defection of business 
interests from the Liberal party in defence of property, it is misleading to give a too much 
emphasis on the decline of the pre-war progressive politics. The Liberal party was still 
backed by industries, which benefited from the economic policy of free trade.574 After the 
breakdown of Lloyd George’s coalition government Liberals’ main economic concerns 
were about the increased war debt and its provocation of inflation. Since their war-time 
experience led to inefficacy of state intervention, the Liberal party oriented their industrial 
policy to minimisation of intervention, in which they identified communal interests with 
those of consumers. 575  They did not prioritize the reconstruction of co-operative 
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relationship between employers and employed, as W.T. Layton saw the post-war situation 
optimistically in expectation of the growth of international consensus through the 
establishment of the League of Nations. For Liberals, as a champion of free trade the rise 
of protectionism under the Baldwin’s Conservative party was an antagonistic political 
cause. However, the irrecoverable schism between factions of Lloyd George and Asquith 
exacerbated their hardship of political weakness.576 Against the Conservatives, centrist 
Asquithian Liberals like Viscount Grey aimed to rebuild the progressive alliance with 
rank-and-file unionists. Its post-war framework rested on making a commitment to 
international coordination, which, in contrast to what Grey labelled Lloyd George’s 
‘madcap finance’ based on his anti-landlord radicalism, was expected to facilitate a 
balanced budget, lower taxation and improvement in national credit. In the conference 
held by the League of Nations Union, of which Grey was the president, liberals agreed 
that a boost in production, rather than fair distribution of wealth, was the foremost means 
to secure industrial peace, as reduction of costs led to an increase in wage rates, shorter 
hours of work and fuller employment.577 Such progressive re-concord was soon disrupted 
by the economic depression. In the 1929 election, the economic policy of free trade was 
a technical matter of politics rather than the doctrine of economic liberalism.578 Later on, 
Lloyd George’s more interventionist and statist approaches to welfare and economy 
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became Liberal party’s cardinal policy in its manifesto, We can Conquer Unemployment. 
Its scheme was based on suggestions of J.M. Keynes, who believed that there was 
fallibility in the long-established liberal principle – enlightened self-interests always 
operated for the sake of the public interest; that it was time to determine what the state 
would ‘take upon itself to direct by the public wisdom, and what it ought to leave, with 
as little interference as possible to individual exertion’, because it was ‘not true that 
individuals possess a prescriptive ‘‘natural liberty’’ in their economic activities’.579    
Meanwhile, the Labour party under the leadership of MacDonald began to succeed the 
radical wing of the liberal tradition. In the general elections of the early 1920s they 
outstripped the Liberal party as the direct political opposition to Conservative 
protectionism. They remained opposed to the imperial tariff system and adhered to the 
principle of free trade. Their general policy of ‘gradualism’ was persistent as the official 
line until the Labour and the Nation of 1928, which revised the radical agenda of Labour 
and the New Social Order of 1918. It was based on a minor modification in the war-time 
control and advocated central management of production and consumption. To achieve 
goals of full employment and wholesale operation of collective bargaining, it required 
extensions of public ownership and control of production to provide services of 
nationalised industries – coal, railways, and electricity – in cheaper prices, as much as 
import control to protect price structure. In this sense, the principle of free trade was 
upheld not so much to propel competition as to lower prices and to ensure minimum 
standard of life. Given Labour’s strong tie with trade unions and adherence to high wages, 
stable employment and welfare policies, imposition of capital levy on high incomes and 
 




profits was sought to cover budgetary deficiencies. To remove trade barriers standing off 
Britain’s traditional staple industries like coal, textiles, shipbuilding, and iron and steel, 
instead of protectionism, they resorted to international organisations such as the League 
of Nations and ILO for setting world standards in wages and regulations of economic 
conditions including tariff negotiations.  
However, in practice, when the Labour party was in power, they did not conform to the 
manifestoes. After the experience of failure, the Second Labour administration turned to 
industrial rationalisation, which had long been abhorred as monopoly of production. 
Distinctions from the Conservative proposal have to be made in terms of their rejection 
of a subsidised model of the Mond-Turner scheme, their countenance of sound finance 
and their desultory outlook for newly emerging industries like automobiles. To ensure 
consistency with free trade, they strived to develop economic internationalism to boost 
export industries. Without intentions to cut costs of production and public expenditure, 
the Labour version of industrial rationalisation was, in short, the means to make 
traditional industries – coal, cotton and iron and steel – more effective and competitive, 
but in denial of direct state intervention its progress was largely contingent on self-
managements of business and banking, which ended up in arousing trade unionist 
resistance showing a deep concern over worse conditions of their employment. Snowden, 
the Chancellor of Exchequer, was obstinate in fiscal austerity and opposed the 
introduction of either import controls or tariffs for planned production, which the TUC 
endorsed in 1930. The party’s loyalty to the fiscal orthodoxy resulted in its inaction of 
economic programmes. As the economic situation deteriorated, the ex-Liberal M.P.s 
began to see the national government as the means to launch effective economic policy 
262 
 
alternative to political deadlock of the Labour administration.580 In the 1931 election, 
Labour’s manifesto dropped rationalisation and brought back the measure of 
nationalisation. Since party’s champions of industrial rationalisation like MacDonald and 
Snowden defected, it reinstated the doctrine of nationalisation on the basis of the 
‘profoundly bureaucratic model of the public corporation’ by curtailing the party’s 
allegiance to voluntarism.581   
The Labour party was the last bastion of free traders. Its strict adherence to the fiscal 
orthodoxy was a radical antithesis to Conservative protectionism. The free trade normalcy 
was projected to reinvigorate consumerist politics, which was, according to the Labour 
manifestoes, deemed to be consummated by the central control of production and 
consumption. To see the extent to which this feature of radicalism was out of step from 
the pre-war orthodoxy of free trade, it is important to look into how the Labour party 
sought to hedge the compelling exigency of industrial reorganisation, on the basis of 
which co-operative relationship between employers’ organisations and trade unions was 
imperative. Despite the party’s ungracious culture prone to overlook ideas from party 
intellectuals, J.A. Hobson published The Conditions of Industrial Peace and examined 
the problem of free collective bargaining as a Labour intellectual in 1927.582 While his 
proposals for a living wage was adopted by the ILP as an alternative socialist policy to 
the mainstream gradualism, MacDonald appointed him as the chairman of party’s 
advisory committee on trade policy. Hobson used to be a founding member of the 
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Rainbow Circle and a protagonist of new liberal organicist rationale to reconcile 
individual liberty with the common good of society. To rectify despotic condition of 
liberalism, Hobson’s radicalism aimed to forge producers’ alliance as the unified ‘people’ 
against privileged classes like ‘landlords and rentiers’. He believed that the growths of 
large-scale business based on innovation in science and technology, which increased the 
amount of production, replaced the economy of custom and its advantageous ascendancy 
under free trade economy led to separation between production and consumption, when 
fierce competition turned out to be economic coordination by a corporate truce to fix 
prices and maintain high rates of profits. The condition of overproduction arose, as the 
number of employment decreased after the formation of monopolistic economic power 
made over-savings of capital and labour and took margins from the consuming public. In 
this condition of underconsumption, communal interests were not at all harmonised nor 
even taken into account and public opinion was amenable to the economic competition 
and lost human causes, when the spiritual cohesiveness got feebler between individuals 
after ‘the free play of economic forces under the guidance of the selfish instincts of 
commercial individuals’.583  
As a prescription for problems of under-consumption, Hobson considered that security of 
individual property was expedient against monopoly in the modern economy, which 
tended to divest labour of its value – the sole property of workers. To achieve this, 
collective control of society was necessary to utilise the force of consumption, since the 
more complex industrial organism became, the more important to scope out private 
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business for the sake of the public.584 In an attempt to seek effective demand, he proposed 
limitations on unlimited savings of individuals, which had a perverse effect to a whole of 
the community. Hence, a limit was set at the ‘quantity of socially useful ‘‘saving’’ for a 
community’.585 Unearned increments of income by land values of rent and price were 
adjudicated as surplus from ‘exertions and sacrifices of the community’. Such economic 
rent was justified ‘neither by natural ‘‘right’’ nor by expediency’ and could be 
‘economically taken by the public and used for public purposes’.586 Under the public 
management, employment was adjusted to the social needs by adoption of public or relief 
works.587 Hobson believed that these public controls by state intervention in the economic 
liberty of individuals indicated conversion from freedom of trade to social organism, in 
which ‘best social use of all the social property by taxation’ was not achieved by natural 
liberty of individuals, but determined by ‘general expediency’ based on the public 
good.588 In this circumstance, individuals were no longer exclusive holders of private 
goods, but were members of society, who contributed their property to their ‘corporately 
made’ administration, which demonstrated ideas of the public as a social organism for the 
common good.589 Reducing underconsumption, the collectivist policy under the corporate 
administration was the only measure to afford a protection for the interest of 
consumers.590 Still, it left individuals equal opportunities of self-expression. It was a 
crucial task of the state to provide every man to enjoy a ‘fair chance of life’, which was 
oppressed by privileged classes manipulating liberal constitution and democracy by 
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enforcing unjust and inequitable laws.591 Hobson’s belief in materialism as a remedy for 
economic liberty was premised on moral and intellectual advancement of the people in 
the process of economic reforms overthrowing the vested interests. 592  To achieve 
economic equality, the ‘general will’ – or ‘the expression of the moral force of the 
community’ – only could bring the substantial justice and place property on a ‘just and 
rational basis’.593    
However, Hobson was not immune from fervid sentiment of imperialism of those days 
and it became his dilemma how to reconcile evolutionary organism with new liberalism 
as the democratic principle of social reform. The problems of underconsumption and 
overproduction posed challenge to the theoretical validity of free trade, which promoted 
foreign investment leading not only to domestic poverty, but also to threat to democracy. 
Hence, it was a perplexing problem for Hobson to find out how to reconcile free trade 
with welfare of the working class without counting on imperialist economic policy, 
particularly when confronting economic competition with foreign industries. His faith in 
radicalism turned his free trade policy once to ‘little Englander’ vision of anti-imperialism, 
which gave an immediate priority to social reform and redistribution of income inside the 
country over international trade. 594  While economic competition between modern 
industries made almost equivalent conditions to militarism, such social reform could 
revive producers’ alliance of small-scale industries, which were ‘the key to a morally 
healthy, liberal future‘ against parasitism and the imperial policy overseas. In opposition 
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to the Liberal imperialists, Hobson advocated the progressive alliance with the Labour 
party and socialist reorganisation of industry by means of minimum wages to stave off 
iniquitous competition for the glorious empire.595 In this sense, he considered that the 
growth of imperialism deprived societies, either host or colonies, of freedom to choose 
indigenous developments in modern civilisation.596  
However, in face of Chamberlain’s imperial tariff programme, Hobson’s view of free 
trade increasingly embraced a spectrum of internationalism, since only free trade made it 
possible to encourage national advancements in industrial democracy and ‘intercourse of 
nations’ based on economic justice. Taking account of international division of labour, 
he considered that ceaseless flows of international capital had an effect of separating 
sovereigns from local monopolies and equalising ‘costs of production and so to enforce 
a better division of labour’. In this process, some demerits of the international free trade 
like underconsumption were offset by its merits of peace and equality brought about by 
an increase in international commerce levelling out economic and social conditions. The 
role of financiers had to undergo revisions as these were ‘critical to the proper allocation 
of investment worldwide’. On the basis of what Hobson called ‘worldwide utility’, ‘there 
was a benign invisible hand at work in international financial markets’.597 This optimistic 
speculation of international trade led him to the war-time advocation of the League of 
Nations as the international institution to establish industrial democracy in 
underdeveloped countries. It was a role of the state to secure commercial treaties for their 
private enterprises and this political support for international free trade was supported by 
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the League.598  
Cain has concluded that Hobson’s acquiescence in individualist economics posed a 
question upon his organicist approach.599 In exploring Hobson’s ambiguous standpoint 
between the economic orthodoxy of free trade and its organicism in the 1920s, it is 
important to take account of Clarke’s study about the discourse of liberal intellectuals, 
who wavered between rationalism and functionalism. Hobson’s compromised attitude 
was expressed as his advocation of British revolution by ‘reason and justice’, which did 
not demand Bolshevist class-war, but his suspicion about the unconstitutional latitude of 
rationalism expected functionalist producers’ alliance to act as the political force. He 
agreed with Marxism at this juncture that structural reform was necessary for the 
condition of harmonious society.600 As long as individuals were not self-contained and 
perpetually susceptible to biases evolved from outside pressures, political myths were the 
means to bring peace ‘into a world of apparent conflict and disorder’.601 Clarke has 
pointed out that after the war Hobson changed his stance on fiscal policy as he endorsed 
the war-time productivist notion that stimulus on consumption would develop powers of 
production, which led working classes to higher standard of living. This productivist turn 
consisted in maintaining the level of war-time demand and imposing capital levy to 
remove debts of the state. An outstanding point different from the pre-war period was 
Hobson’s re-evaluation of social position of the rich.602 Redistribution was the only way 
to rectify proportion of saving to spending and this central control rendered efficiency 
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and justice to industrial organicism, since, once equal distribution was successful in 
providing fuller employment, an increase in consumption improved productivity, which 
ended up in both creating effective demand and boosting national income. Two vital 
policies for facilitating redistribution were to maintain subsistent wage rates and to 
introduce progressive taxation.603   
In Industrial Peace, Hobson pointed out the breakdown of laissez-faire economy, where 
the modern corporate economy in forms of trusts and cartels embittered the condition of 
overproduction. Since these productive forces could control output, prices and markets 
by their own right, they could gain the maximum of net profits through increase in 
efficiency and reduction of wastes.604 At some stages of production, factions of producers 
could add extra ‘surplus profits’ to prices of products before reaching the eyes of 
consumers. As a result, in contrast to the premise of free trade economy, in which profits 
and prices were kept low, their price rates were raised by interaction of industrial 
combinations. Such exercises of price control led to extortion of high prices and market 
dysfunction and, in consequence, individual and uncompetitive producers were extirpated. 
Under this circumstance, real wages and net profits were dependent on productivity and 
efficiency of others, rather than on their own, because, unlike in the consumerist order, 
all values were to be ‘socially’ determined – values of production were accommodated 
with operation of industrial organisation as a whole:605    
For though its productive capacity depends upon its own equipment, 
technique, organisation and the efficiency of its personnel, the amount of its 
output and sales depends largely upon what the other competing businesses 
are capable of doing, and the total amount of business there is to do. And 
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these are not matters within its own control.  
 
Therefore, the post-war economy changed a phase of collective bargaining from the one-
dimensional settlement between organisations of employers and those of workers in a 
single trade to a multilateral level of negotiations in the light of ‘a general equitable 
distribution of the surplus’.606 The workers’ claim on their ‘right to products’ was no 
longer determinate without taking account of outside factors such as state intervention, 
conditions of industries and the consuming public. Once an increase in wage rates pushed 
up prices, this led to reduction of income in other industries and, therefore, appeared 
disparity among industrial sectors, which were severely underpaid and wastefully 
overpaid. Since it was difficult to judge in this condition whether responsibility of 
economic failure was caused by external or internal reasons, surplus wealth had to be 
allocated for social purpose. Hobson considered that large profits of economic 
combinations were rooted in purchasing power of communities:607 
In equity we may say that the entire body of these surpluses, rents, excess 
profits, monopoly earnings of ability, etc., constitute the rightful social or 
public income, as distinct from the proper or economically useful incomes of 
individuals. In strict logic, of course, the social determination of values 
requires us to hold that all income is ‘social’ in origin.     
 
For industrial peace, public administration distributed preserved surplus wealth to 
industries which were outplayed in market competition. Such public revenue was 
collected by taxation on surplus profits, since, in contrast to the laissez-faire economy, 
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state intervention did not put adverse effect on economic activities of private capital 
particularly for the purpose of adjusting mismatch between production and consumption. 
Hence, either by economic corporations such as trusts and cartels or by other price-fixing 
boards, the public services were capable of administrating social wealth ‘in the sense of 
enlarged human welfare’. Relieving people’s concern over overproduction, fair 
distribution of wealth would raise productivity as giving incentive to improve methods of 
production.608 With endorsement of loci standi for producers and consumers, Hobson 
considered, socialist society was formed by equitable settlement of industrial peace 
through a standing body composed of representatives of all the interests. In case of Britain, 
permanent formation of the ‘National Industrial Council’ was expected to fulfil this role, 
inheriting functions of the Whitley Councils, Trade Boards and Industrial Court. Insofar 
as British economy was meshed in the international framework, it was not enough to 
mention solely the national conditions. To achieve international co-operation, Hobson 
argued that reasonable standards of economic and industrial regulations had to be defined 
by the League of Nations.609   
It was important for Hobson to emphasise that personal liberty, whether individual or 
collective, was not given priority over the ‘social right’, because neither employers nor 
workers could be the best judge of values of their products and services in industrial 
disputes in regard with risks or harms on other industries: their rights ‘to strike or lockout 
was[is] only valid as a right of self-defence, so long as no better remedy is available’. It 
was society, which ‘always reserved[s] the right of intervening when a monopoly of 
 
608 Ibid., pp.90-1 
609 Ibid. pp.108-15 
271 
 
scarcity, natural or contrived, threatens public order or vital interests’.610 The ‘social right’ 
rendered stoppages called by discretion of individuals unnecessary. To avoid halting 
exchange of trade, loss of purchasing opportunities of consumers and workers’ refusal of 
terms of contracts, Hobson considered it was necessary to build a more compulsory 
system of arbitration. Other than improvement in education of social obligations, 
reflection of public opinion and legal coercion, there was a certain belief in his vision that 
materialisation of industrial peace was made possible only by intervention of the central 
authority in industrial relations, if the international framework and the principle of social 
right gained legitimacy in the society. 
  
 




This thesis has shown that when contemporaries called for free collective bargaining 
between 1860 and 1930, this liberal jargon connoted two contrasting meanings in the free 
trade society. On the one hand, it suggested free trade in labour in the mid-nineteenth 
century, which made it possible for working class people to define rights and duties with 
their employers on equal terms. In this process trade unions could seek not only fair day’s 
wage for a fair day’s work, but to protect their conventional practice of labour by halting 
overproduction and limiting the number of apprenticeship. The working class right to 
carry out free collective bargaining was secured by the Trade Union Act of 1871, in which 
trade unions were allocated the status of the Friendly Societies Act and placed outside the 
corporate responsibility – they evaded separation between welfare and trade fund. With 
other charters – the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act and the Employers and 
Workmen Act of 1875 – this legal acknowledgement of trade union practice constituted 
neutrality of the state in industrial relations. Under the voluntary scheme of collective 
bargaining, capital and labour could reach the common good of communities without 
state intervention.  
On the other hand,  when the progressives advocated the voluntary practice of collective 
bargaining in the post-First World War period, the liberal jargon displayed a different 
sense from the original. The voluntary method was still preferred to compulsory 
arbitration and trade unions persisted their conventional bottom-up practice of industrial 
democracy. However, the war-time experience caused a drastic change in industrial 
relations, when there was exigency of the state to protect the national interest. It was no 
longer based on the liberal relationship between the state and market, which was governed 
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by the neutral order. The war-time statutory measure restricted the labour market by 
extending the government control over munitions production. The Munitions of War Act 
of 1915 limited the remit of collective bargaining, as it reflected strongly purport of the 
state, imposing regulation, dilution and rationalisation of labour process, which took the 
place of customary practice of trade unions. In place of equal relationship with employers, 
officials from the Ministry of Labour administrated substantial negotiations with trade 
unions in the process of collective bargaining, in which the latter’s strong tie with the 
state disclosed their almost incorporated condition.  
By examining the intellectual background of this change in the political meaning of free 
collective bargaining, this thesis has aimed at contributing to historiography through 
redefinition of the liberal culture of free trade. The rise and fall of Britain’s voluntary 
market culture of collective bargaining suggested the process, in which conditions of free 
trade in labour were deteriorated in association with the growths of corporate economy. 
Political economy of free trade was not a consistent economic discourse in favour of 
expansive production in market economy. Its advancement was concurrent with the 
religious and moral disciplines.611 Hence, its embrace of voluntary market practice of 
collective bargaining did not indicate the straightforward acceptance of the economic 
orthodoxy of individualism by the working classes as presumed in past historiography of 
trade unionism.612 When the trade union charters endorsed the voluntary operation of 
collective bargaining, the Liberal party championed co-operation between official and 
popular economic culture and endorsed trade unions as economic organisation of labour 
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to reconcile market economy with the public interest in the private sphere. Their voluntary 
solution was the rule of law in the market culture of free trade, as its autonomous function 
secured the public good by achieving equilibrium between consumers’ and producers’ 
interest. However, this consensus faltered immediately, as there were increasing calls for 
growth-oriented mode of production. The market culture of voluntarism ended up in 
deadlock, when the state had to handle problems of corporate governance in relation to 
economic competition with rival countries.  
Liberal intellectuals showed a grave concern against this separation between economic 
and moral rules in free trade economy. In acceptance of collectivism, they advocated 
idealist principles, which aspired to achieve the public good by reflecting positive 
conception of public opinion. Complementing theoretical indeterminacy of market 
competition, their differential usage of public opinion suggested liberal and pluralist 
spectrums represented by Conservative political economy. In this respect, this thesis has 
aimed to supplement historiography of the liberal culture of free trade with the latter’s 
intellectual experiment in institutional provision of collective liberty, whose kernel of 
producers’ trust as decentred public virtue has been overlooked by historians of free 
trade.613 While the New liberal economic policy of free trade strived to meet demands of 
consumers by the state ‘tailoring’ organised function of industrial co-operation, the 
Conservatives developed the liberal principle of economic organisation of labour in 
protectionist economy, by which autonomous identification of producers’ with consumers’ 
interest was made possible under the guidance of public opinion. However, with the 
decline of the voluntary market culture of collective bargaining, these views to defend the 
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liberal culture of public opinion was submerged by the growth-oriented economy, as the 
First World War marked a watershed, necessitating productivist formation of national 
economy.    
The post-First World War arrangement to reconstruct the pre-war framework turned out 
the situation that the voluntary framework of collective bargaining was irretrievable. 
Treasury’s return to the Gold standard and deflationary finance emasculated the Whitley 
scheme which aimed to minimise state intervention in industrial relations and prompted 
adjustment of industrial coordination by the joint industrial councils and trade boards. 
However, what the return movement provoked was industrial unrest, which coal-miners 
developed into the nationwide strike in 1926. The progressive force from both employers’ 
organisations and trade unions declined either national or international coordinating 
framework and proclaimed to uphold the constitutional status of free collective 
bargaining.  Nonetheless, from the Conservative-led Mond-Turner talks to Labour’s 
gradualism, the revival form of progressive policy was oriented to co-operation based on 
industrial rationalisation, by which industrial peace was secured by an increase in 
industrial efficiency in expectation of reduction in unemployment. Since the Trade 
Disputes Act of 1906, the British government had not embraced industrial relations and 
avoided ostensibly engagement in class interests in politics, but free collective bargaining 
no longer played the autonomous role in the voluntary framework, but a conciliatory role 
in organised entity of production embedded in the quasi-corporate framework.   
This thesis has examined how contemporary intellectuals saw the voluntary operation of 
collective bargaining and their anxieties over and reactions to the growth of its principle. 
When it endorsed free trade in labour in the 1860s, the discourse of political economy 
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endowed trade unions with theoretical backing that they were not in restraint of trade. In 
the nineteenth century, its discourse always championed the cause of free trade. However, 
in the backdrop of the legal acknowledgement of trade unionism, the optimistic and 
universal language of free trade was counterpoised by the heterodox discourse of political 
economy placed by the Millian circle. The latter regarded the civic virtue of associational 
efforts as the means to save people’s religion of humanity and injected republican 
egalitarianism into the market principle, in which the heterodoxy placed a stronger 
emphasis on de-centred growths of co-operation between capital and labour as leading to 
cultivation of the public spirit than economic concerns.614 Therefore, when the radical 
movement secured equality before the law of trade unions, Mundella’s boards of 
conciliation and arbitration in his hosiery trade were so impactful that officials 
acknowledged the voluntary action of trade unions. The discourse of political economy 
enabled trade unions as economic organisation of labour to reconcile market economy 
with the public interest, since the voluntary collective bargaining disseminated self-less 
virtues of reciprocal acts by determining rights and duties between capital and labour.  
The liberal relationship between the state and market economy had been predicated on  
Britain’s distinct development of political identity of consumers in free trade economy. 
Their strong presence buttressed the legitimacy of voluntary collective bargaining. As the 
third economic force, the public voice of consumers was deemed to seal the gap between 
officialdom and market economy. The positivist concept of public opinion was, thus, 
expected by intellectuals to play an adjudicating role of industrial mediator in the process 
of collective bargaining and have an effect of moralising the market in the neutral 
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institutions. 615  In combination with the radical discourse of political economy, this 
consumerist politics of public opinion formed a bilateral proposition in granting credence 
to the minority report of the Trade Union Act of 1871. Contemporaries including trade 
unionists and Christian preachers shared a strong sentiment that co-operation was 
achieved by market equilibrium between capital, labour and consumers and shaped the 
idea of moral economy, in which the tripartite ideological stronghold enforced the rule of 
law upon the free operation of collective bargaining not to maximize the interest of 
individuals, but that of the public.   
This mid-Victorian concept of co-operation between capital, labour and consumers in the 
voluntary collective bargaining was gradually depreciated, as its rule of law in voluntary 
market culture lost consensus over securing the public good in confrontation with the 
growth of Britain’s corporate capacity and its pursuit of the national interest. 
Contemporary liberals like Crompton saw this process with grave concerns and expressed 
their fear against the economic situation, in which moral economy was increasingly 
overshadowed by the economic law of overproduction. This shift encouraged the growth 
of deductive approach to market economy, which was inclined to endorse practice of 
maximising individual interests. Such rhetoric of growth-oriented production was 
adopted even by trade unionists, for whom the conventional policy of trade unions was 
so irrational as to halt operation of market economy and limit opportunities for expansion 
of production. For upholders of the classical orthodoxy, trade unions were granted 
associational privilege by evading the corporate status and their rights to strike were an 
industrial weapon for achieving their ‘class’ interest.616 From this viewpoint, the trade 
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union programme – limitation of apprenticeship and overproduction – was equivalent to 
imposition of collective tyranny upon individuals. Hence, there was a growing demand 
that it was more important for trade unions to develop the idea of co-operative production, 
in which labour could learn how to accumulate capital and increase material welfare for 
a large number of working people. Jevons, a leading political economist of the marginal 
revolution, insisted that co-operative production grounded on incorporated limited 
liability was a rational way to avoid industrial unrest, which was deleterious to national 
economy and to achieving the common good. The growth of deductive economics shared 
its cause of growth-oriented national economy for the individual interest with the 
discourse of co-operative production.  
The positivist concept of public opinion had holistic and organic characteristics. When 
embracing the federative and national framework of collective bargaining, it gradually 
lost its efficacy and legitimacy to reconcile market economy with the public interest. 
Organised bodies of employers and employed collided with each other for their sectional 
interests and their representativeness tended to overlook the interest of either local bodies 
or rank-and-files. In consideration of this institutional lapse of the voluntary solution of 
collective bargaining, the liberal intellectuals took differential discourses in order to 
reconcile the operation of collective bargaining with the public interest. In contrast to 
neo-classicism, which, like Marshall, expanded utility of consumers as an ultimate 
determinator in the market principle, this thesis has revealed that historical economists 
like Cunningham, Price, Foxwell and Ashley aimed at tackling the problem of trust in 
society. Their reformist tradition sought to reconstruct trust among producers by 
revamping and reimplementing economic organisation of labour in the corporate 
framework. In their discourse, public opinion was not invoked in individualistic and 
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voluntarist latitude, but as collective force, which called for producers’ collective action 
by appraising their role of custom. Rather than enthroning the consumers as the public 
authority, their visions of public opinion suggested a pluralist way of solution. In 
reconciliation between market economy and the public interest, their concepts of 
economic organisation of labour endowed the working classes with their autonomy to 
identify with the interest of consumers. To this end, historical economists emphasised the 
importance of economic coordination under the neo-mercantilist economy based upon 
protectionism.  
Rather than tailoring the voluntary framework of collective bargaining to meet the interest 
of consumers, historical economists’ advocacy of economic organisation of labour was 
projected to achieve economic coordination between production and consumption at a 
corporate level. Maitland pointed out that the problem of trust arose, when the common 
law tradition endorsed the principle of general limited liability, since the latter did not 
dovetail with the individualist and voluntarist tradition of official endowment of trust with 
unlimited liability. Free competition of economic corporations under the principle of 
limited liability emasculated the voluntary procedure of collective bargaining to secure 
freedom of contract, which the trade union charters of the 1870s premised. Rather, the 
voluntary practice was subjugated to pressure from corporate interests, whose order of 
priority given to national economy divested autonomy of trade unions and favoured the 
incorporated status of labour. While the Trade Disputes Act of 1906 ruled out corporate 
responsibility of trade unions, they could not retrieve the customary practice safeguarding 
the public interest, since there was no basis of trust between officialdom and the working 
class radicalism. In this circumstance, Cunningham considered that the problem of trust 
was that of religion, which took a form of absence of the public spirit – lack of personal 
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attitude towards social duty. The laissez-faire economy deprived industries of producers’ 
customary practices, which played a vital role for finding the common interest by 
economic coordination. At this stage of the economic development, Cunningham insisted 
state intervention as the means to rebuild trust in society. However, what determined 
direction of national policy was not the abstract and deductive principle of modern 
economics, but public opinion moulded by the civic voice.  
While Cunningham developed his national policy to restore trust in society, other 
historical economists advocated more rational visions to secure the public interest. Price 
adhered to market economy rather than economic coordination by corporate bodies. 
Posing a doubt about the legitimacy of free trade after Lloyd George’s expansive fiscal 
policy, Price expected public opinion to advance corporate action of producers to 
determine the national interest, whose importance was disparaged by free traders. He 
believed that producers’ competition in corporate economy would eliminate wastes of 
imperfect competition developed under Lloyd George’s free trade policy and serve the 
public interest. In contrast, Foxwell counted on efficacy of corporate governance, in 
which public opinion represented the common interest, since it was important to cushion 
harshness of economic competition and to protect custom of workers. However, his 
lingering faith in market rationality did not suggest state intervention by the central 
authority, but decentred autonomous function of municipal or economic corporations, 
whose public control was projected to prevent corruption and impose practical and 
efficient regulations. Both Price and Foxwell insisted formation of collectivist 
organisations as the means to reconcile the interest of producers with that of consumers. 
Ashley was not exceptional. He also considered to be vital for regulation of production 
both corporate organisations embedded in-between the state and individuals and publicity 
281 
 
of their managing accounts, by which capital could meet demands of labour for the 
interest of communities. In face of the great industrial unrest before the war, Ashley 
drafted a report of the USRC, which aimed to protect the interest of labour by fostering 
their common interest with capital, on which public opinion could put pressure. Against 
free trade, in which cheap labour and production were always source of trouble in market 
economy, he defined that it was a role of the state to seek industrial peace by developing 
public opinion and economic organisation of labour. 
The New Liberal government took an organicist approach to industrial relations, which 
was called by Howell to be the collective laissez-faire system. 617  The government 
increased its mediating role in industrial disputes. Since public opinion was considered 
to be embodied by the morality of politics, the Board of Trade intervened and helped their 
settlements by assisting industrial relations not only to set up the scheme of collective 
bargaining and to define the wage floor, which was sanctioned by the Trade Boards Act 
of 1909. In adherence to free trade, it aimed to rationalise the labour market. By forming 
a nation-wide framework of labour exchanges, New Liberals encouraged effective 
operation of market economy. The introduction of national insurance was also aimed at 
rationalising and compensating failure of the labour market. When Beveridge made a 
proposal of labour exchanges, he believed that it was more efficient than relief works to 
form the state institutions, which could organise fluidity of the labour market, giving 
labour mobility and adjustability to meet supply and demand. He did not just attempt to 
materialize the theoretical assumption of classical political economy, but, taking account 
of problems caused in practice such as ignorance, poverty and custom, to exercise central 
 
617 Howell, Trade Unions and the State. 
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control over demands for labour as the means to ease conflicts of market competition. 
Radicals like the Webbs made a counterargument against the organicist system of the 
collective laissez-faire because of its disruption of freedom of contract, which the 
voluntary system had guaranteed. It made an uncoverable gap between union and non-
union workers, since producers were always exposed to severe competition under free 
trade and only those in well-organised unions could reap rewards of production. The 
policy of statutory minimum wage was their alternative measure to grant citizenship to 
producers.  
Britain’s war-time experience was a turning-point, at which the organicist approach to 
market economy was shifted from consumerist to productivist frame of mind. The 
Munitions of War Act restricted the procedure of collective bargaining and introduced 
the compulsory arbitration system in case of strikes and lock-outs. The working class 
progressives saw party politics as the means to protect voluntary solution and became a 
strong negotiator with the state on working conditions. The coalition government took a 
pro-labour policies to cope with exigency of war-time production. Clay saw such 
experience as critical to the liberal framework of collective bargaining. It was no longer 
possible to seek effective price and adjustment to new conditions by the conventional 
practice of collective bargaining, since bases of pre-war customary practice collapsed 
after the war-time increase in prices and inequality between industries. Bureaucratisation 
of the procedure of collective bargaining led to the situation, in which negotiating strength 
of organisations was vital for determination of wage rates. Hence, Clay argued that the 
government became more and more responsible for intervention in industrial relations 
and that there was a change in nature of public opinion, which began to see and command 
the state to keep industrial peace. He insisted that for reimbuing democratic society with 
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egalitarian sentiment, private enterprise was more suitable than concentrating power to 
the public authority. However, in the post-war world, it was unreal to separate the 
economic from political sphere.  
Upset by the national strike of 1926, party politics promoted the progressive co-operation 
for industrial peace.  Both Conservative and Labour party saw reorganisation of industries, 
based on industrial rationalisation, as inevitable for social reform. In this sense, the 
constitutional status of free collective bargaining did not mean the return to co-operative 
relationship between capital and labour in view of the voluntary market practice. The 
Labour party was the last bastion of free trade, but, rather, it reinforced the central control 
in adjustment between production and consumption. Hobson believed that the progressive 
alliance was indispensable for unifying people against privileged classes. To achieve this, 
he considered that the problem of underconsumption rooted in free competition by large 
corporate bodies had to be tackled by the central authority to distribute wealth for the sake 
of communal interests. Under the public control, either individual or collective liberty 
was subjected to general expediency of ‘society’. After the war Hobson moulded his 
vision of progressivism into the productivist discipline of orthodox economics, in which 
he admitted benefits of international and imperial trade, as increase in world consumption 
was linked with improvement in production. In this principle, the unilateral framework 
of collective bargaining was no longer effective, because what was in need to make 
adjustment between production and consumption was the wholesale paradigm to control 
conditions of industries by distribution of surplus wealth. At this juncture, the mid-
Victorian practice of collective bargaining in the voluntary framework was wholly 
displaced in the intellectual discourse as the means to identify the interest of producers 
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